Authored By : Lancelot Sanderson, J.G. Wooddroffe, AsutoshMookerjee, Charles William Chitty, Lancelot Sanderson

Lancelot Sanderson, C.J.

1. In this matter the Rule was issued by me as Chief Justiceof this Court after consultation with the learned Judges in consequence of twoarticles which appeared in the "Amrita Bazar Patrika" newspaper onthe 18th and 2.2nd of May 1917, respectively. The Eule was directed to TaritKanti Biswas, the printer and publisher of the newspaper, and to Moti LalGhose, Golap Lal Ghose and Pijush Kanti Ghose, Directors, and Golap Lal Ghoseand Mrinal Kanti Ghose, the Managers of the Company called the "AmritaBazar Patrika Ltd.,"having its registered office at No. 2 AnandoChatterjees Lane, Calcutta, and the Rule called upon them to show cause whythey should not be committed or otherwise dealt with according to law forcontempt of Court alleged to have been committed by them by unlawfully publishingthe two articles concerning the High Court and the Chief Justice in hisadministration thereof.

2. The respondents to the Rule have all appeared by learnedCounsel.

3. The first question which it is necessary to consider iswhether these articles or either of them constitute a contempt of Court. Theappeals from Mr. Justice Greaves, to wbioh both the articles refer, are theappeals in the three cases mentioned at the head of the Rule. These cases weredecided by Greaves, J., sitting on the original side, and the appeals in whichthe Improvement Trust were respondents were about to be heard by the Courthearing appeals from the original side at the time of the publication of thetwo articles in May 1917.

4. The first article is as follows: There is a mischievousrumour afloat which should he contradicted. It is stated that a vigorousattempt is being made to get up a Bench to consider the appeal on the judgmentof Mr. Justice Greaves in connection with the acquisition of surplus land bythe Calcutta Improvement Trust according to somebodys choice. We do notbelieve that it is possible for any one, far less the Chairman of the Trust, tosecure a Bench after his own heart as a counterpoise to the Mooker.jee andCuming Bench. We are sure the interest of every rate-payer is safe in the handsof the Honble Judges, and we do not think that any official of the Trust cango so far."

5. The reference to the "Mookerjee and CumingBench" is to an appeal which was disposed of by Mookerjee, J., and Mr.Cuming when he was temporarily acting as a Judge of the High Court in August1916, when the decision was against the Improvement Trust.

6. The second article is as follows: Something likeconsternation prevails on account of the proposed new constitution of the appellateBench of the Calcutta High Court before which appeals against the awards of theImprovement Trust are to be heard. It is known to the reader how this Bench wasoriginally composed of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee and the Honble Mr. JusticeCuming, and how latterly it has come to be presided over by the Honble theChief Justice and Mr. Justioe Woodroffe. Rumour has it that for purposes ofhearing Improvement Trust Appeals the Bench is going to be strengthened by theappointment of Mr. Justice Chitty. Now what neither the public nor ourselvescan understand is this special arrangement for such a Special Bench. If it iscontended that two Honble Judges of the highest Court in the land are notcompetent to decide in appeal cases in which the Improvement Trust isconcerned, a contention, however, which we do not believe the Chief Justioewill care to advance, why should there be a Special Bench of three and not aFull Bench of five, on which at least two Indian Judges could find seats As amatter of fact, as landowners in Calcutta are mostly Indians and as IndianJudges are likely to know more of conditions, practices, etc., prevailing here,it is but meet that the Appellate Bench in the present circumstances should beso composed as to associate Indian Judges with their European colleagues. Thewithdrawal of Sir Asutosh has given rise to rather unsavoury impressions in thepublic mind, since this proposed arrangement is to follow close upon the heelsof his judgment in the case of The Improvement Trust v. Chandra Kanta Ghosh 35Ind. Cas. 749 : 24 C.L.J. 246 : 44 C. 219pc : 2 C.W.N. 8. Be that as it may, wehave perfect faith in the present Chief Justice and believe that as soon as SirLancelot Sanderson understands the public feeling in the matter, his Lordship willeither form a Full Bench or at least associate an experienced Indian Judge withhimself for the hearing of the Improvement Trust appeals."

7. It was admitted by the learned Counsel for therespondents at the hearing of the Rule that the statements of facts containedin this article were in many material respects untrue. There was not anAppellate Bench constituted to hear appeals against the awards of theImprovement Trust" as the article assumes. Such Bench was not originallycomposed of Sir A. Mookerjee and Mr. Justice Cuming as stated in the article:such Bench had not latterly come to be presided over by the Chief Justioe andWoodroffe, J., and it is untrue that Sir A. Mookerjee had been withdrawn fromthe Court.

8. Though these admissions have been made, it may beadvisable to state the real facts.

9. In August 1916, as already stated, Mookerjee, J., and Mr.Cuming were sitting as a Division Bench on the Appellate Side and an appeal bythe Improvement Trust from the Sub-Judge of the 24-Perganas, having come beforethem in the ordinary course, was disposed of by them. One of the questions wasthe alleged power of the Improvement Trust to acquire land compulsorily for thepurpose of recoupment and the decision, was against the Improvement Trust.

10. In July 1916, Greaves, J., sitting on the original side,had decided the same question in three cases in favour of the ImprovementTrust, and in May of this year the appeals from Greaves, J.s judgment in thethree cases were about to be heard by Woodroffe, J., and myself, the Judges whowere then taking the appeals from the original side. Under these circumstancesthe articles were published.

11. As regards the inclusion of Chitty, J., in the Court, noexplanation is necessary: it would be sufficient for me to state that I, asChief Justice, thought it desirable to have three Judges to bear the appeal.But the reason in this case must have been obvious to every one. It was withinmy knowledge, as it was within every ones knowledge, that Mookerjee, J., haddecided one way and Greaves, J., had decided another way on the construction ofthe "Act on which the cases depended. It was obviously, therefore, amatter on which difference of opinion was possible; moreover it was a case ofgeneral importance and in order to avoid a further disagreement which mightoccur if the Court was constituted of two Judges only, and to avoid the furtherproceedings and delay which would undoubtedly be consequent on such adisagreement, I thought it advisable to have three Judges instead of two, andaccordingly I requested Chitty, J., the next Judge in order of seniority whohad not already had the matter before him, to sit with Woodroffe, J., andmyself, and hear the appeals. I may mention here that in my opinion all appealsfrom a Judge sitting on the original side, except interlocutory appeals, shouldbe heard by a Court constituted by three Judges, and when I first sat in thisCourt it was so constituted; but I found that the allocation of three Judges tothat Court dislocated the work in other departments of the Court so much that Icame to the conclusion with much reluctance that with our present staff ofJudges I could not allocate more than two Judges to the original side appeals,except in special cases.

12. These being the facts, I now proceed to consider whetherthe articles are a contempt of Court.

13. I take the definition given by Lord Russell of Killowenin Reg. v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 : 69 L.J.Q.B. 502; L.T. 534 : 48 W.R. 474 : 64J.P. 484 : 16 T.L.R. 305.

Any act done or writing published calculated to bring aCourt or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is acontempt of Court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done orwriting published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course ofjustice, or the lawful process of the Courts, is contempt of Court. The formerclass belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicke, L.C., characterised asscandalising a Court or a Judge. That description of that class of contempt isto be taken subject to one and an important qualification. Judges and Courtsare alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation isoffered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, noCourt could or would treat that as contempt of Court. The law ought not to beastute in such cases to criticise adversely what under such circumstances andwith such an object is published; but it is to be remembered that in thismatter the liberty of the press is no greater and "no less than theliberty of every subject of the Queen.

14. With regard to the first article I have no doubt itconstitutes a contempt of Court. It was admitted by the learned Counselappearing for the printer and publisher that it was a gross libel upon the ImprovementTrust, one of the litigants. It alleges that it is stated that a vigorousattempt is being made to get up a Bench to consider the appeal on the judgmentof Greaves, J., in connection with the acquisition of surplus land by theCalcutta Improvement Trust according to somebodys choice, which Bench isreferred to thereinafter "as a counterpoise to the Mookerjee and CumingBench," which, as I have stated, had decided against the ImprovementTrust. It was urged that this should not be regarded as a contempt, because thematter which would be argued on the appeals was the construction of an Act, andwould be decided by Judges who would not be affected by such remarks.

15. The question is not whether the article in factobstructed or interfered with the due course of justice, but whether it is"calculated" to obstruct and interflre with the due course ofjustice. No matter what the tribunal may be, I am at a loss to understand howit can be seriously argued that such a grave allegation against one of thelitigants that he was attempting to get a Bench constituted in such a way aswould in his opinion give him a favourable decision, is not calculated toobstruct or interfere with the course of justice. Further, the mere suggestionthat such a thing is within the bounds of possibility is a grave reflectionupon the Court and the persona responsible for its administration. I am notunmindful of the argument that the article refers to a "mischievous rumourwhich should be contradicted" and that confidence is alleged in theHonble Judges. The fact that the article is based on a rumour, even if itexisted, cannot, in my judgment, excuse the publication of it. It must havebeen known to the person responsible for the publication that it was absolutelyimpossible for a litigant to get a Bench constituted according to his ownchoice. It is, however, a well-known method of spreading a libel for thepublisher, who does not wish to take responsibility for it, to say there is arumour to this or that effect, but that he himself does not believe it. It wasadmitted by one of the learned Counsel for the respondents that some words mayhave been inserted in the article by the person responsible therefore in orderto protect himself in case of emergency, and having regard to the whole tenorof the article, I have very little doubt that this was the object of the writerin concluding in the manner referred to. If the matter had stopped there,although the paragraph was reprehensible and a clear contempt of Court, itmight not have been necessary for the Court to take any steps of its ownmotion.

16. The second article, however, appeared four days later onthe 22nd May. As already mentioned the facts therein stated are admittedlyuntrue; and consequently the insinuations based thereon are equally groundless.The only part of the article which is based on an alleged remour is thatChitty, J., was to be appointed to the Bench, which was to hear the ImprovementTrust Appeals. For the rest of the statements in the article the author makeshimself responsible.

17. The statement that "something like consternationprevails on account of the proposed new constitution of the AppellateBench" taken by itself is a grave allegation. Why should a Bench which isto be composed of the Chief Justice and two of the most experienced Judges ofthe Court cause consternation But when it is taken with what follows itassumes a much more serious complexion. After misstating the facts as to theprevious constitution of the Bench and referring to the proposed inclusion ofChitty, J., it proceeds "now what neither the public nor ourselves canunderstand is this special reason for such a Special Bench." It thenproceeds to argue that the proper thing would have been to have a Full Bench onwhich at least two Indian Judges could have seats. Beading so far, there may besome reason for doubt as to the meaning of the article, though the aboveallegations go the length of alleging that for some reason which no one couldunderstand, the Chief Justice was about to include Chitty, J., in the Bench,and that such constitution of the Bench had caused something likeconsternation. But I think all doubt is set at rest by what follows when theauthor makes himself responsible for the statement that Mookerjee, J., has beenwithdrawn from the Bench and that such withdrawal has given rise to ratherunsavoury impressions in the public mind, since this proposed arrangement is tofollow close upon the heels of his judgment in the case of the CalcuttaImprovement Trust v. Chandra Kanti Ghosh 35 Ind. Cas. 749 [LQ/MadHC/1916/177] : 24 C.L.J. 246 : 44C. 219pc : 2 C.W.N. 8.." Reading that in the ordinary way, can it meananything except that Mookerjee, J., has been withdrawn from the Bench, takingthe appeals against the awards of the Improvement Trust: that suoh Bench wasoriginally composed of Mookerjee, J., and Cuming, J., that it is now composedof the Chief Justice and Woodroffe, J., that Chitty, J., is about to beincluded which is a special arrangement which neither the author of the articlenor the public can understand, that if any special arrangement is necessary whyshould not Indian Judges be included and that the withdrawal of Mookerjee, J.,coming as it does so soon after his judgment against the Improvement Trust, hascaused an unsajpoury impression in the public mind. Consequently, somethinglike consternation prevails at the proposed new constitution of the Bench.

18. I think it is clear that it means that Mookerjee, J.,has been withdrawn from the Bench taking the appeals against the award of theImprovement Trust and insinuates that it is because of his judgment against theTrust, and, therefore, an unsavoury impression has arisen. I fail to see anyother meaning which can be attributed to it, and I have no doubt that this article,read by itself constitutes a very serious reflection upon the administration ofthe Court, which everyone knows is in the hands of the Chief Justice. But if itis read in conjunction with the previous article, the above-mentioned meaningis made plain beyond dispute. I think the articles should be read together.They were published with only four days interval, they refer to the samesubject-matter, they are written in the same strain and in the same style, andeach article appeared in the colums of the newspaper which are devoted toleading articles. When read together what do they mean It is obvious to mymind they mean to suggest that a vigorous attempt had been made by theImprovement Trust to secure a Bench composed according to their choice and thatthe attempt has succeeded; that otherwise the proposed constitution of theBench is inexplicable and something like consternation prevails. If this be thecorrect meaning, there is no doubt that it is calculated to bring the Court andthe Chief Justice, who is responsible for its administration, into contempt andit is calculated not only to destroy confidence in the tribunal but also toundermine and impair the authority of the Court. If so, there is no doubt thatit is a contempt of this Court.

19. There are two other matters to which I wish to refer. Itwas argued that the object of the second article was to procure the appointmentof two Indian Judges or one Indian Judge to the Bench which was to hear theappeals, and the suggestion contained in the article was that as theland-owners in Calcutta were mostly Indians, and Indian Judges are likely toknow more of conditions and practices prevailing, that it was but meet thatIndian Judges should be associated with their European colleagues. The questionat issue in the appeals depended on the construction of the sections of acertain Act, and had nothing to do with the conditions and practices, etc.,relating to Indians. This, however, might be put down to ignorance on the partof the author of the article, though from the references made in the article tosuch matters as the constitution of the Courts, Full Bench and other matters,the writer appears to be fairly familiar with the proceedings of the Court andthe nature of the appeals in question. A further argument, however, was adducedby the learned Counsel for Moti Lal Ghose, vie., that the real object of thearticle was to get an Indian Judge, who possessed land, appointed to the Benchin question, because Indian Judges would approach the subject from a totallydifferent point of view from that of European Judges, who do not possess landand who do not know where the shoe pinches. This to my mind was an astonishingargument. I was not surprised, therefore, when Mr. C.R. Das, appearing foranother of the respondents at a later stage of the hearing, disassociatedhimself from that argument and stated that in his opinion the above-mentionedargument would be the strongest ground for suggesting that Indian Judges shouldnot be on the Bench in question. Assuming, however, that the learned Counselfor Moti Lal Ghose was correct in his statement as to the meaning and object ofthe article, it is not only one which would be rightly and strongly resented bymy Indian colleagues but it also provides an additional reason for holding thearticle a contempt of Court: for it involves the suggestion that one of myIndian colleagues should be added to the Bench in question because he possessedland and would approach the question from a different point of view from a Judgewho possessed no land and who would, therefore, be entirely independent and itthereby constitutes a very grave and unjustifiable reflection on my Indiancolleagues.

20. It is also to be noted that if this was the object, theauthor of the articles was endeavouring to obtain the constitution of a Benchafter his own heart, the very thing which he had professed to condemn sostrongly when attempted, as alleged, by the Improvement Trust. Assuming,however, that the object of the article was to get an Indian Judge appointed,no matter for what reason, that does not justify the publieation of the untruestatements of facts and the unworthy and groundless insinuations based thereon.

21. The other matter to which I refer is the passage at theend of the article in which the author expresses perfect faith in the ChiefJustice. This, to my mind, is so inconsistent with the insinuations previouslymade in the articles, that it is impossible to conceive that it was genuinelyintended. It is much in the same style as the conclusion of the previousarticle, and I do not think there can be any doubt as to the object of theauthor in using these words, viz., to try and provide a means of escape forhimself if he is taken to task for the pre-vious matter contained in hisarticle.

22. No one has come forward to acknowledge the authorship ofthe articles or the responsibility of the publication, and we have, therefore,had no opportunity of hearing or considering any explanation from theindividual, in person, who was so responsible. Consequently the meaning and theintention of the writer must be gathered from the articles themselves. Theymast be read as they stand, giving to the words used their natural meaning. Wehave had many arguments and many commentaries upon the articles addressed to usby all the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents. I have considered themcarefully and though I should like to have come to the conclusion that thearticles do not and were not intended to constitute an attack on the Court, Iregret to say I am unabla to come to that conclusion. It might possibly havebeen different if the author of the article or the person responsible for itspublication had come forward and personally explained what was in his mind; buthe has not chosen so to do, and we mast construe the articles as they stand,and I have no doubt that any one reading them would come to the conclusion thata very serious aspersion waa cast upon the Coarfc and the administrationthereof, and that consequently they do constitute a contempt.

