Harries, J.This is a petition for revision of an order passed by the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector of Patna refusing to refer an objection to an award for determination by the Civil Court. The case first came before Wort J., who, owing to a conflict of authority, referred it to a Division Bench. A Bench, consisting of James and Chatterji JJ., referred the case to the Chief Justice with a recommendation that it should be heard by a larger Bench. Accordingly the case has been argued before this Special Bench. Proceedings for the compulsory acquisition of certain land in the Patna District took place before the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector of Patna, who was authorized to exercise the powers of the Collector, and in due course he made his award u/s 11, Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894).

2. By his award he awarded to the tenant a sum of Rupees 4917-12-0, to the proprietors a sum of Rupees 99-12-0 and to the tenure-holders Rs. 452. The present petitioner, who held a four annas share in the tenure, objected to the award and claimed a reference to the Civil Court. The Land Acquisition Deputy Collector was of opinion that the objections of the petitioner were frivolous and were made with a view to harass thS tenant. He declined to refer the matter to the Civil Court: hence the present application for revision. Section 18, Land Acquisition Act, 1894, provides that

any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

3. The application must state the grounds upon which the objection to the award is taken, and provided the objection is within time, the Collector must refer the matter to the Civil Court. In my view, the wording of Section 18(1) leaves the Collector no alternative but to refer the matter if the application is made within the periods prescribed by the Section and is not barred by proviso 2 to Section 31 of the Act. It follows therefore that the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector of Patna had no right whatsoever to refuse to refer the matter on the ground that the objections were not bona fide and were frivolous. It is to be observed that Rule 107 of the Executive Instructions issued by the Board of Revenue for this Province for the guidance of the Collectors, makes it clear that a reference to the Court, on receipt of an application u/s 18, is obligatory, unless the application is barred by the provisos to Section 18 or by proviso 2 to Section 31. However, in spite of the provisions of the Act and this instruction the Deputy Collector declined to make a reference.

4. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that this Court has power to revise the order of the Deputy Collector and to order him to refer the matter to the Civil Court. It is now conceded that if the Court has such a power, such must be u/s 115, Civil P.C., as this Court has no longer any power of superintendence, which it previously possessed u/s 107, Government of India Act, 1915. Section 115, Civil P.C., provides that,

the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto....

5. From the wording of the Section, it is clear that the High Court possesses revisional powers only in matters decided by a Court which is subordinate to the High Court. Before this Court can interfere in the present case, it must be established that the rejection of the application for reference to the Civil Court was made by the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector as a Court and as a Court subordinate to this Court. There can now be no doubt that land acquisition proceedings up to the time when the award is made are administrative proceedings and not judicial proceedings. This has been clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State (1905) 32 Cal 605.

6. In that case their Lordships held that the inquiry by the Land Acquisition Collector as to the value of land and the amount of compensation to be paid for its acquisition, resulting in the award, is an administrative, and not a judicial proceeding. If the owner of the land desired a judicial ascertainment of the value of the land, he could require the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Court for determination. As the proceedings before the Collector were not judicial, the latter was not limited to the evidence taken before him, but was entitled to avail himself of information supplied him without the knowledge of the owner of the land, and not disclosed at the inquiry.

7. At page 629, Lord Robertson, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed:

When the Sections relating to this matter are read together, it will be found that the proceedings resulting in this "award" are administrative and not judicial; that the "award" in which the inquiry results is merely a decision (binding only on the Collector) as to what sum shall be tendered to the owner of the lands; and that, if a judicial ascertainment of value is desired by the owner, he can obtain it by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector to the. Court. The Sections directly relevant (besides the 9th already set out) are the 11th, 12th, 18th, 14th, 15th and 18th. These Sections, and. the question as a whole, are very satisfactorily discussed in the judgment under appeal, and their Lordships do-not think it necessary to repeat the reasoning.

It will be observed that Lord Robertson cites Section 18 of the Act as one of the Sections which makes it clear that the proceedings before the Collector, at least up to the making of the award, are administrative and not judicial. It follows, therefore, that the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector in this case was certainly not a Court up until the time he made his award; and Lord Robertsons observations seem to suggest that he was not acting as a Court in these proceedings u/s 18 of the Act. It has however been held by a Bench of this Court in Saraswati Pattack Vs. The Land Acquisition Deputy Collector Of Champaran, , that the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector is acting as a Court subordinate to this Court in refusing to refer to the Civil Court a question under proviso 2 to Sub-section (1) of Section 49, Land Acquisition Act. Proviso 2 to Section 49 is in these terms:

Provided also that, if any question shall arise as to whether any land proposed to be taken under this Act does or does not form part of a house, manufactory or building within the meaning of this Section, the Collector shall refer the determination of such question to the Court, and shall not take possession of such land until after the question has been determined.