23. If then the articles constitute a contempt the nextquestion is, whether the Court has jurisdiction to deal with it by theseproceedings. There can be no doubt as to this: it was held in 1883 in SurendraNath Banerjee v. Chief Justice of Bengal 10 C. 109 : 10 I. A, 171 : 4 S P.C.474 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 76 by the Judicial Committee that the High Courts inthe Indian Presidencies are Superior Courts of Record. The offence of contemptof Court and the powers of the High Court to punish it are the same in suchCourts as in the Superior Courts in England, and the jurisdiction was exercisedby the High Court in that case.

24. This jurisdiction was affirmed in 1913 in the case ofGovernor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] : 41 C. 173 at p. 176 : 18C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : 17 C.W.N. 1253, when Sir Lawrence Jenkins,C.J., said at page 215 Pages 41 G.--Ed: "Now this Court is a Court ofRecord in all its jnrisdictions, and it thus has power to commit for anycontempt in relation to any of those jurisdictions."

25. Then Mookerjee, J., at page 242 said: "Now, it isindisputable that a Court of Record has authority to punish for contempt. SirBarnes Peacock, C.J., observed in Abdool and Mahtab, In re 8 W.R. Cr. 32 thatthis Court by the express terms of the Letters Patent is a Court of Record andthere can be no doubt that eve) y Court of Record has the power of summarilypunishing for contempt", and indeed the learned Counsel appearing for theprinter and publisher of the newspaper admitted the jurisdiction of the Courtbut argued that in this case it should not be exercised. The suggestion thatthis jurisdiction is obsolete and ought not to be exercised is futile, in viewof the fact that it was exercised Joy this Court in 1883 and affirmed to be inexistence in 1913. It was also exercised in England as recently as 1900 in thecase of Reg, v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 at p. 40 : 69 L.J.Q.B. 502; L.T. 534 : 48W.R. 474 : 64 J.P. 484 : 16 T.L.R. 305. already referred to.

26. The question remains then whether the Rule should bemade absolute against the respondents or any of them.

27. As regards the case of Tarit Kanti Biswas, the firstrespondent on the record, there is evidence that he was the printer andpublisher of the newspaper. We have before us a certified copy of the returnmade by him under the Act (XXV of 1867), his name appears in the newspaper asprinter and publisher and he has himself put in an affidavit admitting that heoccupies such position and that he printed and published the articles inquestion.

28. As already stated, his learned Counsel admitted thejurisdiction of this Court and further admitted his legal responsibility if thearticles constituted a contempt. This responsibility could not be denied, forit has been held in many cases that the printer and publisher is liable forcontempt even though he was not aware of the subject constituting suchcontempt, and the reason for that is given by Lord Morris, in Mc. Lead v. St.Aubyn (1899) A.C. 549 : 68 L.J.P.C. 137 : 81 L.T. 158 : 48 W.R. 173 : 15 T.L.R.487 as follows: "A printer and publisher intends to publish and sointending cannot plead as a justification that he did not know thecontents." Againit was pointed out by Stirling, J., in American Exchangein Europe v. Gillig (1889) 58 L.J. Ch. 706 at p. 707 : 61 L, T. 502 that theforeman printer (who was the person concerned in that case) is the person whois held out to the public as the publisher, and under these circumstances he isanswerable for publishing the article complained of although he is ignorant ofits contents. This has been the law since the well-krown decision of LordHardwicke in the case of St. James Evening Post (1742) 2 Atk, 469 : 26 E.R.683.

29. I refer to the above-mentioned cases to show that in myjudgment the learned Counsel was correct in making the admission that thisCourt has jurisdiction in these proceedings, and that if the articlesconstitute a contempt of Court, the printer and publisher is legally liable inrespect thereof.

30. Having held that the articles are a contempt, it remainsto be considered whether the Rule should be made absolute. The printer andpublisher has put in an affidavit in which he alleges he did not read thearticles when they were handed to him for publication, which was done in theordinary course of his business. He admits that certain statements in thesecond article are incorrect, and he then proceeds to argue that thepublication was in the public interest. Paragraph 6 of his affidavit runs thus:

That I further state that the said articles were publishedby myself in good faith and in the public interest and without any intentionwhatsoever of offending against the dignity or integrity of this Honble Courtor of prejudicing the due course and administration of justice in the matter ofthe appeals referred to in the said articles.

31. 7. That long before the appeals referred to in the saidarticle came on to be heard by this Honble Court, it was well known among thepublic of Calcutta how the Calcutta Improvement Trust had objected to thehearing of the appeal in which the question of the powers of the CalcuttaImprovement Trust was involved by any of the Indian Judges of this HonbleCourt and how, as a matter of fact, they through their Counsel, Mr. LangfordJames, adopted the very unusual course of applying in open Court to the Honblethe Chief Justice that the appeal case of Trustees for the Improvement ofCalcutta v. Chandra Kanta Ghosh 35 Ind. Cas. 749 [LQ/MadHC/1916/177] : 24 C.L.J. 246 : 44 C. 219 :2 C.W.N. 8. should not be heard by the Honble Mr. Justice Mookerjee, and howafter the decision in the last mentioned case by the Honble Mr. JusticeMookerjee and the Honble Mr. Justice Cuming they had unsuccessfully applied tothe Government for legislation for the purpose of doing away with the effect ofthe said decision. In the circumstances recited the public were watching withdeep interest the action of the Honble the Chief Justice, in constituting theCourt which would hear the appeals from Mr. Justice Greaves decision.

32. 8. I further state that the said articles were publishedto give expression to public feeling in Calcutta and, as stated above, withoutthe remotest intention of scandalising this Honble Court or of reflecting onthe conduct of the Honble the Chief Justice or of any other Judges of thisHonble Court.

33. If it be true that the public were watohing with suchdeep interest the action of the Chief Justice in constituting the Court, itseems to me that fact enhances the serious nature of the publication of thearticles. For the public in the ordinary course might not trouble its headabout the constitution of the Court, and might not pay much attention to thearticles; but if, on the other hand, the public really was interested in thematter, it would pay attention to them, and it was all the more incumbent uponthe author and publisher to abstain from making false statements and groundlessinsinuations. I may have my doubts as to the deep interest" alleged in theaffidavit, but if it did exist, the seriousness of the publication is greatlyincreased.

34. The learned Counsel for the printer and publisher urgedthat his client would be sufficiently dealt with by the proceedings which hadbeen taken and that the Rule should not be made absolute against him. I takeinto consideration all the learned Counsel urged and I sympathise with hisargument that the editor if there be one, or the person responsible for thepublication, ought in common fairness to have come forward and borne the burdenin respect thereof; the fact that the printer and publisher does not disclosethe name of the person responsible for the publication is a factor to beconsidered when deciding how the printer and publisher should be dealt with. Inthis case, the printer and publisher has not disclosed the person responsiblefor the publication, whom of course he must know, though he may not know theactual writer of the articles. On the contrary he has attempted to justify thepublication by the paragraphs of his affidavit to which I have referred. It wassaid by Lord Hardwicke in the case already cited, "nothing is moreincumbent upon Courts of Justice than to preserve their proceedings from beingmisrepresented;" and the reason for this must be obvious to every one. My attentionhas been drawn on other occasions to articles criticising the High Court. Ihave found that many of them were unjustifiable, because they were based onstatements of facts which were incorrect: but the Court has not taken anynotice of them because they were not worth the time of the Court. But this is adifferent matter, the allegations contained in the articles exceed the boundsof any legitimate criticism and strike at the very root of the administrationof justice.

35. People who are familiar with the administration of theCourt would know how impossible the allegations were, but among people who arenot so familiar with the Courts administration, such articles as those inquestion with their groundless insinuations may be very mischievous andpernicious. They contain grave misrepresentations of the proceedings andadministration of this Court, and in my judgment we should be failing in ourduty if we did not take such steps as are within our power to counteract theeffect of them and to vindicate the Court and its authority.

36. In my judgment, therefore, the Rule should be madeabsolute against Tarit Kanti Biswas, the printer and publisher.

37. As regards the other four respondents, the evidencebefore us, apart from the question of its admissibility on the technicalgrounds which were put forward during the argument, raised a strong prima faciecase that they were responsible for the publication of the newspaper containingthe articles.

38. The "Amrita Bazar Patrika Co., Ltd.," wasincorporated in 1908, the original Directors being Sisir Kumar Ghose, Moti LalGhose and Golap Lal Ghose, for the purpose of acquiring and taking over as agoing concern the business of newspaper proprietors, printers and publishersthen carried on, and in connection therewith the entire rights including thegoodwill of the newspaper called the "Amrita Bazar Patrika," thenbeing published from "No. 2, Ananda Chatterjees Lane, in Calcutta and allor any of the assets and liabilities of the proprietors of the business inconnection therewith, and with a view thereto to enter into the agreementreferred to in Clause 3 of the Companys Articles of Association and to carrythe same into effect with or without modification, with the usual subsidiarypowers contained in the Memorandum of Association.

39. The Company gave the statutory notices that it intendedto carry on its business at No. 2, Ananda Chatterjees Lane, which was to bedeemed its registered office: that it possessed a printing press at 19 and 20,Bagbazar Street, which the Company purchased from Golap Lal Ghose, On the 5thMarch 1917, the respondents Moti Lal Ghose, Golap Lal Ghose and Pijush KantiGhose were the Directors. Golap Lal Ghose and Mrinal Kanti Ghose were theManagers, and it further appeared that Golap Lal Ghose apted as FinancialManager and Mrinal Kanti Ghose as Secretary. The address of all the four wasgiven No. 2, Ananda Chatter-jees Lane. The Articles of Association (which wereput in evidence by M. K, Ghose) provided that the business of the Companyshould be managed by the Directors, who might pay all expenses incurred ingetting up and registering the Company and might exercise all such powers asare not by the Indian Companies Act required to be exercised by the Company ingeneral meeting subject to the provisions of the Act and of the Articles, etc.

40. It was obviously a family business converted into aLimited Company. This is confirmed by the list of persons holding sharesexhibited in Mr. Hechles affidavit. The evidence shows that the Directors and,Managers were living at the premises which are the registered office of theCompany; that the newspaper was published at those premises; that it was theduty of the Directors to manage the business; there was no editor disclosed orany other person occupying a position similar to that of an editor who would beresponsible for the publication and the contents of the newspaper.

41. From these facts it would naturally be presumed thatthese respondents were actually engaged in the management of the newspaper andpersonally responsible for its publication. These Directors were occupyingpositions very different from those generally occupied by Directors ofCompanies, whose duties are restricted to attending periodical meetings anddirecting the policy of the Company.

42. Two of the respondents, Pijush Kanti Ghose and MrinalKanti Ghose, however, have put in affidavits and it appears therefrom thatMrinal Kanti Ghose was away from Calcutta on private business at the time whenboth the articles in question were published, and that Pijush Kanti Ghose wasaway on private business when the second article was published and under thesecircumstances I think that the prima facie case against them may be said tohave been met, and I do not think that either of them should be heldresponsible in these proceedings for the publication and that consequently theRule should be discharged as against them.

43. There are, therefore, two Directors left to manage thebusiness of this newspaper at the material times, viz., Mati Lal Ghose andGolap Lal Ghose. Golap Lal Ghose; in the evidence is described as Director andManager and also as Financial Manager. Mrinal Kanti Ghose has sworni that GolapLal Ghose has only, to do with receipts and disbursements of the Company andkeeps the accounts thereof.

44. Under these circumstances, I think the prima facie casemade against him may; be rebutted, and that he should not be; held responsiblein these proceedings for the publication of the articles, even though it is notalleged that he was not at the premises when the paper was published at thematerial times, and in my judgment the Rule should be discharged against him.

45. With regard to Moti Lal Ghose, the case is different: Ithink under the circumstances mentioned above, it may not unreasonably bepresumed that he was responsible for or privy to the publication. It was theDirectors duty to manage the business: such business was the publishing of thenewspaper: one of the three Directors was away from Calcutta another, it issworn, had only the financial matters to attend to; Moti Lal Ghose, therefore,is the only Director to whom the particular duty of editing and publishing thenewspaper can be ascribed. As already-mentioned, he, was not in the position ofan ordinary Director, who makes periodical visits to the Companys premises atstated and regular intervals. He was living on the premises where the paper waspublished and carrying on the family business which had been turned into aLimited Company.

46. There is no Editor disclosed, and even in the affidavitswhich have been put in by Pijush Kanti Ghose and Mrinal Kanti Ghose there is nospecific reference to any editor. There is a general statement only, e.g., theaffidavit by Pijush Kanti Ghose runs as follows : "Neither I nor my coDirectors exercise any control whatever over the contents of the Amrita BazarPatrika newspaper, but we perform duties and exercise such powers as are mentioned and defined in the Articles of As sociation of the LimitedCompany." This is not a convincing statement, It is to be noted that itdoes not go the length of saying that the Directors did not know of, or werenot privy to, the publication of the articles: if they did know of theinclusion of the articles and allowed the newspaper containing the articles tobe published, they would be responsible.

47. Further the main duty of the Directors mentioned anddefined in the Articles of the Company is to manage the business of theCompany, which business is the publication of the newspaper. Under suchcircumstances the natural presumption would be, I think, that Moti Lal Ghose,either was responsible for, or at all events, was privy to the publication ofthe articles. But it has always been held that the jurisdiction which the Courthas in respect of a contempt of Court should be exercised with great care andshould only be exercised when the case is beyond all reasonable doubt, and thisshould especially be the case when the proceedings are at the instance of theCourt itself. Moti Lal Ghose has made no affidavit nor has he offered anyexplanation of his position in connection with the newspaper at No. 2, AnandaChatterjees Lane, and if the above-mentioned presumption of responsibilitywere drawn against him, I do not think he could complain. But I think it isjust possible that he may not have been responsible for or privy to thepublication of the article. Although no reference is made to the existence ofan editor, or some person in the position of an editor, it is still possiblethat there may be one who is not before the Court. For there is the generalstatement by Pijus Kanti Ghose and Mrinal Kanti Ghose made on oath that theDirectors do not exercise control over the contents of the newspaper. Thoughthis general statement be unsatisfactory, it cannot be wholly disregarded andit may be that the general control as to the contents of the newspaper may bevested in the hands of some person who occupies the position of an editor andwho, for reasons known only to the respondents, has not been disclosed, andthat consequently these articles may have been inserted without theresponsibility or knowledge of Moti Lal Ghose. It is not likely that this wasso, but still it is just possible and having regard to the principle that inproceedings of this nature we should be scrupulously careful to see that thecase is clear beyond all reasonable doubt, I think Moti Lal Ghose should begiven the benefit of that doubt and that the Rule should not be made absoluteagainst him.

48. In view of the attitude taken up by the respondentDirectors, we considered whether a Rule should not be issued against theCompany itself with respect to which the considerations which affect thepositions of the Directors would not arise: but in view of the fact that the objectof the proceedings, viz., the vindication of the Court and its authority, hadbeen obtained by the proceedings already instituted, we came to the conclusionthat it was not necessary to take up the time of the Court by adding theCompany, which would necessitate a further hearing.

49. Before leaving the case of the Directors, I desire torefer to the attitude adopted by them. If the articles were innocentlyintended, the natural thing would have been for the person responsible forthem, or for their publication, to come forward and declare his intention: onthe other hand, even if they were not innocently intended, one would haveexpected the person really responsible for their publication to come forwardand take the responsibility on his own shoulders as was done in the case of twowell-known newspapers in Calcutta on previous occasions. They have chosen notto do so but to leave the printer and publisher to bear the brunt of thematter.

50. It is further to be noted that, although it was evidentthat the Court, by issuing the Rule, regarded this as a matter refecting uponthe Court, although it has been admitted that the second article containedstatements of fact which were entirely untrue, and consequently that theinsinuations based thereon were groundless, although two of the respondentslearned Counsel admitted that the article, to say the least of it, was a pieceof great impertinence, not one word of apology has fallen from the Directors ofthe Company.

51. As regards the many technical points raised by learnedCounsel as to the admission of the evidence, I do not think it is necessary forme to discuss them: none of them affect the case of the printer and publisher.I would only say that I have had the opportunity of reading Woodroffe, J.s judgment,and I agree with him that most of them were trivial and unsubstantial. TheCourt was occupied over these proceedings for two and a half days: some part ofthe time no doubt was taken up by the discussion of the meaning of thearticles, but the greater part was devoted to technical objections relating tothe evidence and to the question as to who was really responsible for thepublication. This fact shows how essential it is that the Legislature shouldprovide for the registration of the editor or the person really responsible forthe contents of a newspaper, so that the responsibility might be placed in theproper quarter without any difficulty or delay.

52. For the above-mentioned reasons, in my judgment, theRule should be made absolute against Tarit Kanti Biswas, the Printer andPublisher, and it should be discharged as against the other respondents.

53. J.G. Wooddroffe, J.--The arguments before us (other thanthose of Mr. Norton for the printer) would suggest that the parties regardedthis Rule as an opportunity for a legal tamasha, to use an expressive if notjudicial term, rather than as a proceeding taken in the public interest toascertain the true facts. Divorced from the lengthy and unnecessary discussionsbefore us and freed of obstructive tactics the matter is really quite a simpleone and might have been decided with but little delay. In that case too ourjudgments might have been short but the exuberant argument calls for someanswer.

54. The parties before us are the directors, managers, andsecretary of the Amrita Bauar Patrika, Ltd.," a small Company, seemingly afamily business, which owns and runs a Calcutta newspaper called the AmritaBazar Patrika. With them is joined their printer. Ordinarily of course anewspaper has an editor but this Company or some of its members have been verysecretive on the question whether there is an editor and if so, who he is. Thisis not the first time that the editor, if there be one, has been kept in thebackground. Perhaps it was considered that such secrecy was a convenient policyin defence of proceedings against the paper. Whatever be the object thesepersons have so far successfully concealed the fact and name of their editor.In the present proceedings it was not unreasonable for the Court to think thata summons to the directors, managers and secretary was sufficient withoutnotice on the company and that the officers of the company would disclose theactual facts. What actually occurred at the trial has shown that no assistancecan be expected from the companys officers and on a future occasion it will benecessary to consider whether the Court should not proceed against the companyand its property. Such difficulties as we have experienced would be remediedwere a law enacted compelling the registration of the names of editors just asthe English Newspaper and Registration Act, 1881, (44 and 45 Vic. c. 6) compelsthe registration of the names of the proprietors. As the Court was not inpossession of evidence whether there was an editor or who he was, proceedingswere instituted against those persons who are empowered to manage the businessof the company and against its printer.

55. On the 18th and 22 May last two articles appeared inthis newspaper which seemed to the Chief Justice in consultation with theJudges of the Court to be a contempt. The writer circulates what he calls"mischievous rumours" and "unsavoury impressions" and makesstatements which suggest that a litigant before the Court, namely, the CalcuttaImprovement Trust, had been successfully intriguing to get a Bench of itschoice to hear an appeal from the decision of Greaves, J. As such an intriguecould not succeed without the connivance of the Court, such a statement wasscandalising the Court as it is technically called. Nextly, as the allegationof such an intrigue touches the party said to be carrying on this intrigue thetendency of suoh writing is to prejudice that party. Thirdly, the articles arecalculated to interfere with the administration of justice, for the writer seeksto do, though in his own way, what he complains of in the case of the litigantTrust, namely, to influence the Chief Justice to form a Bench to hear theappeal in question, the Bench to be of such composition as the writer approved.As it seemed to the Court that prima facie a contempt had been committed,aRule was served upon the persons mentioned to show cause: that is, they weregiven the opportunity of showing that the articles were not contemptuous, andif they were, that they were not responsible for them.

56. The parties whom we called for, have come before us.Leaving aside the printer, their substantial contention (to be extracted fromthe general mass of objections and arguments) is that the business in whichthey are each engaged has nothing to do with the control of the contents of thepaper; that is, their work is not of an editorial character. One of them swearsthat he was out of Calcutta when both the articles were published and anotherthat he was away from Calcutta when the second and chief article appeared, Theprinter says that he has no control of the contents of the paper and that heprinted what was given him without first reading it. Two parties, Moti LalGhose and Golap Lal Ghose, have filed no answer at all. All parties have refusedto state whether there is an editor, but they all contend that we are quitemistaken in supposing that the articles are a contempt. On the contrary we aretold that the writer of these articles was a man who had perfect faith andconfidence in the Chief Justice and Judges; that he was solicitous for theirhonour and was only seeking to protect and counsel the Court from and inrespect of certain "mischievous rumours" and "unsavouryimpressions." In short he was the Courts benefactor who thought that ifit would but follow his advice as to how it should conduct its business, itwould escape the "unsavoury" imputations which the public were makingagainst it. This was said by some of the learned Counsel to be so clear thatMr. Jackson affirmed that no case could be found in all the reports whichapproached the present one in the weakness of the alleged contempt. If there beanything in all this, what should the parties have donep Each of the directorsshould have put in an affidavit exculpating themselves from being privy to thepublication. The reading and examination of these affidavits might hava takenhalf an hour. If these affidavits were accepted as truthful and the editor hadbeen named, these parties other than the printer would have been dischargedwithin about half an hour of their appearance before us instead of, as now,after a protracted argument for three days. We should have then expected thatthe parties would have named and produced their editor, the more particularlythat the articles for which he would have been responsible are alleged to be ofa wholly innocuous character, and their author to be one who cherishes thehonour of this Court and would be its adviser and protector. But strange tosay, this man of alleged good and disinterested motives is not named orproduced. What had he or the parties to fear assuming that their argument as tothe meaning of the articles is correct. Can it be said that notwithstandingsuch excellent intentions he was yet afraid that we might deal with him unjustlyIf so, the writers professions of his perfect faith and confidence in theCourt are a pretence. If he had come here and had explained whatnotwithstanding the form of his expression he actually meant; if he had comehere and said (as has been suggested by others in his absence) that he gave nocredence to these rumours, that he personally made no suggestion against theCourt, which in fact he was seeking to counsel and protect: if, I say, he hadsatisfied the Court of his innocence, then he too would have been discharged,and necessarily with him the printer. As a fact, the position taken up beforeus is "we refuse yon all information. Prove what you can againsjtus." Such affidavits as have been put in show that they have been elaboratelydrawn so as to keep out information. If, as in my opinion, there is a case madeout, calling for an answer, it is obvious that the non disclosure andnon-production of the editor or writer leads to the inference that he or theyare withheld because upon a true construction of the articles they do in factconstitute a contempt and that there is no reality in the argument which wouldhave us hold that there was no contempt at all. If so, why all this secrecy andtechnical objections as to jurisdiction, procedure, nature of contempt,evidence and so forth

57. It is first objected that we have no jurisdiction and ifwe have and if there was a contempt, the affidavits issued with the Rule do notmake any case calling for an answer, and if it did call for an answer on theassumption that the articles constituted a contempt, they are not a contempt infact, and lastly, if they do constitute a contempt, two of the parties were notin Calcutta at the time of the publication of one or both of the articles.

58. As regards jurisdiction a number of stale objectionswere taken. It is not necessary to go into the history and nature of contempt.It is too late now to contend that we have no other jurisdiction than thatconferred by the Indian Penal Code or that in exercising this jurisdiction weare judges in our own cause. The jurisdiction has been approved many years agoby, amongst other Judges, their Lordships of the Privy Council. The secondobservation applies to all cases of contempt, and if it were given effect to,the Court would be deprived of its jurisdiction in every case. In the presentone, the Court, as it is entitled to do, issued the Rule of its own motion. TheCourt, however, in such cases does not seek to vindicate any personal interestsof the Judges but the general administration of justice, which is a publicconcern. It is not a fact that proceedings for contempts by scandalising theCourt are obsolete, as Mr. Jackson argued. There are, moreover, special reasonsin this country why this jurisdiction should be maintained, which I need nothere develop. I may, however, refer in this connection to the observations inMcLeod v. Aubyn(1899) A.C. 549 : 68 L.J.P.C. 137 : 81 L.T. 158 : 48 W.R. 173 :15 T.L.R. 487, The point of jurisdiction has been laboured with a view toestablish the point that the case before us should be decided as a criminalone. It is what is called a "criminal" contempt, but all proceedingswhether in respect of civil or criminal contempts are, in my opinion, of acriminal nature in the sense that they are in pcenam, that is, when theirobject is to punish by fine or imprisonment. It does not, however, follow thatthe procedure in such cases is in all respects the same as an ordinary criminalcase. It is obviously not. For if it were, the parties before us would havebeen in the dock (not to speak of other matters) no affidavits could have beenfiled by or against them. In fact both the offence as also the jurisdiction andprocedure under which it is tried are sui generis. As regards the question ofproof, no case either civil or criminal should be tried and determinedotherwise than according to the law governing it. It is not the fact that civilproceedings may be slack and criminal proceedings must be strict. A derelictionof duty may, of course, be of greater or less moment according to the nature ofthe proceeding in which it happens. As regards the standard of proof I wouldrepeat what was held in Weston v. Peary Mohun Das 23 Ind. Cas 26 : 40 C. 898 :18 C.W.N. 185, that there is but one rule of evHence which in India applies toboth civil and criminal trials and that is contained in the definition of"proved" and disproved "in Section 3 of the Evidence Act.Whether the case is civil or criminal, a fact is only proved or disproved if itcomes within the terms of that section. It may be conceded that the caseagainst the persons before us must be proved strictly, which means according tolaw. That charge is that the two sets of parties before us, namely, printer andpublisher of the newspaper Amrita Bazar Patrika" and the directors andmanager of the Amrita Bazar Patrika, Ltd.", committed acontempt of Courtby publishing and being privy to the publication of the articles of the 18thand 22nd May set out in the affidavit of the Registrar. The first question iswhether these articles constitute a contempt of Court, and then if so, who, ifany, of the parties before us are responsible for it. Learned Counsel whoappeared for the various parties have offered different arguments as to the constructionof the articles. The actual facts whish are undisputed are that some cases wereinstituted against the Calcutta Improvement Trust on the original side of thisCourt before Greaves, J., which failed, that learned Judge holding that theCalcutta Improvement Act gave the Trustees a power to acquire land by way ofrecoupment. Another case against the same Trust came up for hearing on appealfrom the Moffussil. Previous to the hearing by this latter Bench on theappellate side of the Court an application was made by Counsel for the Trust tothe Chief Justice for the transfer of the case from the last mentioned Bench onthe ground that Mookerjee, J., was a landowner and, therefore, personallyinterested. That application was refused, on the ground that the learned Judgewould himself determine whether the circumstances were such that he should hearthe case or not. The objection was not repeated before the learned Judgehimself and the case was then heard on the appellate side of the Court byMookerjee and Cuming, JJ., who held that the Trustees had no such powers. Afterthat there was then an appeal to the Privy Council by the Trust against thedecision of Mookerjee and Cuming, JJ., and an appeal by the parties suing theTrust against the decision of Greaves, J., to this Court hearing appeals fromthe original side. The Judges who had been previously taking such appeals werethe Chief Justice and myself. On the 18th May 1917, the first of the articlesappeared. Its salient points are these;--It alleges the existence of a"mischievous rumour which should be contradicted." The writer doesnot himself contradict the rumour but gives it further currency. That rumourwas stated to be that an attempt was being made by or on behalf of the CalcuttaImprovement Trust "to get up" and "secure" a Bench afterits "own heart" to deal with the appeal from the decision of Greaves,J., so that that Bench might act "as a counterpoise" to the Bench ofMookerjee and Cuming, JJ. Expressing confidence in the Judges the writer saysthat he does not think that any official of the Trust "can go sofar."

59. The Benches of this Court are appointed by the ChiefJustice, it may be, in some cases, after consultation with the Judges. It is ofcourse plain that a litigant could not "get up "or" secure"a Bench of his own choice "and after his own heart except with thecomplicity of the Chief Justice or Judges. Of this the writer of the articlesis well aware, for he says that he is sure the interest of every rate-payer issafe in the hands of the Honble Judges," and he "does not think thatany official of the Trust can go so far, "As I have said, the originalside appeals were then being heard by a Bench of two Judges, namely, the ChiefJustice and myself. A hearing of original side appeals by two Judges is not aconvenient one nor in conformity with old practice, but it has been inexist-ence for several years since Sir Lawrence Jenkins time owing to thegreat bulk of work and the shortage of Judges to deal with it. It is notconvenient, because it is advisable that there should be a third Judge to turnthe scale in cases of difference of opinion. As the appeals under considerationinvolved a question of great public interest and might involve a reference to aFull Bench, the Chief Justice with my concurrence determined to appoint a thirdJudge to meet the possible case of a difference of opinion and a practicallyinfructuous hearing. A third Judge has been added to the usual Bench of twoJudges on previous occasions. The third Judge added was Chitty, J., the nextsenior Judge to myself excluding Mookerjee, J., who had tried the Improvementappeal which raised the same, question as that which the appellate Courthearing the appeal from Greaves, J.s decision had to determine. Before the constitutionof the Bench was actually published, the second article of the 22nd Mayappeared. That article is based on a number of misstatements. It wronglyassumes that there was an Appellate Bench constituted to hear "appealsagainst the awards of the Improvement Trust." It wrongly states that thissupposed Bench was composed of Mookerjee and Cuming, JJ. It then wrongly statesthat this Bench had latterly come to be presided over by the Chief Justice andmyself. It then says that the "withdrawal" of Mookerjee, J., (whichis not true) had "given rise to rather unsavoury impressions in the publicmind" since this supposed "withdrawal" and supposed reconstitution of the Bench followed close upon the heels of his judgment"in the case I have mentioned. The suggestion involved in these allegedimpressions is of course that Mookerjee, J., who is supposed to have had chargeof Improvement Trust cases, was "withdrawn" because he had decidedagainst the Trust. He could not himself "withdraw" of his own motion,nor can any one else but the Chief Justice who appoints the Benches. But whyshould he be so "withdrawn p" The first article suggests the reason,namely, that the Improvement Trust was endeavouring to get up and secure aBench after its own heart as a counterpoise to the decision of Mookerjee andCuming, JJ. Then it says, "something like consternation prevails onaccount of the proposed new constitution of the Appellate Bench," that is,by the substitution of the Chief Justice and myself for Mookerjee and Cunning,JJ., the 1 withdrawal" of Mookerjee, J., which had given rise to rather"unsavoury impressions," the addition of Chitty, J., and thenon-selection of any Indian Judge. It suggests that the presence of one or moreof these was necessary because of their knowledge of local conditions. I mayhere observe that the printer sought to prove good faith by, amongst others,the allegation that it was well known that the Trust objected to their casebeing tried by any Indian Judges. The point before the Court in the Trust caseswas a pure question of law equally well triable by either an English or IndianJudge, unless we accept Mr. Jacksons strange argument (from which Mr. C.R.Dass dissented) that that Judge is best qualified to try such cases who isinterested therein by reason of his possession of land in Calcutta. Beadingthis second article in connection with the first, the inference to be drawnfrom it, in the absence of any explanation from its writer, is that the allegedmachinations of the Trust to secure a Bench "according to somebodyschoice" had succeeded and that the Bench which was to hear the appeal fromthe decision of Greaves, J., was packed. Of course, there is no question butthat if this was the suggestion, there has been a gross contempt of Court. Mr.Norton who appeared on behalf of the printer and publisher contended that thetwo articles should not be read together. There is no substance in this. But hefrankly conceded that if the two articles be read together then they werecapable of the above-mentioned interpretation, though he did not admit thatthat was meant, and suggested that the writer did not understand the meaning ofthe word unsavoury," But how can we say that when the writer and editorare not before us

60. Mr. Jacksons argument lends support, though perhapsunconsciously, to the construction I give to these articles. For he hasendeavoured to re-construct what he called the atmosphere in which they werewritten with a view to show that the writer acted in the public interest and ingood faith. But when a person has written nothing which is prima facie anoffence, a plea of good faith is unnecessary. It is only relevant on theassumption that the articles do on their face appear to be contemptuous. It isthen said that the writer was only repeating rumours to which he himself didnot give credence. One cannot escape either contempt or libel merely byalleging that there was a rumour. This is a common way in which libels arespread. The existence of a rumour, if there was one in fact, is nojustification in itself for its repetition. Moreover, the writer associateshimself with these alleged public suspicions. Thus he says, "now whatneither the public nor ourselves can understand", and so forth. And infurther dealing with the matter he refers to a contention which the ChiefJustice will not "care to advance."

61. Then it is said that the writer was merely stating theexistence of these "unsavoury impressions in the public mind" in theinterest of the Court so that they might be contradicted. It is said that hehas more than once expressed his perfect faith and confidence in the ChiefJustice and Judges. That is so. It is an obvious question to ask why, if thewriter meant no offence but was only acting for the Courts good, he was notbrought forward. What had he to fear Will it be suggested that the fear isthat nevertheless the Court might deal with him unjustly If so, this is, as Ihave said, the strongest argument against the sincerity of his professions offaith and confidence in the Judges. In my opinion, it is not possible to acceptan argument that the writer meant no offence and was merely acting inprotection of the Court from unsavoury public impressions, when he is not evennamed much less brought forward. Moreover, the article itself does not, in theabsence of any explanation from him, support this view. It states certainalleged rumours. It misstates the facts which are supposed to he the cause ofthese rumours. It does not contradict these rumours and say and show that thereis nothing in them. It on the qontrary gives them circulation, The writerassociates himself with those who are said to entertain these alleged unsavouryimpressions. He writes in a way open to the inference that the allegedmanoeuvres of the Trust had succeeded. It may be that these expressions offaith and confidence and so forth were insetted, to use an expressive phrase ofCounsel, for the "protection" of the writer. It is possible that ifthe editor or writer had appeared before us, he might have succeeded in showingthat, however apparently unfavourable to him the language of these articles is,yet in fact no offence was intended. But he is not produced and we must givethem what seems to us their natural meaning. It has been held that even wherethe writer knew that proceedings were still pending, the fact that he did notdesire or intend to prejudice the case is immaterial (except as to the extentof his punishment) if the Court be satisfied that such was the obvious andnecessary result of his words. Daw v. Eley (1869) 7 L.J. Ch. 113 : 17 W.R. 245,Martindale, In re (1894) 3 Ch. 193 : 64 L.J. Ch. 9 : 8 Rule 729 : 71 L,. T. 468: 43 W.R. 53 and Townshend (Marquis), In re (1906) 22 L.R. 841. In the absenceof the editor or writer, I can only and do infer the intent from aconsideration of the natural meaning of the words used and the impression whichI believe they would convey to the ordinary reader of them.