8. This proviso like Section 18 gives the Collector no alternative but to refer the question to the Court if he is called upon to do so. In Jagpat Koeri and Others Vs. Emperor, the Deputy Collector refused to make the reference, and a Bench of this Court consisting of Chapman and Roe, JJ., held that this Court could interfere in revision and direct a reference. It has been urged that the Court had no jurisdiction to interfere, but the Bench was of opinion that the reference to the Civil Court was the first step in a judicial proceeding and that the act of making a reference or refusing to make a reference was a judicial act which gave the Court jurisdiction to interfere. Reliance was placed on two earlier cases of the Calcutta High Court to which I shall refer later.

9. This case is certainly an authority for the proposition that the Court has jurisdiction in the present case to interfere and to refer the petitioners objections for a determination by the Court. No reasons however are given in the judgment as to why the Court came to the conclusion that the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector was a Court subordinate to this Court. All that Chapman J., held was that in making a reference or in refusing to make a reference the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector was acting judicially and he assumed that if such was the case this Court could interfere in revision. The learned Judge did not consider whether the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector, even if he was a Court, was a Court subordinate to this Court. The judgment assumes what this Court is now called upon to decide.

10. It has been urged on behalf of the opposite party that this case was wrongly decided. The point had been before the Calcutta High Court on at least two previous occasions. In Administrator General of Bengal v. Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Parganas 12 CWN 241 a Bench held that in rejecting an application u/s 18, Clause (1), Land Acquisition Act asking for a reference to the Civil Court, the Collector acted judicially, and his order was subject to revision by the High Court. From the judgment it is not clear whether the Bench held that the Court had power under its revisional jurisdiction or under its power of superintendence. At p. 245 the learned Judges observed:

The next question which arises is whether this Court has jurisdiction u/s 622 (now 115) Civil P.C., or Sections 15 of 24 & 25 Victoria, Clause 104 to interfere. It is admitted that up to and including the time of making his award the Collector was in no sense a judicial officer and that the proceedings before him were not judicial proceedings, Ezra v. Secretary of State (1905) 32 Cal 605, and however irregular his proceedings were, we cannot interfere with his award made u/s 11 of the Act.

But when an application is made to the Collector requiring him to refer the matter to the Civil Court, the Collector may have to determine and, it seems to us, determine judicially, whether the person making the application was represented of not when the award was made, or whether a notice had been served upon the applicant u/s 12(2) and what period of limitation applies and whether the application is under the circumstances made within time. The Collectors functions. under Part 3 of the Act are clearly distinguishable-from those under Part 2. Part 8 of the Act relates to proceedings in Court. In our opinion the Collector in rejecting the application was a Court and acting judicially, and his order is subject to revision by this Court. To hold otherwise would be to give finality to an award u/s 11 even in cases in which the Collector acts irregularly and contrary to law and then refuses on insufficient grounds to make a reference under Part 3 of the Act. The party aggrieved may be left without remedy which is implied by a judicial trial before the Judge.

11. In this case also the learned Judges give no reasons for holding that the Collector, if a Court at all, was a Court subordinate to the High Court. Once they came to the conclusion that the Collector acting u/s 18 was acting judicially, it was assumed that he was a Court subordinate to the High Court. It is clear that all Courts are not subordinate to the High Court. For example, Revenue Courts are subordinate to the Board of Revenue, and this Court has no power whatsoever to revise any orders passed by them, yet they act judicially. In my view it in no way follows that this Court has revisional jurisdiction merely because an order is one made judicially. The case in Administrator General of Bengal v. Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Parganas 12 CWN 241 was followed in Krishna Das v. Land Acquisition Collector of Patna 16 CWN 327 in which it was held that where a Land Acquisition Collector refused to make a reference to the Civil Court u/s 49, Land Acquisition Act, the High Court in revision could set aside his proceedings subsequent to the refusal and directed the Collector to proceed according to law. From the judgment in this case it is not clear whether the learned Judges held that the power to interfere was under the CPC or not. They propounded the question which they had to decide in these words:

The first question that arises upon this rule is whether the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector is subject to the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

12. They held, following the earlier case to which I have referred, that the Court had power to interfere. In this well as in the earlier Calcutta case, the learned Judges felt themselves compelled to interfere because if they did not do so, the petitioner would be left with no remedy whatsoever. The same question again arose in Leath Elies Joseph Solomon Vs. H. C. Stork, in which it was held that the High Court had power to revise an order of the Land Acquisition Collector refusing to refer a case to the Civil Court u/s 18, Land Acquisition Act. In this case the learned Judges had no doubt that the Collector, in refusing to make a reference u/s 18, was acting judicially, but they had some doubt as to whether the Court had power to interfere with such an order u/s 115, Civil P.C. At p. 1043 the learned Judges observed:

There can be no question that the act of the Collector in refusing to make a reference u/s 18, Land Acquisition Act, is a judicial act. The petition for a reference corresponds to the plaint in a suit. It initiates judicial proceedings in the land Acquisition Court, which, by virtue of Section 54, Land Acquisition Act, is a Court subordinate to the High Court, and the petition for reference is practically a part of those proceedings. Though, therefore technically Section 115, Civil P.C., may not be applicable, it was hardly the intention of the Legislature that there should be no remedy against the wrongful rejection of an application for reference. It may be noted in this connexion that no relief u/s 45, Specific Relief Act, could be obtained outside the jurisdiction of the Chartered High Courts. In these circumstances and in view of the previous rulings of this Court...we will not decide against the petitioner on the preliminary point.

From these observations it is clear that the Bench decided that they must interfere because there was no other remedy. They clearly doubted whether they had power to interfere under the revisional jurisdiction and only interfered because of the earlier decisions, which had held that the Court could revise such orders.

13. In a recent Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court a different view has been taken. In Gopinath Shah Vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, a Bench held that assuming that a Land Acquisition Collector when acting u/s 18, Land Acquisition Act, is a Court he is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. Consequently, the High Court has no power to interfere u/s 115, of the CPC with an order made u/s 18, Land Acquisition. Act, by a Collector. It will be seen therefore that the view of the Calcutta High Court has not been consistent, and the latest decision of that Court strongly supports the view that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision with orders passed u/s 18, Land Acquisition Act. The view expressed in this latest Calcutta case is similar to that taken by a number of other High Courts.

14. In Abdul Sattar Sahib v. Special Deputy Collector, Vizagapatam AIR (1924) Mad 442 a Full Bench held that the High Court had no power u/s 115, Civil P.C., or u/s 107, Government of India Act, to revise the order of a Collector, acting under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, refusing to make a reference to the Court u/s 18 in a matter upon which he had passed an award. The Full Bench further held that though the Collector in refusing; to refer the matter was acting "judicially," it was doubtful whether he was acting as a "Court" and he was certainly not a Court subordinate to the High Court within Section 115, Civil P.C.

The same view was taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bhajani Lal and Others Vs. Secy. of State . The Full Bench held that a Collector, in making or refusing to make a reference u/s 18, Land Acquisition Act, acts in an administrative capacity and not judicially, and even if it were held that the Collector in this matter acted judicially, he was not a Court, and certainly not a Court subordinate to the High Court.

15. The High Courts of Bombay, Lahore and Rangoon have also held that a Collector, acting u/s 18, Land Acquisition Act, is not a Court subordinate to the High Court: see Balkrishna Daji Gupte Vs. The Collector Bombay Suburban, Mushtaq Ali v. Secretary of State AIR (1930) Lah 242 and M.H. Mayet v. Land Acquisition Collector, Myinagyan AIR (1934) Ran 118. In my judgment the view expressed in the Pull Bench cases of the Madras and Allahabad High Courts is the correct one. Even assuming the Collector acts judicially in making or declining to make a reference u/s 18 of the Act, it is extremely doubtful whether he can be regarded as a Court. Even if he is a Court, it is, in my view, clear that he is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. The Land Acquisition Collector is not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, and the High Court has no power whatsoever over him.

16. Section 55 of the Act empowers the Provincial Government to make rules consistent with the Act for the guidance of officers in all matters connected with its enforcement, and may from time to time alter and add to the rules made. Certain executive instructions have been issued by the Board of Revenue, Bihar and Orissa and these instructions deal with the duty of Land Acquisition Collectors in dealing with references under Sections 18 and 49: see paras. 106, 107 and 110 of the Executive Instructions of the Board of Revenue. It appears to me that the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector in this case, if he was a Court at all, was a Court subordinate not to the High Court but to the Board of Revenue. The latter certainly had powers of superintendence which this Court does not possess.

17. In my view the mere fact that the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector might have been acting judicially gives this Court no right whatsoever to interfere u/s 115, Civil P.C. Such power of interference is only given in cases of orders made by Courts subordinate to the High Court. Further, the fact that the petitioner may have no remedy unless revision lies is also no ground for holding that this Court can interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is strictly limited to cases falling within Section 115, Civil P.C. It is unfortunate that this Court has no power to interfere, but the absence of a remedy is a matter for Legislature and not for the Court. This Court cannot legislate in order to give the petitioner a remedy. In my view therefore the case in Saraswati Pattack Vs. The Land Acquisition Deputy Collector Of Champaran, was wrongly decided and must now be regarded as overruled. For the reasons which I have given, I am satisfied that this Court has no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector, and therefore this application must fail. I would accordingly discharge the rule. In the special circumstances of this case, I would make no order as to costs.

Dhavle, J.

18. I agree.

Manohar Lall, J.

19. I agree.