62. In the present case the articles not only scandalise theCourt but are otherwise a contempt, For it is a contempt to prejudice orattempt to prejudice a litigant and to interfere with the course of justice.Here the Trust is a litigant in this Court and it is suggested that it has beenattempting to influence the course of justice by trying to "get up" aBench of its "choice" of which allegation there is no proof whatever.Nextly, the writer of the article himself seeks to control the formation of theBenches in his own way by putting forward alleged unsavoury impressions in thepublic mind based on a number of wholly unfounded statements, adding that assoon as the Chief Justice understands the supposed public feeling in thismatter, his Lordship would form a Bench of a nature which the writer approved.In my opinion, the articles do constitute a contempt of Court.

63. I now pass to the question as to which, if any, of theparties before us are responsible for it. Mr. Norton for the printer andpublisher Tarit Kanti Biswas has conceded that if we hold that there is acontempt, then his client is liable though he pleads for mitigation ofpunishment--a matter with which I later deal. This liability is obvious,because scienter is attributable both to printer and editor. Neither can escapeliability by alleging that he did not know that the contemptuous words had beeninserted in his newspaper. Chesshire v. Strauss (1896) 12 T.L.R. 291, Rex v.Parke (1903) 2 K.B. 432 : 72 L.J.K.B. 839 : 89 L.T. 439 : 52 W.B. 215 : 67; P.421 : 19 T.L.B. 627, Eex v. Davies (1906) 1 K. B 32: 75 L.T.K. B 10 1 : 93 L.T.772 : 54 W.R. 107: 22 T, L.B. 97, Jones, Ex parts (1806) 13 Ves. (Jun.) 237 :33 E.R. 283. As regards the others, the affidavit of Mr. Hechle the Registrarshows that the paper is, according to the imprint, printed and published at thePatrika Press, 19 and 20, Bagbazar Street, and issued by the Patrika PostOffice, Calcutta. This Patrika Press works for the "Amrita Bazar PatrikaCompany, Ltd.", which was incorporated with the object amongst others ofcarrying on the business of newspaper proprietors by printing and publishingnewspapers and taking over the rights in the previously existing Amrita BazirPatrika newspaper. The registered office of the company is No. 2 Ananda Chatterjees Lane, Calcutta. A certified copy of the annual summary shows that MotiLal Ghose, Golap Lal Ghose and Pijus Kanti Ghose are directos and Golap LalGhose above mentioned and Mrinal Kanti Ghose are managers. It will be observedthat all these persons are named Ghose and they all give the same address,which happens also to be that of the registered office of the company.

64. The total number of shares taken up is 766. Of theseonly 16 were issued for cash, probably for the expenses of incorporation, and750 for a consideration other than cash. These shares of Rs. 100 each are heldby 15 persons. The Ghose directors and managers hold 369 shares, three otherpersons of the name of Ghose hold 234 shares. There are four lady proprietorsholding 112 shares and against the name of the first the fathers name is givenas Moti Lal Ghose. It is not clear from the summary whether the latter standsin the same relation to the other three ladies. There is one person of the nameof Datta who holds 51 shares. The addresses of all these persons (the ladiesand N.G. Datta included) is given as No. 2, Ananda Chatterjees Lane, showingthat this is a place of residence as well as being the registered office of thecompany. It is obvious on this evidence that these persons are related, thatthey live at the same address which is the registered office, and that thecompany is merely a small family business incorporated.

65. All the persons cited except Mrinal Ghose are directors.The latter is described as manager (with Golap Lal Ghose) and also assecretary. That Pijus Ghose and Mrinal Ghose are director and managerrespectively, is also admitted in their affidavits. As regards Moti Lal Ghoseand Golap Lal Ghose who have filed no affidavits, a number of technical, and inmy opinion trivial, objections have been taken. The first objection taken byMr. C.R. Das is that there is no proof that they are directors, notwithstandingthat their oo director and secretary have sworn that they are, and they havethemselves declined to give any information on any point to the Court. Theargument is based on the contention that the certified copy of the summaryfiled on the 9th May 1917 of share capital and shares, etc., as they stood onthe 5th Mrch 1917, purporting to be signed by Golap Lal Ghose as financialmanager, was not admissible. Mrinal Ghoses affidavit states that Golap Ghoseis a director and financial manager, but Mr. C.R. Das contended that this isnot admissible against him nor (it must follow) against Moti Lal Ghose. It isnot necessary to go into this last objection, for I think that the summary wasa public record of a private document, of which a certified copy is admissible[Evidence Act, Sections 74, 75, 65 (e)]. It has been argued that record"in Section 74, Clause 2, refers only to the case where the public office itselfmakes a copy, that is, record of a private document, and keeps it. If it does,it is certainly a public record. But "record" does not merely meanthis. The word record also means a collection of documents. Section 74 (2)refers to private documents made by private persons and kept as a record inpublic offices to which the public have generally access. If this were not so,how could the public get such documents The originals being in the custody ofa public office the latter would not part with them, and not being a publicdocument no certified copy could be given.

66. The next objection is that if the certified copy isadmissible, there is no proof of the signature of Golap Ghose. Assuming thatthe mere production of a certified copy is not such proof where proof is necessary,it is not necessary here. Such certified copy is proof that some person givingthe name of Golap Lal Ghose and describing himself as financial manager of thecompany signed such document, As that document was accepted by the Registrar ofJoint Stock Companies, it is common sense to assume that he was satisfied thatit was a return by the financial manager of the company. Thjs objection,therefore, in substance is that the Golap Lal Ghose who purports to sign thisdocument is not or at any rate has not been shown to be the identical Golap LalGhose for whom Mr. C.R. Das has pleaded before us. It is admitted that theobjection is technical. That is true, but we must see if the allegedtechnicalities are sound and we must give as much play to common sense as thelaw permits. The Rule was served on Moti Lal Ghose and Golap Lal Ghose asdirectors of the company. These are the persons whom we wished to see, notanybody else. The persons so served come here. If they were not the personsdescribed in the summons they need not have come here. They can only be heardin these proceedings on the supposition that they are what the Rule states themto be. It is not open to any body and everybody to come and show cause againstthis Rule. Mr. C.R. Dass title to be heard at all is dependent on theassumption that he represents the person described in the Rule. The unrealnature of the objection is enhanced by the fact that the secretary of thecompany has sworn in these proceedings that Golap Ghose and Moti Lal Ghose areDirectors. If it be, as contended, that we cannot refer to this affidavit whendealing with the case of Golap Ghose and Moti Lal Ghose (a matter I do notdecide), this does not make the taking of such an objection any the moresensible. Objections should, even when legal, have some relation to reality.

67. The third legal objection is that assuming that thereturn is proof of the state of affairs on the 5th March 1917 and shows thatthese two persons were Directors on that date, it does not follow that theywere Directors when the Rule was issued on the 30th May, 1917. It is to beobserved, firstly, that apart from any presumption of continuance, the summarywas filed on the 9th May, only three weeks before the issue of the Rule, whichwas not likely to be done had there been any change between the 5th March andthat date. Further under seation fc7 of the Indian Companies Act VII of 1913changes of directorship are required to be notified by the Company, and hadthere been any change, it would have appeared in the affidavit of Mr. Hechle,the Registrar, as the result of his recent enquiry in the matter. Nor it islikely that the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies would issue to an enquirer acertified copy of a return which had been changed. This objection is as unrealas the rest. I have no doubt whatever that Moti Lal Ghose and Golap Ghose areDirectors apart from the affidavit of the Secretary of the Company who statesthat they are in fact such.

68. According to the Articles of Association produced withthe affidavit of Mrinal Ghose, the business of the Company is to be managed bythe Directors, that business being according to the Memorandum of Associationthe carrying on of the Amrita Bazar Patrika newspaper. But here again withfurther luxury of objection it is protested that we cannot look at the Articlesof Association of the Company of which these two persons are Directors andwhich have been actually produced by the Secretary of the Company with hisaffidavit. It is sufficient to say that the affidavit of the Rule states whoare Directors; the nature of the Company and, the facts proved indicate thatits business must be carried on by them; and the provisions of this article arethe same as and are indeed copied from Section 75 of Schednle I, Table A of ActVII of 1913, the provisions of which, unless otherwise arranged, apply to allCompanies. The table of the earlier Act is on this point substantially thesame. It has been, therefore, proved as against the parties named as Directorsthat they are such.

69. The question whether persons in the position ofDirectors are responsible must depend on the facts of eaoh case. In In re Judd(20.) the directors of Judd and Co. used to print and deliver a newspaper toanother Company who published the same. They did not, it was held, sell ordeliver, a fact which would relieve them from even civil liability. In Ex parteGreen (1891) 7 T.L.R. 411 the manager of a Limited Company which disseminatedparagraphs amounting to contempt of Court was held responsible. In that casethe manager denied that he had seen the matter before it was published andthat, in general, it was no part of his duty to supervise the reading out ofnews. The affidavit of the party taking proceedings spoke only to his"information and belief" as to the responsibility of the manager.This was held to be, prima facie, sufficient and on the letters and affidavit,he was held guilty. In one case it was held that the individual liability hadnot been directly established and in another that it had been. Doubtless, inthe case of an ordinary large newspaper Company where the Directors meettogether once a week to transact business in the Board rooms, the ordinaryinference might be (in the absence of direct evidence) that they were notconscious of the publication of a particular article, for in the case supposedthey would have appointed an editor.

70. The facts in the present case are very different andpeculiar. In Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] : 41 C. 173 at p.176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : : 17 C.W.N. 1253 astatement resting on information and belief that Moti Lal Ghose was editor wasruled out as not being legal evidence and the fact that Moti Lal Ghose did notin that proceeding deny the allegation was held immaterial. No disclosures wasmade as to whether there was an editor or who he was. Ordinarily, of course, anewspaper has an editor, but we have no legal evidence of that in this case andthe affidavits filed by one of the Directors and the Secretary, and theprinter, do not even mention the existence of such a person. The Company, as Ihave said, appears to be a small family affair composed, in the main, ofGhoses, whose address is that of the registered office of the Company which isalso given as that of some ladies, one of whom at least is the daughter of MotiLal Ghose. Three of these Ghoses including Moti Lal Ghose are Directors andanother Ghose is Secretary. The Articles of Association direct, not that thebusiness shall be under their control, but that they shall manage the business.That business is shown to be the carrying on of the newspaper Amrita BazarPatrika, which is now being published from No. 2, Ananda ChatterjeesLane." Some one must see to the literary part of this business. In theabsence of evidence as to there being a separate editor, prima facie theDirectors who are authorised to manage the business are the persons who do soin all its aspects. They must have authorised the circulation of the paper. Hadthere been reliable evidence that there was an editor who was some person otherthan the defendants even though his name was not disclosed, prima facie theresponsibility for the articles would have lain with the editor, though ofcourse the Directors or other persons would also have been liable who wereshown to be privy to the publication. Here there is evidence that themanagement of this business is entrusted to the Directors. That businessincludes every department of it, financial, literary and so forth, for there isnothing to prevent one or other of the Directors being also editor. This is theinference which arises on the facts here proved. If the Directors have in factdelegated any of these functions to some other person, it is for them to showthat fact. I am of opinion, therefore, that the affidavit in support of themotion disclosed a prima facie case against the Directors as such and callingfor an answer from them. As regards the permanent Manager and Secretary, I deallater. Having regard to the facts proved I need not further consider their casehere.

71. But assuming that the affidavit accompanying the Rulesdoes make a case calling for an answer, the matter does not rest there. PijusKanti Ghose has put in an affidavit and has sworn that neither he nor hisco-director exercise any control over the contents of the newspaper andexercise "only such powers as are mentioned in the article." Who doescontrol the paper is not stated. A similar statement is made in the affidavitof Mrinal Kanti Ghose. Nextly, the affidavit of Pijus Kanti Ghose swears thathe was away from Calcutta on the date of the second or chief article. Thereforehe is shown not to have been directly privy to it. Simlarly, the affidavit ofMrinal Kanti Ghose states that he exercises no control over the contents of thenewspaper, that his duties are to keep the minutes, registers and records ofthe Company, to issue notices and to make returns. Further, he swears that hewas absent from Calcutta on both the dates when the articles appeared. He has,therefore, also met the case against him. There remains the cases of Golap LalGhose and Moti Lal Ghose, neither of whom have given any answer. Theabove-mentioned affidavits state that Golap Lal Ghose also has no control overthe contents of the paper, and this statement is supported by the fact that thereturn the latter made to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies shows that heis Financial Manager. Ordinarily, therefore, he would attend to this side ofthe business and probably to this only. There lastly remains amongst thedirectors the case of Moti Lal Ghose. He also has not filed an affidavit and weare told less about him than any one else. The affidavits offered to us seem tobe of what is called a "tricky" character. The wording is in thepresent tense. As was pointed out by my brother Fletcher, they might notsupport a prosecution. They do not deal with the condition of things when thearticles were published. They do not state precisely what powers the Directorsdo exercise, or whether there is an editor. The statement that the Directorshave no control over the conients does not show that they were not aware of thearticles before they were published and circulated by their authority. Hadthere been no affidavits, I would have been disposed to adjudge that Moti LalGhose was in contempt; even after the reading of these affidavits, my mind hasbeen in doubt, for the affidavits are deliberately drawn to keep allinformation from the Court and are, as above stated, otherwise unsatisfactory.Moti Lal Ghose has filed no affidavit. Though it has been objected by Counsel(Mr. C.R. Das) for one of the parties" that we cannot consider as againstany particular party the affidavits offered in defence by other parties (apoint I need not consider), still I am unwilling as against Moti Lal Ghose torest the case on any such technicality. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact thatthere are three sworn statements before us that neither the Directors,Financial Manager, Secretary or Printer have control over the contents of thenewspaper. As I said, I have had my doubts as to the sufficiency of thisstatement. Moti Lal Ghose (whose case I regard with strong suspicion) is,however, entitled to the benefit of them. As some one must have such control,we must now assume after the reading of these affidavits that there is anunnamed editor who is not before the Court. I conclude then that the affidavitsoffered in reply to the Courts Rule are such that it should be dischargedagainst the parties to these proceedings other than the printer and publisher,Tarit Kanti Biswas. We might, without all this complex argument, have come tothe same conclusion within half an hour if all the parties had sworn that theywere not responsible and disclosed the name of the editor who, subject to anyexplanation he might make, was liable. As already stated, it is conceded by hisCounsel, Mr. Norton, that the printer is liable provided that the articlesconstitute a contempt. He has, however, argued that the case is not of so seriousa character as to call for the exercise of this jurisdiction, and if it is, helastly pleads that the position of his client should excite our pity and thatwe should discharge him without penalty.

72. In my opinion, the case does call for the exernise ofthis jurisdiction by reason of the articles scandalizing the Court having atendency to prejudice the parties and to interfere with the administration ofjustice. As regards the action to be taken and penalty to be awarded, each casemust depend on its own facts.

73. As regards the second point, I cannot yield to thesuggestion that merely because a man is a printer and publisher he shouldescape scot-free. Did we hold this, it would be open, as in this case, for theparties to exculpate themselves by affidavit and to suppress all information asto who was in fact responsible. The printer might also be put up to refuse suchinformation and be told, "it is all right, say you are only the printerand ask for pity and then we shall all be excused." Our jurisdiction wouldthus become largely illusory. I do not say that there may not be cases wherethe Court will deal leniently with the printer, but this is not one. In thefirst place, he states in his affidavit that it was known to him that thematter dealt with by these articles was the subject of concern to the publicwho were watching with deep interest" the action of the Chief Justice inconstituting the Court to hear the appeal from the decision of Greaves, J. Hethen saya that the articles were published to give expression to public feelingin Calcutta and that the "articles were published by myself in good faithand in the public interest," This statement is, on its face, in conflictwith paragraph 3 of his affidavit, where he says that he did not read thearticles before publication nor did he consider at any time prior to theirpublication their meaning or purport. If this be true, how could they have beenpublished by him in good faith and in the public interest According to hisow.n statement, he was aware that the subject was creating public interest, andhe is prepared to swear that the articles were published to give expression topublic feeling. If there were, in fact, such an interest, there was the greaternecessity for caution on his part in seeing what he published with reference toit. His statement that in fact he did not see the articles before publicationis weakened by the attempted justification that they were published "bymyself in good faith and in the public interest," though it is of coursepossible that this inconsistency was due to bad drafting.

74. As, however, the affidavits are in general astutelydrawn, we cannot well assume this. He denies that the articles are a contemptand seeks to justify himself. In this he fails. Nextly, he says that he has nocontrol over the contents of the newspaper and that they were handed to him forpublication in the usual course of his business. He carefully refrains fromsaying who gave him the articles, whether it was the editor who did so, or whohe was. His Counsel justifies this refusal on the ground of loyalty to hisemployers. If he esteems that loyalty above his public duty to inform the Courtwho committed this alleged offence, he cannot complain that we do not show himindulgence. He joins with the others in refusing information and if, apart fromsuch refusal, he is liable, he must take the consequence. The Courts in Englandhave held [as for example in American Exchange in Europe v. Gillig (1889) 58L.J. Ch. 706 : 61 L T. 502] that this refusal by the printer to give up thename of the editor is a matter which will weigh with it in determining whethera penalty shall be awarded against the printer or not. Mr. Norton hascomplained (I) thought with that moderation which rarely goes with real zeal)that his client should be left to suffer because his employers have sotproduced their editor. In the English-man Contempt case [Re Banks and Fenwick45 Ind. Cas. 113 : 26 C.L.J. 401 : 19 C.L.J. 449.] Captain Fenwick, the editorof that paper, came forward to bear the brunt of what was in reality done byhim or his order, on which the Rule was withdrawn against the printer. SirBarnes Peacock observed that in doing that Captain Fenwick had only done thatwhich every honourable gentleman who fills the editors chair would do, in notallowing a publisher of a paper to take the consequence of articles written andpublished by his order by not coming forward to avow the authorship." Thiswas also done by Babu Surendra Nath Banerjee in the well-known Beng.ileeContempt case [Surendra Nath Banerjee v. Chief Justice of Bengal 10 C. 109 : 10I. A 171 : 4 S. P.C. 474 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 76], where Garth, C.J., said thatBabu Surendra Nath Banerjee had properly done his best to protect his printer.There is no disposition, however, upon the part of any one in this case toadopt this proper and honourable course. But the printer himself does not denythat he is ignorant who the editor is and he himself through his Counseldeclines to give his name, There are some cases in which, one might sympathisewith the printer, but here he has not only declined to give up the editorsname, but has otherwise associated himself with the other parties in the caseand has sought to justify both himself and them in what I hold to be acontempt, and he must, therefore, take the consequences such as they are. In,however, adjudging the penalty I have not wholly left out of count the factthat he is the printer, for, had the editor been found guilty of contempt, hewould, in my opinion, have been subject to much heavier punishment.

75. The defence to these proceedings except as to theconstruction of the articles--a legitimate argument--was ill advised and awaste of time. If the Directors, Managers and Secretary were not personallyresponsible for the contempt, they had only to frankly state the facts onaffidavit and disclose who was so liable. The printer similarly, who in law isliable, might have stated the persons from whom he got the articles he printedand thus have personally freed himself from all further action against him. Weshould then on the supposed facts have only had to deal with the personprimarily liable, namely, the editor. He could, then, if be had wished, havepersonally put forward the plea here advanced that the articles have beenmisunderstood and that on the contrary he was moved by a desire to act in theinterest of the Court and to protect it from mischievous" andunsavoury" rumours. If this were the fact, he would have nothing to fearfrom Judges who, according to the argument before us, had the completeconfidence of the writer of these articles. Even if these articles were illexpressed and capable of a bad interpretation, their effect might have beennegatived by the public avowal of their author that for him they had no suchmeaning. These proceedings might have thus been disposed of within an hour orless, with the result that either all parties might have been freed of penaltyor if penalty were awarded it would have fallen on the party primarily liablenamely, the editor. On the contrary, all the parties before us have adopted ahostile attitude to the Court, have refused all information, concealed the nameof the editor and put forward every technical objection to defeat an enquirywhich has thus been prolonged over three days with unnecessary delay andexpense to the public and the parties concerned. For this the parties, by thecourse they have adopted, are responsible. T.his course further hasstrengthened the inference which is to be drawn from the natural language ofthe articles in the absence of explanation from their writer. It is not in suchabsence to be supposed that the intentions of the writer and editor of thesearticles were as innocent as the argument before us suggests and that the nameof one who was, it is said, only seeking to protect this Court from unsavouryrumours and to give it what he thought good advice, should be kept concealed.It is absurd also to suppose that the party responsible would himself, ifinnocent, carefully avoid his presence in the Court, which it is said hehonoured and was seeking (howevr ill-considered his language might be) tocounsel and protect.

76. I, therefore, concur in the order which the ChiefJustice has made.

77. Asutosh Mookerjee, J.--On the 18th May 1917 thefollowing paragraph appeared in the editorial columns of the Amrita BazarPatrika:

There is a mischievous rumour afloat which should becontradicted. It is stated that a vigorous attempt is being made to get up aBench to consider the appeal on the judgment of Mr. Justice Greaves inconnection with the acquisition of surplus land by the Calcutta ImprovementTrust according to somebodys choice. We do not believe that it is possible forany one, far less the Chairman of the Trust, to secure a Bench after his ownheart, as a counterpoise to the Mookerjee and Cuming Bench. We are sure theinterest of every rate-prayer is safe in the hands of the Honble Judges and wedo not think that any official of the Trust can go so far.

78. Four days later, on the 22nd May, the followingparagraph appeared in the editorial columns of the same paper:

Something like consternation prevails on account of theproposed new constitution of the Appellate Bench of the Calcutta High Court,before which appeals against the awards of the Improvement Trust are to beheard. It is known to the reader Jiow this Banoh was originally composed of SirAsntosh Mookerjee and the Honble Mr. Justice Cnming, and how latterly it hascome to be presided over by the Honble the Chief Justice and Mr. JusticeWoodroffe. Rumour has it that for purposes of hearing Improvement TrustAppeals, the Bench is going to be strengthened by the appointment of Mr.Justice Chitty. Now, what neither the public nor ourselves can understand isthis special arrangement for such a Special Bench. If it is contended that twoHonble [Judges of the highest Court in the land are not competent to decide inappeal cases in whish the Improvement Trust is concerned--a contention,however, which we do not believe the Chief Justice will care to ladvance--whyshould there be a Special Bench of three and not a Full Bench of five, on whichat least two Indian Judges could find aeats As a matter of fact as land-ownersin Calcutta are mostly Indians, and as Indian Judges are likely to know more ofconditions, practices, etc., prevailing here, it is but meet that the AppellateBench in the present circumstances should be so composed is to associate IndianJudges with their European colleagues. The withdrawal of Sir Asntosh has givenrise to rather unsavoury impressions in the public mind, since this proposedarrangement is to follow close upon the heels of his judgment in the case ofThe Improvement Trust v. Chandra Kanta Ghosh 35 Ind. Cas. 749 [LQ/MadHC/1916/177] : 24 C.L.J. 246 :44 C. 219 : 2 C.W.N. 8.. Be that as it may, we have perfect faith in thepresent Chief Justice and believe that as soon as Sir Lancelot Sandersonunderstands the public feeling in the matter, His Lordship will either form aFull Bench or at least associate an experienced Indian Judge with himself forthe hearing of Improvement Trust Appeals.

79. On the 30th May 1917 the Chief Justice, after previousconsultation with the other members of the Court, directed the issue of a Ruleon Tarit Kanti Biswas (the printer and publisher of the Amrita Bazar Patrika),Moti Lal Ghose, Golap Lal Ghose and Pijush Kanti Ghose, Directors, and GolapLal Ghose and Mrinal Kanti Ghose, Managers, of the Company called the AmritaBazar Patrika, Ltd., to show cause why they should not be committed 01otherwise dealt with according to law for contempt of Court committed by thepublication of the two articles mentioned concerning the High Court and theChief Justice in his administration thereof. The materials whereon the Rule wasissued were contained in two affidavits sworn by the Registrar on the originalside and the Registrar on the Appellate Side as to the actual publication ofthe articles in the paper and the position the opposite parties occupied inrelation to the paper and the Company, which were its proprietors. The oppositeparties have appeared in Court in person and have been represented by Counsel;three of them, Tarit Kanti Biswas, Pijus Kanti Ghose and Mriual Kanti Ghose,havefiled affidavits which will require examination hereafter. On the elaboratearguments addressed to the Court, the following points emerge forconsideration, namely, first, what is the true meaning of the two articlesmentioned; do they constitute contempt of Court; secondly, if the articlesconstitute contempt of Court, has this Court jurisdiction to punish theoffenders summarily and should such authority, if any, be exercised in thepresent instance; thirdly, what is the true nature of the present proceedings;is it civil or criminal in character, and fourthly, have the opposite partiesor any of them been proved to be so connected with the publication of thearticles as to render them liable to punishment for contempt of Court.

80. As regards the first question, namely, the true meaningof the two articles set out above, there can, in my opinion, be little room fordoubt, notwithstanding the able and ingenious arguments, which have beenaddressed to us. The obvious course to pursue in a case of this description isto read the offending articles as they stand and to attach to the words usedtheir natural meaning without the assistance of a laborious commentary. Thegeneral rule of interpretation cannot be formulated in more precise terms,because objectionable language may take an infinite variety of forms; this muchis clear that it is incumbent on the Court, in all cases, to consider thegeneral tone of the writing. The meaning and intent are to be determined by afair interpretation of the language used and are matters of law for the Courtas to whether or not they constitute contempt. Disclaimer on the part of thepublisher as to any intentional disrespect to the Court is consequently not asufficient defence, when the purpose and meaning of the writing is obviously ofa contrary import. No doubt, if the language is fairly capable of an innocentinterpretation, the Court will not be astute to read into it a sinister import.[Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] : 41 C. 173 at p. 176 : 18C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : : 17 C.W.N. 1253, Townshend(Marquis), In re (1906) 22 T.L.R. 841, Martindale, In re (1894) 3 Ch. 193 at p.200 : 64 L.J. Ch. 9 : 8 Rule 729 : 71 L,. T. 468 : 43 W.R. 53 and Daw v. Ffley(1869) 7 L.J. Ch. 113 : 17 W.R. 245 J. But, if the intent is fairly clear,liability to punishment for contempt of Court cannot be successfully evaded bythe use of a transparent artifice. Tested from this point of view, how do thesearticles stand F The first article makes reference to an alleged rumour whichthe writer describes as mischievous and worthy of contradiction. The rumour isstated to have been to the effect that a vigorous attempt was being made to geta Bench constituted according to the choice of somebody to hear, the appealfrom the judgment of Mr. Justice Greaves in a suitin connection with theacquisition of surplus land by the Calcutta Improvement Trust. The writerexpresses his belief that no official of the Trust, far less the Chairman,could go far as to make an attempt of this character, and that it was not possiblefor anybody to secure a Bench after his own heart as a counterpoise to what iscalled the Mookerjee and Cuming Bench. The writer concludes with an assurancethat the interest of every citizen is safe in the hands of the Judges. If thisarticle had stood by itself, it might perhaps have been argued with seemingplausibility that, however much open to reproach on the ground of indiscretionand impropriety, the writer had no intention to commit a contempt of Court. Butthe second article, which is written in a very different tone, showsconvincingly the true intent and purpose, of the first article. The question,however, was raised before us, whether the two articles should be readtogether. It was contended that they should not be so read, as there was nothingto indicate that they had emanated from the same individual. In my opinion, thetwo articles may legitimately be read together to determine their scope andpurpose, even though they were proved not to have been written by the sameperson. They obviously relate to the same topic and were published in theeditorial columns of the same newspaper, there was a very brief interval oftime between them and the first obviously led up to the second, though notexpressly mentioned, therein. The first article has, I think, a sinisterimport, and conveys the insinuation that one of the litigant parties in theappeals about to be heard was endeavouring to have a Bench constitutedaccording to its choice. There is no room for controversy that imputation ofthis character constitutes a contempt of Court. Contempt by speech or writingmay he by scandalising the Court itself or by abusing parties to actions or byprejudicing mankind in favour of or against a party before the cause is heard;as has been said, there is nothing of more pernicious consequence than toprejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties incauses before they are finally heard and thus to attempt to obstruct orinterfere with the due course of justice. [St. James Evening Post case (1742) 2Atk 469 : 26 E.R. 683, Cann v. Cann (1754) 2 Vcs. 520 : 2 Dick, 795 : 28 E.R.332., American Exchange in Europe v. Gillig (1889) 58 L.J. Ch. 706 : 61 L T.502, R. v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 : 69 L.J.Q.B. 502; L.T. 534 : 48 W.R. 474 : 64J.P. 484 : 16 T.L.R. 305., Rex v. Davies (1906) 1 K. B 32: 75 L.T.K. B 10 1 :93 L.T. 772 : 54 W.R. 107: 22 T L.B. 97 and McLeod v. St. Aubyn (1899) A.C. 549: 68 L.J.P.C. 137 : 81 L.T. 158 : 48 W.R. 173 : 15 T.L.R. 487]. But, from mypoint of view, it is really immaterial whether the two articles are consideredseparately or are regarded as component parts of one aggregate, for even ifthere were any real doubt as to the purpose of the first, there can be noserious dispute as to the meaning of the second.

81. The second article, when carefully analysed, may heresolved into the following propositions:

82. (1). That the Appellate Bench of the Calcutta High Courtbefore which appeals against the awards of the Improvement Trust are to beheard was originally composed of myself and Mr. Justice Cuming.

83. (2). That I had been withdrawn from this Bench, and thatthe withdrawal had given rise to rather unsavoury impressions in the publicmind, as it followed close upon the heels of the judgment in the case ofTrustees for the Improvement of Calcutta v. Chandra, Kanta Ghosh 35 Ind. Cas.749 : 24 C.L.J. 246 : 44 C. 219 : 2 C.W.N. 8., to which I was a party.

84. (3). That this Appellate Bench had latterly come to bepresided over by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Woodroffe.

85. (4). That there was a rumour that the Appellate Bench soconstituted was about to he strengthened by the appointment of Mr. JusticeChitty and this proposed new constitution of the Appellate Bench had createdsomething like consternation.

86. (5). That if the Bench was to be composed of more thantwo Judges, it should consist of not three but five Judges, of whom two atleast should be Indian Judges, because land-owners in Calcutta (who wereprincipally affected by the operations of the Calcutta Improvement Trust) wereIndians, and Indian Judges were likely to know more of conditions and practicesprevailing here than European Judges.

87. These statements constitute a tissue of falsehoods, and,to my mind, one of the most conspicuous features of this trial is that not onlyhas not even the semblance of an attempt been made to establish the truth ofthese allegations, it has actually been conceded that they are vitiated by afundamental error. No Bench composed of myself and Mr. Justice Cnming had, atany time, been constituted to hear appeals against what are inaccurately termedthe awards of the Improvement Trust. The plain truth is that last year, whenMr. Justice Cuming and myself were in charge of the Bench which had to takecases of what is called the First group of the Districts, the appeal of theCalcutta Improvement Trust against Chandra Kanta Ghosh came up before us,inasmuch as the appeal had been preferred from the decision of a SubordinateJudge of the 24-Pergannahs. The appeal belonged to our group, was heard by usin due course, and was dismissed. We had at no time been constituted a SpecialBench to hear appeals in all cases in which the Improvement Trust wasconcerned, and there is no foundation whatever for the first proposition thatthe Appellate Bench, before which appeals against the awards of the ImprovementTrust were to be heard, was originally composed of myself and Mr. JusticeCnming. Consequently, the suggestion contained in the second proposition that Ihad been withdrawn from the Appellate Bench, which in fact bad never beenconstituted, is equally groundless. Here I may observe that as under Section108, Sub-section 2 of the Government of India Act, 1915, the duty devolves uponthe Chief Justice to determine, from time to time, what Judges of the Court areto constitute the several Division Courts, the second proposition necessarilyinvolves an imputation against the Chief Justice that he had withdrawn me fromthe Appellate Bench he had previously constituted, composed of myself and Mr.Justice Cuming, to hear appeals in cases in which the Calcutta ImprovementTrust was concerned, There is clearly the further imputation that the ChiefJustice had taken this aotion by reason of my judgment in the appeal preferredby the Improvement Trast against Chandra Kanta Ghosh. As the Appellate Benchhad never in fact been constituted in the manner stated by the writer, thecharge that I had heen withdrawn therefrom for the reason assigned wasevidently baseless. The third proposition, namely, that the Appellate Bench hadbeen constituted of the Chief Justice himself and Mr. Justice Woodroffe, insupersession of the previously constituted Bench, composed of myself and Mr.Justice Cuming, was consequently equally unfounded; as a matter of fact, longbefore the constitution of the Bench to hear the appeals from the originalside, Mr. Justice Cuming had ceased to be a member of this Court. The fourthproposition refers to the rumour that the Appellate Bench presided over by theChief Justice and Mr. Justice Woodroffe was about to be strengthened by theappointment of Mr. Justice Chitty, and that something like constrenationprevailed on account of the proposed new constitution of the Bench. As I readthe article, the consternation was due, not so much to the fact that the ChiefJustice and Mr. Justice Woodroffe composed the Bench, as to the fact that theBench was about to be strengthened by the ap-pointement of Mr. Justice Chitty.This implies most unmistakably that a just decision, that is, a decision justin the estimate of this impartial writer, could not be expected from a Bench soconstituted. If language has any meaning, this was clearly a libel on Mr.Justice Chitty, if not also upon the other two members of the Bench. The fifthproposition involves a libel upon Indian Judges but in the opposite direction.No doubt, it is very artfully suggested that Indian Judges should be on theBench to hear this class of cases, because they are likely to know more ofconditions and practices prevailing here than European Judges. But, as was wellknown, the matter in controversy in the appeals had not the remotest connectionwith a knowledge of local conditions and practices. The point in issue was adry question of law as to the true interpretation of a legislative enactment.The writer, however, unmistakably insinuates that land-owners in Calcutta (whoare principally affected by the operations of the Trust) are mostly Indians,and Indian Judges on the Bench might be expected to give a decision in theirfavour. I do not appreciate the distinction between an insinuation that aEuropean Judge is likely to decide in favour of the executive, because he is aEuropean, and an insinuation that an Indian Judge is likely to decide in favourof Indian land-owners, because he is an Indian. To my mind, the two statementsare equally reprehensible as libels on the Judges of this Court. I cannot, inthis connection, pass by in silence the observations of Mr. Jackson as to theconstitution of the Bench which actually heard the appeals from the judgment ofMr. Justice Greaves. The Courtis called upon, in the present Rule, to considerthe true character of the allegations contained in the two articles publishedin the Amrita Bazar Patrika, and to determine whether they do or do notconstitute a contempt of Court. We have no concern whatever with the question,whether the Chief Justice, who alone is charged with the duty to constituteDivision Courts, has in this particular instance exercised wisely or otherwisethe discretion vested in him by law. The remarks of Mr. Jackson on this subjectwere absolutely irrelevant for the determination of the question before theCourt, and exhibited, I feel constrained with regret to hold, an unusual andunwarranted lapse from that decorum which we are accustomed to associate withthe transaction of public business in a Court of Justice. I cannot but deem itsignificant that the other Counsel engaged in the case expressly dissociatedthemselves with special care from the comments made by Mr. Jackson in thisbehalf. Here I may observe that in the judgment just delivered by the ChiefJustice he has taken pains to explain the reasons which moved him to constitutethe Bench as he did; Mr. Justice Woodroffe also has touched on the subject andexpressed his opinion thereon. But, for obvious reasons, which need not bedilated upon, I must respectfully decline to examine the question. Besides, theexercise of discretion by the Chief Justice in the matter of constitution of aDivision Court to hear the appeals against the judgment of Mr. Justice Greaves,is, under the law, not liable to be reviewed by this Bench and is not subjectto our approbation or disapprobation. I desire, consequently, to guard myselfmost carefully from the discussion of a question, which, notwithstanding whatfell from Mr. Jackson, does not, in my judgment, properly arise even as aside-issue in these proceedings; such a discussion is not likely to advance anyuseful purpose, because it cannot be of real assistance in the solution of thevery narrow issue comprised in the scope of our enquiry, namely, the realimport of the two articles published in the Amrita, Bazar Patrika and whether,on a fair interpretation, they did or did not constitute a contempt of thisCourt; upon that matter, which alone it is our function to decide, I feel noreasonable doubt. I desire, however, to repudiate most emphatically theastonishing assertion made by Mr. Jackson that landless Judges, as he calledthem, were, merely because they were landless, less competent and lesstrustworthy as interpreters of a statutory enactment than Judges of any otherclass, and that Indian Judges, because they might possibly be proprietors ofland, were for this purpose more capable and reliable as expounders of the lawthan their European colleagues. But to return to the two articles: it seems tome indisputably plain that the implication of the second article, whether takenalong with or independently of the first, is that, at the instance of personsinterested in the Calcutta Improvement Trust, the Chief Justice has constituteda Special Bench to ensure a decision favourable to the Trust in the appealsagainst the judgment of Mr. Justice Greaves. This brings me to the questionwhich is the cruse of the whole matter, namely, whether an imv putation of thischaracter constitutes a contempt of Court.

88. It is not necessary for our present purpose to give anexhaustive enumeration of acts which amount to contempts of Court. It issufficient to state that scandalous attacks upon Judges, calculated to cause anobstruction to public justice, do constitute such contempts. Blaokstone, in acelebrated passage of his Commentaries (Volume IV, page 285) which will befound quoted in Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] : 41 C. 173 atp. 176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : : 17 C.W.N. 1253,specifies, in his description of contempts of Court, contempts which arise"by speaking or writing contemptuously of the Court or Judges, acting intheir judicial sapacity and which demonstrate a gross want of that regard andrespect, which, when onoe Courts of Justice are deprived of, their authority,so necessary for the good order of the kingdom, is entirely lost amongst thepeople." Sir John Wilmot, C.J., in Rex v. Almon (1765) Wilm. 243 at p. 255: 97 E.R. 94 justifies a similar view in a passage which may be usefullyrecalled here:

By our constitution, the King is the fountain of everyspecies of justice, which is administered in this kingdom. The King is deiureto distribute justice to all his subjects; and, because he cannot do it himselfto all persons, he delegates his power to his Judges, who have the custody andguard of the Kings oath, and sit in the seat of the King concerning hisjustice. The arraignment of the justice of the Judges, is arraigning theKings justice; it is an impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choiceof his Judges, and excites in the minds of the people a general dissatisfactionwith all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minda to obey them; andwhenever mens allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is themost fatal and most dangerous obstruction of justice, and, in my opinion, callsout for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstructionwhatsoever; not for the sake of the Judges, as private individuals, but becausethey are the channels by which the Kings justice is conveyed to the people. Tobe impartial, and to be universally thought so, are both absolutely necessaryfor the giving justice that free, open, and uninterrupted current, which ithas, for many ages found all over this kingdom, and which so eminentlydistinguishes and exalts it above all nations upon the earth.

89. It is needless to multiply early instances of the applicationof this doctrine, which will be found collected in 3 Howell State Trials,1074-1080. and 8 Howell State Trials, EO. Amongst modern instances referencemay be made to the observations In the matter of a. Special Reference from theBahama Islands (1893) A.C. 138, Reg. v. Staffordshire County Court Judge (1888)57 L.J.Q.B. 483 : 36 W.R. 796, Reg. v. Oray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 : 69 L.J.Q.B. 502;L.T. 534 : 48 W.R. 474 : 64 J.P. 484 : 16 T.L.R. 305., Hex v. Davies (1906) 1K. B 32: 75 L.T.K. B 10 1 : 93 L.T. 772 : 54 W.R. 107: 22 T L.B. 97, SureiidraNath Banerjee, v. Chief Juctice of Bengal 10 C. 109 : 10 I. A 171 : 4 P.C. 474: 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 76, Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhicary, In the matter of 34 I.A.41 : 29 A. 95 : 4 A.L. J 34 : 9 Bom. L.E. 9 : 17 M.L.J. 74 : : 11 C.W.N. 273 5 C.L.J. 130 : 2 M.L.T: 5 Cri. L.J. 152 (P.C.), Taylers case41 Ind. Cas. 930 : 26 C.L.J. 345 : 19 Cri. L.J. 402, and Banks and Fenwick, Inthe matter of 45 Ind. Cas. 113 : 26 C.L.J. 401 : 19 C.L.J. 449. The principlededuoible from these cases is that punishment is inflicted for attacks of thischaracter upon Judges, not with a view to protect either the Court as a wholeor the individual Judges of the Court from a repetition of the attack, but witha view to protect the public, and specially those who, either voluntarily or bycompulsion, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, from the mischiefthey will incur, if the authority of the Tribunal be undermined or impaired.The contention has been advanced, however, that if this be the true reason forthe rule, it is necessary to establish, as a matter of fact, that the actualeffect of the publication has been an obstruction to public justice, and, that,in the absence of such proof, it cannot be held that there has been a contemptof Court. In support of this position, reliance has been placed upon thedecisions in R. v. Freemans Journal (1902) 2 I.R. 82 : 6 Ir.L.R. 628 and Kingv. Dolan (1907) 2 I.R. 260 : 9 Ir. L.R. 647. The cases mentioned do not supportthis proposition, which is, on the other hand, negatived by the decisions inReg. v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 : 69 L.J.Q.B. 502; L.T. 534 : 48 W.R. 474 : 64J.P. 484 : 16 T.L.R. 305., Hunt v. Clarke (1889) 58 L.J.Q.B. 490 : 61 L.T. 343: 37 W.R. 724, In re Pall Matt Gazette Jones Mower (1894) 11 T.L.R. 122. (49(1897) 13 T.L.R. 305, Grimwade v. Cheque Bank Ltd. (1897) 13 T.L.R. 305, theseshow that a contempt of Court is committed by libellous attacks on a Judge forwhat he did judicially, if such attacks are likely, or tend in any way, tointerfere with the due administration of justice. As Elliott, J., well puts itin People v. Stapltton (1893) 18 Col 568 : 23 L.R. 787 : 33 Pacific 167, itwould be as reasonable to require proof of actual hinderanoe in the administrationof justice by reason of a libellous attack on a Judge in his judicial capacityas for a person who has made a violent assault on another to plead that he hascommitted no offence because he has not succeeded to overcome his victim. It isnot only important that the trial of causes shall be impartial and that thedecisions of the Courts shall be just; it is equally important that causesshall be tried and judgments rendered without bias, prejudice or improperinfluence of any kind. He who scandalises the Court or a Judge in relation to aparticular litigation, commits an offence, not merely against the rights ofthose litigants, but also against public justice: In the matter of a SpecialReference of the Bahama Islands (1893) A.C. 138. It is a public wrong, a crimeagainst the State, to undertake, by libel or slander on the Judges, to impairconfidence in the administration of justice. That a party indulges in calumnyof the gravest character, and, consequently, does not succeed in his endeavour toshake the confidence of the public in the Court, surely does not alter thequality of his act or make it any the less reprehensible. From this standpoint,it is immaterial whether the attack on the Judge is with reference to a causeabout to be tried; or actually under trial, or recently adjudged; in eachinstance, the tendency is to poison the fountain of justice, to createdistrust, and to destroy the confidence of the people in the Courts, which areof prime importance to them in the protection of their rights and liberties:Beg v. (Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 : 69 L.J.Q.B. 502; L.T. 534 : 48 W.R. 474 : 64J.P. 484 : 16 T.L.R. 305. Upon my construction of the second article, read withor without reference to the first, I hold that it undoubtedly constitutes a contemptof Court.

90. As regards the second question, there is no room forcontroversy that this Court has power to punish summarily a contempt of Courtcommitted by the publication of a libel on the Court or on the Judges, when theCourt is not sitting. By Clause 1 of the Letters Patent of 1862 and Clause 2 ofthe Letters Patent of 1865, the Court was constituted as a Court of Record;and, as a superior Court of Record, it has summary jurisdiction to punish forcontempt of Court, This was affirmed in respect of the Superior Courts atWestminster by Wilmot, C.J., in Rex v. Almon (1765) Wilm. 243 at p. 255 : 97E.R. 94 and his opinion has been quoted with approval in a long line ofdecisions, the most notable whereof is, perhaps, the judgment of Cookburn, C.J.,in Reg. v. Lefroy (1873) 8 Q.B. 134 : 42 L.J.Q.B. 121 : 28 L.T. 182 : 21 W.R.332 Mr. Jackson contended that this view will not stand scrutiny and mayproperly be described as law taken for granted." In this connection, heinvited our attention to a celebrated passage from the judgment of Lord Denman,L, C.J., in Reg. v. OConnell (1844) 5 SC 877); 11 C1. & Fin. 155 at p. 372: 9 Jur. 25 : 1 Cox. C.C. 413 : 7 Ir. L.R. 261 : 8 E.R. 1061 at p. 1143 : 65R.R. 59: "A large portion of that legal opinion, which has passed currentfor law, falls within the description of law taken for granted; if astatistical table of legal propositions should be drawn out, and the firstcolumn headed law by Statute, and the second, law by decision, a thirdcolumn, under the heading of law taken for granted would comprise as muchmatter as both the others combined. But when, in pursuit of truth, we areobliged to investigate the grounds of the law, it is plain, and has often beenproved by recent experience, that the mere statement and re-statement of adoctrine,--the mere repetition of the cantilena of lawyers, cannot make it lawunless it can be traced to some competent authority, and if it beirreconcilable to some clear legal principle." But the question remains,whether the proposition that a Superior Court of Record has power to punishsummarily for contempt of Court, can appropriately be treated as "lawtaken for granted." I am not unmindful that a learned writer (Mr. JohnCharles Fox in the Law Quarterly Review, Volume XXIV, pages 184, 266) hasmaintained the view that the opinion expressed by Wilmot, C.J., in Reg. v.Almon (1765) Wilm. 243 at p. 255 : 97 E.R. 94 is not historically accurate. Letus assume that this criticism is well established on the ancient authoritiesand that while originally the superior Courts of Common Law had jurisdiction topunish only disobedience to the Kings writ summarily by fine and imprisonmentupon attachment, they had jurisdiction only on indictment or bill to punishcontempts in facte and other obstructions to the administration of justice,such as libelling the Court or the Judge. Let us assume also that thedevelopment of the summary jurisdiction to punish contempts has been of slowgrowth and that the earliest recorded case of libel or slander on the Court ora Judge by a stranger unconnected with the service of process, which waspunished summarily by attachment, cannot be traced to a period anterior to1720. Surely, this cannot but be regarded now as a matter of other than antiquarianinterest. We have abundant "competent authority" not irreconcilableto clear legal principles," in support of the view that a Superior Courtof Record does possess the power to punish summarily contempts of Court of thedescription now before us. Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J., maintained and appliedthis principle in Abdool and Mahtab, In re 8 W.R. Cr. 32 and Be William, Tayler41 Ind. Cas. 930 : 26 C.L.J. 345 : 19 Cri. L.J. 402, which, upon a full reviewof the authorities, was re-affirmed in Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind.Cas. 81 : 41 C. 173 at p. 176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 :: 17 C.W.N. 1253. We have also the pronouncement of theJudicial Committee to the same effect in Me Dermott v. Judges of British Guiana(1868) 2 P.C. 341 : 5 Moo. P.C. 466 : 38 L.J.P.C. 1 : 20 L.T. 74 : 17 W.R. 352: 16 E.R. 590, where they confirmed the view indicated in the earlier cases ofSmith v. Sierre Leone (Justices of) (1841) 3 Moo 361 : 13 E.R. 147 and Rainy v.Sierra Leone (Justices of) (1853) 8 Moo P.C. 47 : 14 E.R. 19 : 97 R.R. 26. Asregards the power of Indian High Courts in a case of this character, we havetwo decisions by the Judicial Committee, namely, Surendra Nath Banerjfe v.Chief Justice of Bengal 10 C. 109 : 10 I. A 171 : 4 P.C. 474 : 5 Ind. Dec.(N.S.) 76 and Sashi Bhushan Bar-badhicury, In the matter of 34 I.A. 41 : 29 A.95 : 4 A.L. J 34 : 9 Bom. L.E. 9 : 17 M.L.J. 74 : 11 C.W.N. 273 5 C.L.J. 130 :2 M.L.T. 5 Cri. L.J. 152 (P.C.). In the former case it was ruled that the HighCourt had power to punish in a summary manner, by fine cr imprisonment or both,a contempt of Court, which in that case, as in the present, consisted in thepublication out of Court of a libel on one or more of the Judges. In the lattercase, the Judicial Committee held that there was no doubt that the publicationof the libel in question constituted a contempt of Court, which might have beendealt with by the High Court in a summary manner, by fine or imprisonment orboth. In my opinion, these repeated pronouncements by the Judicial Committeeconclude the matter, so far as "competent authority" is concerned,and no useful purpose can be served by an examination of the historical basisof the opinion expressed by Wilmot, C.J. That the possession of this power by aJudicial Tribunal (however cautiously and sparingly it may have to beexercised) is not also irreconcilable to clear legal principle" is beyondserious controversy; indeed, the summary power to commit and punish forcontempts tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, isessential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to themaintenance of the authority of a Court and to the enforcement of itsjudgments; it is a necessary incident and attribute of a superior Court,without which it could no more exist than without a Judge, [See the casesreviewed in Governor of Bengal v. Mati Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] : 41 C. 173 at p.176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : : 17 C.W.N. 1253.]It was argued, however, on the authority of the decision of the JudicialCommittee in Me Lead v. St. Aubyn (1899) A.C. 549 : 68 L.J.P.C. 137 : 81 L.T.158 : 48 W.R. 173 : 15 T.L.R. 487 that committals for contempt of Court bywoandalisiug the Court itself had become obsolete in England. It may beobserved here parenthetically that this very decision of the Judicial Committeeis an authority for the proposition that, as laid down by Lord Hardwieke in St.James Evening Post case (1742) 2 Atk 469 : 26 E.R. 683, the publication ofscandalous matter in respect of the Court itself is a contempt and that powersummarily to commit for contempt of Court is considered necessary for theproper administration of justice. I do not read the statement, that committalsfor contempt of Court by scandalising the Court itself had become obsolete inEngland, as destructive of the authority of the earlier decisions on thesubjeot. Indeed, the proposition taken literally seems to go too far and it issignificant that, in the very next year, proceedings were taken in England forcontempt of Court in the case of Reg. v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 : 69 L.J.Q.B.502; L.T. 534 : 48 W.R. 474 : 64 J.P. 484 : 16 T.L.R. 305. There can, I think,be no doubt that where the circumstances clearly demand action of thisdescription, the Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power topunish on summary process the contempt of scandalising it and therebyattempting to interfere with the due course of justice. No doubt, as LordMorris observes in McLeod v. St. Aubyn (1899) A.C. 549 : 68 L.J.P.C. 137 : 81L.T. 158 : 48 W.R. 173 : 15 T.L.R. 487, Courts may be satisfied sometimes toleave to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them,But I do not accede to the argument that it is invariably prudent for the Courtto assume an attitude of indifference or to institute regular criminalproceedings against the offender. In this connection, reference mayappropriately be made to the weighty words of Kent, C.J., in Yates v. Lansing(1810) 5 Johnson 282 Whenever we subject the established Courts of the land tothe degradation of private prosecution, we subdue their importance and destroytheir authority. Instead of being venerable before the public, they becomecontemptible; and we thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon everythingsacred in society and to overthrow those institutions which have hitherto beendeemed the best guardians of civil liberty." [See also the very pertinentobservations of Marshall, J., in State v. Shepherd (1900) 113 Geo. 114 : 15L.R.A. 225 quoted in Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] : 41 C. 173at p. 176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : : 17 C.W.N.1253.] In my opinion this Court has undoubted jurisdiction to deal summarilywith persons who have committed contempt by scandalous attack upon the Judges,and such power should be exercised in the present instance. When I hold this, Ido not overlook the assertion of the printer and publisher that the articlesbefore us were published by him in good faith and in the public interest. Thesincerity of this plea appears to me to be, open to the gravest doubt. But,even on the assumption that this allegation is literally true, I desire to addthat, while I do not underrate in the least degree the importance of theliberty of the press, I cannot hold it expedient that any class of thecommunity should be priviJged to attack the Courts so as to interfere with therights of litigants or to embarrass the administration of justice. Thepublishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher right than others, tobring to public notice the conduct of Courts, and provided the publications aretrue and fair in spirit, there is no law to restrain the freest expression ofthe disapprobation that any person may entertain of what is done in or by theCourts. But liberty of the press must not be confounded with license or abuseof that liberty, and though it may be true that where the liberty of the pressand freedom of public comments end, there tyranny begins, it is at leastequally true that where vituperation begins, there the liberty of the pressends; and the inherent power of the Superior Courts of the Record to punish anypublication calculated to interfere with the administration of justice cannotbe deemed in any Way restricted by considerations of the kind urged by theprinter and publisher.

91. As regards the third question, namely, what is the truenature of the present proceedings, is it civil or criminal in character, thematter is of practical importance from the point of view of the mode of trialto be adopted. In the case of dovetnor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] :41 C. 173 at p. 176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : : 17C.W.N. 1253I had occasion to examine fully the distinction between a criminaland a civil contempt, which is of a fundamental character.

92. A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed againstthe dignity and authority of the Court. A civil contempt, on the other hand, isfailure to do something ordered to be done by a Court in a civil action for thebenefit of the opposing party therein. Consequently, in the case of a criminalcontempt, the proceeding is for punishment of an act committed against themajesty of the law, and, as the primary purpose of the punishment is thevindication of the public authority, the proceeding conforms, as nearly aspossible, to proceedings in criminal cases. In the case of a civil contempt, onthe other hand, the proceeding, in its initial stages at least, when thepurpose is merely to secure compliance with a judicial order made for thebenefit of a litigant, may be deemed instituted at the instance of the partyinterested and thus to possess a civil character. But, here also refusal toobey the order of the Court may render it necessary for the Court to adoptpunitive measures against the person who has defied its authority: at thatstage, at least, the proceedings may assume a criminal character. In thismanner, the dividing line between acts which constitute criminal and otherswhich constitute civil contempt may become indistinct in those cases, where thetwo gradually merge into each other: see St. James Even-ing Post case (1742) 2Atk 469 : 26 E.R. 683, Scott v. Scott (1913) A.C. 417 : 82 L.J.P. 74 : 109 L.T.1 : 57 S.J. 498 : 29 T.L.R. 520, Lechmere Gharltons case (1837) 2 Cri. 316) 40E.R. 661: 45 R.R. 68, Wallace, In re (1866) 1 P.C. 283 : 4 Moo P.C. (N.S.) 140: 36 L.J.P.C. 9 : 15 W.R. 533 : 16 E.R. 269., Davies, In re (1888) 21 Q.B.D.236 : 37 W.R. 57., Onslows and Whalleys case (1873)9 Q.B. 219 andSkip-worths case (1873) 9 Q.B. 230. A careful scrutiny of the cases in thebooks shows, however, that much confusion exists in the reported decisions asto whether or not contempt proceedings are civil or criminal, where thecontempt is committed in relation to a civil proceeding, and, it isconsequently desirable to investigate briefly the true test fordifferentiation.

93. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the verynature and purpose of Courts of Justice. It subserves at once a double purpose,namely, as an aid to protect the dignity and authority of the tribunal and alsoas an aid in the enforcement of civil remedies. The power may consequently beexercised in civil or criminal cases or independently of both, and eithersolely for the preservation of the authority of the Court or in aid of therights of the litigant or for both these purposes combined. By reason of thistwofold attribute, proceedings in contempt may be regarded as anomalous in theirnature, possessed of characteristics which render them more or less difficultof ready or definite classification in the realm of judicial power. Hence, suchproceedings have sometimes been styled sui generis. That they are largely of acriminal nature, inasmuch as the Court has power to convict and punish for thewrong committed, cannot be disputed, and yet it must be recognised that, insome respects, by reason of the end subserved, they partake of the nature of acivil remedy. This dual characteristic has given rise to many controversies,specially when questions have arisen as to right of appeal from the orderpassed [as in, Reg. v. Barnardu (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 305 : 58 L.J.Q.B. 553 : 61L.T. 547 : 37 W.R. 789, Barnardo v. Ford (1892) A.C. 326 : 61 L.J.Q.B. 728 : 67L.T. 1 : 56 J.P. 629, Relmore v. Smith (1886) 35 Ch. D. 449 : 56 L.J. Ch. 145 :56 L.T. 72 : 35 W.R. 157, A.G.v. Kissane (1893) 32 Ir. L.R. 220, Hunt v. Olarte(1889) 58 L.J.Q.B. 490 : 61 L.T. 343 : 37 W.R. 724, Reg. v. Staffordshire CountyCourt Jttdge(1888) 57 L.J.Q.B. 483 : 36 W.R. 796, OSheav. OShea (1890) 15P.D. 59 : 59 L.J.P. 47 : 62 L. 713 : 38 W.R. 374 17 Cox. C.C. 107, Bessette v.Conkey Co. (1904) 194 U.S. 324.; 48 Law. Ed. 997, Ohtislensen Engineering Co.,In the matter of (1904) 194 U.S. 458 : 48 L E 1072, Warden v. Searls (1887) 121U.S. 14 : 30 L E 853, Gompers v. Bucks Store do. (1911) 221 U.S. 418], theapplicability of rules of evidence [Celluloid Co. v. Chrolithian Co. (1885) 24Fed. 585, Bullock Co. v. West-inghouse Co. (1904) 63 C.C.A. 607 : 194 U.S. 636J.E. 7 parte Gould (1893) 99 Cali. 360 : 21 L.R.A. 751 : 37 Am. St. Rep. 57],the finality of the judgment [.Fischer v. Hayes (1881) 19 Blatoh 13; C. Fed.63. (74) (1869) 7 Bla 23 : 17 Fed. Cas. 9911. (75) (1893) 9 T.L.R. 196 and ReMullee (174)], liability for payment of costs, Cornish, In re (75), Martindale,In re (1894) 3 Ch. 193 at p. 200 : 64 L.J. Ch. 9 : 8 Rule 729 : 71 L,. T. 468 :43 W.R. 53 and Day v. Longhurst (1892) 62 L.J. Ch. 334 : 2 E. 234 : 68 L.T. 17: 41 W.R. 283], right of trial by Jury, [Tinsely v. Anderson (1898) 171 U.S.101 : 43 LE 91, Ee Debs (1895) 158 U.S. 564 : 39 L E. 1092 and Eilenbecker v.District Court of Plymouth County, Iowa (1890) 134 U.S. 31 : 33 L E. 801] andother like matters. The difficulty in each case is to determine when aparticular proceeding assumes the criminal rather than the civil aspect, orwhen of both, and, if the latter, which feature must control. The question hasbeen repeatedly and elaborately discussed by the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates: Kearney Ex parte (1882) 7 Wheat. 38 : 5 Law. Ed. 391", New Orleansv. New York Mail Steamship Co. (1874) 20 Wall. 387 : 22 LE 354, Chiles, In re(1875) 22 Wall. 157 : 22 Law. Ed. 819. (S3) (1880) 102 U.S. 12]; 26 LE 95, Hayesv. Fischer (1880) 102 U.S. 12]; 26 L E. 95, Warden v. Searls (1904) 194 U.S.458 : 48 L E 1072, Ex. Debs In re (1895) 158 U.S. 564 : 39 L E 1092, ONeal v.United States (1903) 190 U.S. 36 : 47 L E 945, Christensen Engineering Co. Inthe matter of (1904) 194 U.S. 458 : 48 LE 1072 Bessette v. Conkey Co. (1904)194 U.S. 324.; 48 LE 997, Doyle v. London Guarantee Co. (1907) 204 U.S. 559 andGompers v. Bucks Stove Co. (1911) 221 U.S. 418. The view de-ducible from thesedecisions is in general agreement with what is indicated above, namely, aproceeding to punish for contempt has the essential qualities of a criminalproceeding, whether the proceeding is initiated primarily to vindicate theCourts authority or solely as a coercive and a remedial measure to enforce therights of the litigant or for both these purposes combined. This must be so,since it necessarily results from the nature of the power to punish forcontempt that whatever the primary purpose of such a proceeding may be, it isalways within the power of the Court to make its judgment, in part, at least,punitive or vindicatory in character; in other words, where the sole purposesought by initiating the proceeding is to secure the coercive and remedialaction of the Court against a party, the Court may nevertheless, in itsdiscretion, add a punishment, by way of fine or imprisonment, for the failureof the person in contempt to obey its mandate, I think it undeniable that theproceeding must be regarded from its inception to the point of judgment as of acriminal pature, or, at least potentially so, since until the judgment isgiven, it cannot be known what its character will be. It is the judgment,therefore, which must eventually in any case determine the character of theproceeding, and this leads to the conclusion that logically, perhaps, insteadof characterising contempt proceedings as criminal or remedial according tocircumstances, it is contempt judgments that should be so classified. In anyview, there is no room for controversy that where, as here, the contemptconsists in an attack upon the Court, the proceedings, instituted to vindicateits dignity, are of criminal nature, even though the attack has been made inconnection with civil suits or appeals, either actually decided or pending or aboutto be taken up for disposal [Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20 Ind. Cas. 81 [LQ/CalHC/1913/367] :41 C. 173 at p. 176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 : : 17C.W.N. 1253].

94. As regards the fourth question, we have to considerseparately the liability of each of the five persons who have been called uponto show cause why they should not be committed for contempt of Court. TaritKanti Biswas has filed an affidavit to the effect that he is the printer andpublisher of the Amrita Bazar Patrika and that in such capacity he printed andpublished the "articles mentioned. He states, however, that he exercisesno control whatever over the contents of the newspaper, that he did not readthe articles when they were handed over to him for publication, that he did notconsider, at any time prior to publication, their meaning or purport, that heinserted them in the paper in the usual bourse of business, that he acted bonafide and was not actuated by a disrespectful or other improper feeling ormotives towards the Court or the Chief Justice, and that he did not intend toexcite contempt or to reflect in any way upon the integrity or dignity of theCourt or of the Chief Justice in his administration thereof. Notwithstandingthis defence there can be no doubt as to the liability of the printer andpublisher; for as Lord Morris observed in McLeod v. St. Aubyn (1899) A.C. 549 :68 L.J.P.C. 137 : 81 L.T. 158 : 48 W.R. 173 : 15 T.L.R. 487, a printer andpublisher intends to publish and so intending cannot plead as a justificationthat he did not know the contents. Indeed, this has been the settled law eversince the decision of Lord Hardwioke in St. James Evening Post case (1742) 2Atk 469 : 26 E.R. 683, which was followed by Lord Erskine in Jones, Ex parts(1806) 13 Ves. (Jun.) 237 : 33 E.R. 283, and by Stirling, J., in AmericanExchange in Europe v. Oilltg (1889) 58 L.J. Ch. 706 at p. 707 : 61 L T. 502,Cheshire v. Strauss (1896) 12 T.L.R. 291, Kex v. Parsce (1903) 2 K.B. 432 : 72L.J.K.B. 839 : 89 L.T. 439 : 52 W.B. 215 : 67; P. 421 : 19 T.L.B. 627, Emmensv. Pottle (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 354 at p. 357 : 55 L.F.Q.B. 51 : 53 L.T. 808 : 34W.E. 116 : 50 J.P. 228, Bex. v. Duties (1906) 1 K. B 32: 75 L.T.K. B 10 1 : 93L.T. 772 : 54 W.R. 107: 22 T L.B. 97, Daw v. Eley (1869) 7 Eq. 49f 38 L.J. Ch.113 : 17 W.R. 245, Tichborne v. Tichborne (1867) 7 Eq. 55 note; 15 W.R. 1072 atp. 1073 : 17 L.T. 5, Cheltenham fy Swansea By. Carriage and Waggon Co., In re(1860) 8 Eq. 580 : 38 L.J. Ch. 330 : 20 L.T. 169 : 17 W.R. 463 and Littler v. Thomson(1839) 2 Beay. 129 : 48 E.B. 1129: 50 R.R. 124. The Rule must consequently bemade absolute against the printer and publisher. With regard to his allegationthat he had no intention whatever to offend the dignity or integrity of theCourt and that in reality he was helpless in the position he oscupied as aservant of the Company, one cannot but feel that the value of suoh assurance isconsiderably discounted by the faot that he has given no information to theCourt. I am not unmindful that as ruled In the matter of a Special Referencefrom the Bahama Inlands (1893) A.C. 138, he was under no legal obligation toassist the Court in any way, and to disclose the name of the person primarilyresponsible for the articles; still his conduct serves to throw doubt in aconsiderable measure on the genuineness of his profession that he had nointention to prejudice the due course of administration of justice or to oastany reflection on the Judges of this Court. He must accordingly take theconsequences of his act, and cannot reasonably urge that he has established aclaim for specially considerate treatment. See the observations of Stirling J.,in American Exchange in Europe v. Gillig (1889) 58 L.J. Ch. 706 at p. 707 : 61L, T. 502.

95. As regards the other four defendants, it is necessary tostate that they have not all taken up the same attitude in this matter. Counselon behalf of Moti Lal Ghose declined to answer, as he was entitled to do, thequestion put by me, whether he was in reality one of the Directors of theCompany as stated in the return of Golap Lal Ghose alleged to have been filedunder Section 32 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Pijush Kanti Ghose hasfiled an affidavit in which he admits that he is one of the Directors of theCompany, but that neither he nor his co directors exercise any control over thecontents of the newspaper and perform such duties and exercise such powers onlyas are mentioned and defined in the Articles of Association. He farther allegesthat he was absent from Calcutta from the 21st May to the 4th June and was nothere on the date when the second article appeared. Mrinal Kanti Ghose has fileda similar affidavit, in which he admits that he is the Secretary of theCompany. He further alleges that Moti Lal Ghose, Gopal Lal Ghose and PijushKanti Ghose are Directors of the Company, that Golap Lal Ghose is also theFinancial Manager, that neither he nor the Directors nor the Financial Managerexercises any control whatever over the contents of the paper and that theDirectors perform such duties and exercise such powers only as are mentionedand defined in the Articles of Association (extracts wherefrom are appended tothe affidavit). He enumerates also the duties of the Secretary and of theFinancial manager, and finally adds that he was absent from Calcutta from the4th May to the 22nd May and was not here on either of the two dates when thearticles mentioned appeared. Golap Lal Ghose has not filed any affidavit, andon his behalf, Counsel has contended that there is no legal evidence whateverto connect him in any way with the publication of either article. This argumentis based on three grounds, namely, first, that secondary evidence of the returnalleged to have been filed under Section 32 of the Indian Companies Act was notadmissible; secondly, that oven if secondary evidence were held admissible,evidence was requisite to prove that the original had been filed by Golap LalGhose who is Director and Financial Manager of the Company and has been calledupon to show cause; and, thirdly, assuming but not admitting that he was aManager on the 5th March 1917, as stated in the return, there is no evidencethat he was Manager on either of the dates when the offending articles werepublished.

96. Before I deal with these objections and their effectupon the Rule, I may make the preliminary observation that the materials whichwere placed before the Court when the Rule was issued amply justified theaction then taken, indeed, made it in a manner incumbent upon the Court tofollow the course actually adopted. These materials showed that the AmritaBazar Patrika was the property of a Company called the Amrita Bazar PatrikaLimited, incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, on the 19thNovember 1908; that one of the objects for which the Company was establishedwas to acquire and take over as a going concern the business of newspaperproprietors, printers and publishers then carried on in connection with thepaper; that the registered office of the Company was at No. 2, Ananda ChatterjeesLane, where the newspaper was published, and where many of the shareholders andDirectors who were olosely related to each other lived, and that on the 5thMarch 1917, the Directors and Managers were the persons mentioned in the returnfiled by the Secretary under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. Inthese circumstances, there was a strong prima facie case against the defendantsthat they were connected with and responsible for the publication of thearticles in question. But although these materials were sufficient to justifythe issue of a Rule, on careful scrutiny and on examination of the allegationsin the affidavits filed in answer to the Rule, I see no escape from theconclusion that an order cannot properly be made against any of the defendantsother than the printer and publisher.

97. With reference to the legal objections just enumerated,I am not prepared to accede to the contention that secondary evidence of thereturns in the custody of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies is notadmissible. Section 65, Clause (e), of the Indian Evidence Act provides thatsecondary evidence may be given of the contents of a document when the originalis a public document within the meaning of Section 74. Section 74, Sub-section2, provides that public records kept in British India of private documents arepublic documents. The question consequently reduces to this, whether thereturns in the custody of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies constitutepublic records of private documents. The observation of Lord Blackburn inSturla v. Freccia (1880) 5 A.C. 623 at p. 642 : 50 L.J. Ch. 86 : 43 L.T. 209;W.R. 217 : 44 J.P. 812 is of no assistance in the solution of this question anddoes not show that a public record of a private document is limited to an entrymade in a book by a public officer, which reproduces the contents oi thedocument and thus constitutes a written memorial made by the public officerauthorised by law to perform that function. The term "record" asappears from the Oxford Dictionary (Vol. VIII, page 266) has a morecomprehensive meaning and includes a collection of documents. When, as in thecase of the Indian Companies Act, the Legislature has provided that returns areto be lodged with a public officer, these returns, when transmitted to andfiled by him, do constitute public records of private documents within themeaning of Section 74, Sub-section 2, although they are not copied out by theRegistrar of Joint Stock Companies into a volume kept for the purpose; they areundoubtedly intended for reference and used by the public, But though thisobjection is of no avail, the second exception is well-founded; for althoughsecondary evidence may be admissible, the party who produces the evidence isnot relieved of his obligation to prove the execution of the document, just asif the original had been produced, unless the case is covered by Section 90 ofthe Indian Evidence Act or the Legislature has expressly provided that thedocument or endorsement thereon is receivable in evidence without proof ofexecution, as, for example, in Section 60 of the Indian Registration Act.Consequently, as against Mtiti Lal Ghose and Golap Lal Ghose there is no legalevidence to establish that the former is a Director and the letter a Manager ofthe Company, The statements made by Pijush Kanti Ghose and Mrinal Kanti Ghose,in the affidavits filed by them at the hearing, cannot fairly be used to theDetriment of other defendants as the proceeding is in the nature of a criminaltrial. Besides, as pointed out in the case of Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal 20Ind. Cas. 81 : 41 C. 173 at p. 176 : 18 C.L.J. 452 : 14 Cri. L.J. 321 :: 17 C.W.N. 1253on the authority of the decision in Reg. v.Stanger (1871) 6 Q.B. 352 : 40 L.J.Q.B. 96 : 24 L.T. 226 : 19 W.R. 640,supplementary evidence cannot be given so as to prejudice the position of theaccused. To the same effect are the observations made by Wright, J., Hooley, Inre, Hooley, Ex parte (1899) 6 Hanson 44 at p. 46 : 79 It T. 703 when he wasasked to grant leave to amend a notice of motion to commit a company forcontempt of Court: "That is not the way in which the Court deals withmatter of this kind affecting the liberty of the subject. Applicants must comewith their machinery ready." The procedure should be at least equallystrict to adherence to the forms of the law at least equally scrupulous, whenthe Court finds itself in the position of Prosecutor and Judge and anunexpected lacuna in the evidence transpires daring the trial. The Court mustact with great caution in strict conformity with the requirements of the lawand avoid a perhaps not unnatural tendency to supplement the evidence [Martinv. Mackonochie (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 730]. As regards the third legal objection,however, I am not convinced that there is any substance in the argument.Section 87 of the Indian Companies Act requires that notice of changes amongthe Directors or Managers shall be filed from time to time, The certifiei copyof the return furnished by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies must,therefore, be presumed to embody the latest changes. Consequently, if thereturn had been duly proved, it would have furnished prima facie evidence ofthe names of the directors and managers on the day the copy was supplied. Butthis point is immaterial, as, in my opinion, there is no legal evidence toconnect Moti Lal Ghose and Golap Lal Ghose with the publication of thearticles.

98. There remains for examination the cases of Mrinal KantiGhose, and Pijush Kanti Ghose who admit that they are directors. But theyassert in their respective affidavits that none of the directors nor thefinancial manager exercises any control whatever over the contents of thepaper. There are no materials at the disposal of the Court sufficient to contradictthese statements made on oath; consequently, the denial is, in theoircumstanoes, a sufficient answer to the rule. I cannot but observe, however,that the further assertion in the affidavits of these two persons that thedirectors perform such duties and exercise such powers only as are mentionedand defined in the Articles of Association detracts to some extent at leastfrom the value of the previous statement. The Articles of Association show thatthe business of the company is required to be managed by the directors, whilethe Memorandum of Association shows that the object for which the company wasestablished was to acquire and take over as a going concern the business ofnewspaper proprietors, printers and publishers then carried on in connectionwith the "Amrita Bazar Patrika." Consequently, the Memorandum andArticles of Association taken together may imply that it was the duty of thedirectors to manage the publication of the paper, and from this point of viewthey might be held responsible for the publication of the articles mentioned.This inference might possibly be strengthened by the circumstance that theexistence of an editor is not mentioned, not even so much as suggested, inthese proceedings. But although the case may, in these circumstances, be one ofstrong suspicion, it is impossible to hold that notwithstanding the categoricaldenial to the contrary, it has been established beyond doubt that the directorswere responsible for, or connected with the actual publication of the twoarticles. We cannot possibly hold as a matter of law that the directors of alimited company which owns a newspaper are liable to be committed for contemptof Court on account of a libel published in the paper [Reg, v. Judd (1889) 37W.R. 143 : 16 Cox. C.C. 559 : 59 L.T. 993 : 53 J.P. 215]. The decision inGreen, Ex parte, Robbins, Intte matter of (1891) 7 T.L.R. 411 cannot betreated as an authority for a general proposition of law that where a limitedcompany disseminates amongst newspapers matter amounting to contempt of Court,their manager, merely because he was the manager, was liable to be committed.The decision rested, I think, on the facts admitted or established before theCourt, which showed that the manager was in fact responsible for all the paragraphssent out to newspapers. Nor can we apply to the case before us the presumptionwhich at one time was applied in England as to the responsibility of theproprietor of a newspaper for libels published in his paper. The view that theproprietor of a newspaper was answerable, criminally as well as civilly, forthe acts of his servants or agents in misconducting a newspaper, enunciated byLord Kenyon in E. v. Walter (1799) 3 Esp. 21 : 16 R.E. 808, and re-stated byLord Ellenborongh, C.J., in R. v. White (1829) 1 Moo 271; (1811) HL 287, andby. Lord Tenterden, C.J., in R. v. Cuteh (1829) 1 Moo 433 has long beenobsolete in England [R. v. Holbrook (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 60 : 47 L.J.Q.B. 35 37 L.T.530 : 26 W.R. 144 : 13 Cox. C.C. 650], and should unquestionably not be appliedin this country in a case of the description now before us, even though it beheld applicable to trials for defamation under the Indian Penal Code: Ramasamiv. Lokanada 9 M. 387 : 1 Weir 375 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 665. (94) 2 Ind. Cas.193 : 32 M. 338 : 5 M.L.T. 415 : 9 Cr. I.J. 506 and Harisarvothama Rao v.Emperor 2 Ind. Cas. 193 [LQ/MadHC/1909/117] : 32 M. 338 : 5 M.L.T. 415 : 9 Cri. I.J. After anxiousconsideration of all the materials on the record, I have thus arrived at theconclusion that the Rule must be discharged also as against Mrinal Kanti Ghoseand Pijnsh Kanti Ghose.

99. I cannot consider the result of this trial satisfactoryfrom the vital point of view indicated by Lord Hardwicke in 8t. James EveningPost Case (1742) 2 Atk 469 : 26 E.R. 683, namely, that there cannot be anythingof greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure sothat parties may proceed with security both to themselves and their characters.The persons responsible for the grave contempt of Court which has beencommitted have not been brought to justice. This is not a matter for legitimatesurprise as the Court has not the machinery at its disposal for the discoveryof the offenders and the materials available from the public records haveproved insufficient for the purpose. At the same time the offenders havepreferred to keep themselves in the dark and have not adopted the eminentlyhonourable course which was pursued in two other instances in this Court andwhich evoked the just commendation of Sir Barnes Peacock and Sir Richard Garthrespectively: Banks and Fenwick In the matter of 45 Ind. Cas. 113 : 26 C.L.J.401 : 19 C.L.J. 449 and Surandrarath Baneryee v. Chief Justice of Bengal 10 C.109 : 10 I. A 171 : 4 P.C.J. 474 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 76. They have nothad thecourage to come forward to avow their responsibility and either to justifytheir action or to express contrition for their misconduct. Even the directorsof the company have contented themselves with a disavowal of theirresponsibility and have expressed no regret whatever for the articles publishedin a newspaper owned by the company. In these circumstances it is undoubtedlyworthy of consideration whether legislative provision should not be made tocompel "registratioji of the name of the editor and proprietor of anewspaper precisely in the same way as that of the printer and publisher. (See44 and 45 Vict. C. 60.) It may finally be observed that, on recurrence of acase of this character, the Court may find it necessary to proceed against "thecompany, as has been done in some recent instances. No doubt, the view wasmaintained at one time that a corporation could not be held liable for contemptof Court, as by reason of its impersonal nature it could not be attached:Gttilford v. Mills (1866) 2 Keb, I; T. Eaym. 152. But the weight of modernauthority is apparently against this doctrine, and the view has been maintainedthat proceedings by way of contempt would lie against corporations as well asindividuals: in the case of individuals, the process is by attachment of theperson, followed by fine or imprisonment or both; in the case of corporations,the process is by fine followed by sequestration or distraint: R. v. BirminghamGloucester Ry. Co., (1842) 3 Q.B. 223 : 2 (G. and D. 236 : 3 Ry. Cas. 148 : 11L.J.M.C. 134 : 6 Jur. 801 : 114 E.R. 492 : 61 R.R. 207 London v. Lynn (1789) 1H.B1. 206, Spokes v. Banbury Local Board (1865) 11 Jnr. (N.S.) 1010 : 35 L.J.Ch 105 : 13 L.T. 453. The decision of Wright, J., in Hooley, In re, Hooley, Exparte (1839) 2 Bea. 129 : 48 E.B. 1129: 50 R.R. 124, is seemingly an authorityonly for the proposition that a limited company cannot be committed to prisonfor contempt: it does not decide the question whether such a company may not befined for contempt of Court and the fine recovered by distraint orsequestration. In the Courts of the United States, the liability of acorporation for contempt of Court has been affirmed by a large preponderance ofauthority: Bloomington Church v. Muscatine (1855) 2 Iowa 69, West Jersey Co. v.Board of Public Works (1896) 58 N.J.L. 536 : 37 Atl. 578, U.S. v. Munplus Ry.Co. (1881) 6 Fed. 237, Re Westminster Realty Corporation (1908) 108 N.Y. Sup.551, Union v. People (1887) 121 I A 647, Stratton v. Merswether (1913) 154 Ky.839 : 159 S.W. 613, Schreiber v. Garden (1912) 137 N.Y. 747, State v. BaltimoreRy. Co. (1913) 73 W. Va. 1 : 79 S.E. 834. One of the most recent cases in whichthe question is examined as one of principle is that of Fiedler v. BanbriekBros. (1912) 162 Missourie App. 528 : 142 S.W. 1111, where, upon an elaboratereview of earlier decisions, the conclusion was reached that corporations,though not liable to be imprisoned, were liable to be fined by way ofpunishment for contempt of Court. (See also Rapaljee on Contempts, Section 48,and High on Injunctions, Section 1460.) It is not necessary for me to decidefinally on this occasion the liability of corporations to be punished forcontempt of Court in their corporate capacity; but in view of the turn eventshave taken in the present proceedings it is desirable to point out that when agrave contempt of Court has been committed by a newspaper owned by a company,the immunity from punishment which the offenders may imagine they enjoy byreason of stolid silence is most probably of an illusory character.

100. My conclusion on the whole is that the Rule must bemade absolute against the printer and publisher, but discharged against all theother defendants.

101. Charles William Chitty, J.--I have had the advantage ofreading the judgments just delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice and Mr.Justice Woodroffe, and I entirely agree with what they have said generallyabout the case, and the orders to be passed with regard to the severalrespondents. I wish, however, to state, with regard to Babu Moti Lal Ghose thatI should have been disposed to hold him responsible for the articles inquestion, as one who has been proved to be a director of this company and whoin that oapactiy has been called upon by this Court to show cause, and hasshown none. As the majority of the Bench are in favour of giving him thebenefit of the doubt, I do not desire to press my opinion further. I therefore,concur in the order about to be passed.

102. Mr. Justice Fletcher, who is unavoidably absent to-day,desires me to say that he too was prepared to hold Babu Moti Lal Ghoseresponsible, but under the circumstances he also concurs in the order to bepassed.

103. Order of the Court.

104. Lancelot Sanderson, C.J.--Tarit Kanti Biswas Themembers of the Court are unanimously of opinion that in printing and publishingthe two articles in question in the Amrita Baiar Patrika newspaper you wereguilty of a contempt of Court.

105. The serious nature of it has been referred to in thejudgments which have been delivered, and it is not necessary, therefore, for meto recapitulate what has already been said.

106. In the earliar part of your affidavit you state thatyou did not read the articles when they were handed to you for publication andthat you inserted them in the usual course of your business as printer andpublisher.

107. Later, however, in your affidavit you proceeded to tryand justify the publication of the articles by alleging that they werepublished by you in good faith and in the public interest, a position which weconsider incbnsitent with that of a man who puts forward the case that heprinted and published the articles in ignorance of their contents.

108. We are all of opinion there was not the smallestjustification for the publication of such untrue statements and unjustifiableimputations as were contained in the articles.

109. If the person responsible for the publication of thesearticles had come forward and had taken the responsibility upon himself, or ifyou had disclosed to the Court the person who was really responsible for thepublication, which must have been within your knowledge, although you might nothave known the actual writer of the article, it might have been possible for uato treat the offence in your case with such leniency as your learned Counselprayed for.

110. The person really responsible, however, has not beendisclosed but you, being the printer and publisher, whose identity could not beconcealed and whose legal liability could not be denied, are left by youremployers to bear the brunt of this matter.

111. We have taken all these matters into consideration. Thecontempt of Court, however, in our judgment was of such a nature that in theinterest of the administration of justice it is impossible for ns to pass itover without some penalty.

112. It is essential to vindicate the authority of the Courtand to make it clear that articles such as those in question constituting agrave contempt of Court cannot be published with impunity.

113. Tarit Kanti Biswas! The judgment of the Court is thatyou Tarit Kanti Biswas do pay to the Accountant-General of this Court a fine ofRs. 300 before 4-30 P.M. to-day, and that you be detained until such hour, oruntil such time as the fine is paid; and if the fine is not paid as hereindirected, you be lodged on the civil side of the Presidency Jail until the saidfine is paid or until the further order of this Court.

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In Re: Tarit Kanti Biswas and Ors. (27.06.1917 - CALHC)