Patanjali Sastri, J.:—

1. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree dated 6th March, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal setting aside a decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Nadia and dismissing a suit brought by the appellant, the Midnapore Zemindary Co., Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the Company) for certain declaratory reliefs.

2. The Company's predecessors in interest acquired a permanent putni right in a Diara estate known as Sarkarpara Naluapara and bearing Touzi No. 893, Nadia Collectorate, and in certain other lands from the then proprietors, under a patta dated 5th November, 1866, on a consolidated rent of Rs. 5,483-5-1 per annum. The proprietary interest in the estate subsequently passed to the Dudhuria family now represent by respondents 2 to 5 and they were recorded as proprietors in or about 1920. The estate was subject to periodical settlements of revenue and the previous settlement having expired in 1937, fresh survey and settlement proceedings were started in 1937 under Chapter X, Part II, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. In the course of those proceedings, the Settlement Officer assessed a rent of Rs. 13,379-10-0 in respect of Touzi No. 893. The Company preferred an appeal to the appellate revenue authorities on the ground that the Settlement Officer had no power to settle the rent of the patni in contravention of the terms and conditions of the patta of 1866 which was binding both on the proprietors and the Government. The appeal proved unsuccessful and thereupon the company instituted the present suit under S. 104-H of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, praying for a declaration that the settlement of rent made by the Settlement Officer in 1937 was illegal and ultra vires and that the company was not liable to pay the rent settled or any portion thereof. The Province of Bengal, which was the first and the main contesting defendant in the suit, raised various pleas in defence including a preliminary objection that the suit was prematurely commenced as the period of the notice delivered to the Government as required by s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, had not expired when the suit was instituted. Respondents 2 to 5 took no active part in the proceedings after filing a written statement supporting the pleas of the first defendant.

3. The trial court negatived all the pleas and decreed the suit. On appeal by the first defendant a Division Bench of the High Court (Mukherjea and Ellis, JJ.), while upholding the findings of the Subordinate Judge on the merits, held that the suit was brought one day too soon as in computing the period of two months for purposes of s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the day on which the notice was served on the Government was to be excluded and not included as was done by the Subordinate Judge. As, in their view, the Government was a necessary party they dismissed the suit as against the respondents 2 to 5 also.

4. From that judgment the company applied on 3rd June, 1945, for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council and leave was granted by the Court on 13th August, 1945.

5. Before, however, the records of the case could be transmitted to His Majesty in Council, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, came into force on 15th August, 1947, and, as from that date, two independent Dominions were set up in India known as India and Pakistan and their respective territories were defined. The Province of West Bengal was included among the territories of India and the Province of East Bengal among those of Pakistan and the boundaries of the New Provinces were determined by a Boundary Commission appointed by the Governor-General as provided for in s. 3(3) of the Act. It appears that notwithstanding such determination a dispute has arisen between the New Dominions as to whether certain areas form part of the territories of the one or the other. Sarkarpara Naluapara is among those areas and is claimed by the Province of East Bengal which is said to be actually collecting the revenue payable in respect of the estate. In these circumstances, the company being naturally desirous of obtaining an effective and binding adjudication as to whether or not it is liable to pay the newly assessed rent, applied to the High Court to have the records transmitted to His Majesty in Council notwithstanding the enactment of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, so that the final decision in these proceedings may be capable of enforcement in whichever Dominion the estate in question may ultimately be found to lie. The High Court, however, without deciding the question of jurisdiction of this Court to hear the appeal, transmitted the records to this Court “without prejudice to the contention of the parties which may be hereafter raised before the Federal Court as to the competence of the appeal before the Federal Court”.

6. A preliminary objection was accordingly raised by Mr. Panchanan Ghosh on behalf of the company that, inasmuch as the Province of East Bengal claims and exercises control and jurisdiction over the area comprising the lands in suit as being part of its territories, this Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal, and that any judgment or order passed by it could have no validity or effective operation in relation to the subject-matter of these proceedings according to well established principles of private international law and comity of nations. Learned counsel, while admitting that the case fell within the terms of s. 4 of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, urged that, after the new Dominions were set up under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Indian Legislature had no power to legislate in respect of lands in Pakistan and that s. 4 of the former Act should be construed as being subject to a presumed territorial limitation having regard to principles of international comity, so that the present appeal which concerns lands in Pakistan should not be brought before the Federal Court of India. Otherwise, it was suggested, the provision would be ultra vires in so far as it had the effect of bringing such appeals before this Court. This contention cannot prevail. In the first place this Court cannot entertain an objection based on the allegation that the land which is the subject-matter of these proceedings is within the territories of another State when, as has been represented to us on behalf of the Government, the Government of this country disputes the boundary line as put forward by the Dominion of Pakistan and claims that the land in question lies within the home territory, being comprised within the boundaries of the Province of West Bengal as determined by the award of the Boundary Commission already referred to. “State territory,” observes Oppenheim, “is an object of the Law of Nations, because the latter recognises the supreme authority of every State within its territory International Law, Seventh Edition, Volume 1. page 408,” and disputes as to boundaries between two contiguous States cannot be the subject of enquiry by the municipal courts exercising jurisdiction in either State. Ordinarily the court takes judicial notice of the boundaries of a State but when in doubt it obtains information on the point from its own Government. In Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch. 811, where the boundary of a foreign State was in question, Farwell, J. observes as follows:

“Sound policy appears to me to require that I should act in unison with the Government on such a point as that. Assuming that the Foreign Office have already satisfied themselves that the territory in question is within the dominion of Morocco, and have applied to the Sultan of Morocco for redress in any given matter, it would surely be improper that I, sitting here as a judge of the High Court, should, in the face of that act of Her Majesty, hold as a matter of fact that the territory in question was not within the dominion of the Sultan of Morocco. I should be contravening the act of Her Majesty acting as a Sovereign in a matter which is within the cognizance of Her Majesty's Foreign Office”.

7. This view was approved by Viscount Finlay in Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan Government [1924] A.C. 707 where he said:

“The judgment of Farwell, J. in Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate [1900] 1 Ch. 811 seems to me to be a perfectly accurate statement of the law and practice on this point. There are a great many matters of which the Court is bound to take judicial cognizance, and among them are all questions as to the status and boundaries of foreign powers. In all matters of which the Court takes judicial cognizance the Court may have recourse to any proper source of information. It has long been settled that on any question of the status of any foreign power the proper course is that the Court should apply to His Majesty's Government, and that in any such matter it is bound to act on the information given to them through the proper department. Such information is not in the nature of evidence; it is a statement by the Sovereign of this country through one of his Ministers upon a matter which is peculiarly within his cognizance”.

8. The principle must apply a fortiori to a case where the home State of the Court is asserting that a certain area lies within the bounds of its territorial supremacy and is engaged in a dispute with a neighbouring State as to the correct boundary line. It would be strange and unfortunate if there were divergence of action between the State and its own Courts in such circumstances. In this view no question of extra-territorial operation of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, can arise in the present case.

9. But even assuming for the purpose of argument that the land in question is eventually found, as a result of a peaceable settlement of the disputed frontier, to be within the territories of Pakistan, the appellant's apprehension that the decision of this Court will not be recognised as having any binding effect appears to be groundless; for it takes no note of the Orders promulgated by the Governor-General before the 15th August, 1947, in exercise of the powers conferred under s. 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, The provisions of those Orders were specially designed to remove the difficulties arising in connection with the transition to the new situation created by the partition of the country and are accordingly binding on both the Dominions. Among such Orders are the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, and the High Courts (Bengal) Order, 1947. The first mentioned Order, which relates to the initial distribution of rights, property and liabilities between the new Dominions, would, on the assumption that the estate in question is situated in East Bengal, in effect make that Province a party to the proceedings [Article 12(2)] and the other Order, which provides for the constitution of a High Court for the Province of East Bengal and sundry other matters, contains provisions as a result of which the decision of this Court in the present appeal will have effect within the territories of Pakistan. By para. 4 of Article 13 any order made by the High Court in Calcutta before “the appointed day,” that is, 15th August, 1947, is to have effect not only as an order of that High Court but also as an order made by the High Court of East Bengal. By para. 5 any order made by the High Court of East Bengal in proceedings transferred to that Court by virtue of that Article is to have effect not only as an order of that Court but also as an order made by the High Court in Calcutta. Para. 6 is important and reads as follows:—

“Where any such order as is mentioned in paras. 4 and 5 of this article has, whether before or after the appointed day, been confirmed, varied or reversed on appeal, effect shall be given to the decision of the appellate court as if the order appealed from were an order not only of the High Court by which it was made, but also of the High Court in Calcutta or the High Court of East Bengal, as the case may be”.

10. It will be seen that, by virtue of these provisions, notwithstanding the constitution of the new Province of Bast Bengal as part of the Dominion of Pakistan, the decree now under appeal which was made by the High Court in Calcutta before the appointed day is to have effect in East Bengal as if it was an order made by the High Court of East Bengal, while any decision of this Court as the “appellate court” confirming, varying or reversing that decree is to receive effect as if that decree were also a decree of the High Court of East Bengal. In other words, the judgment under appeal is to be regarded as a judgment of the High Court of East Bengal, and quoad hoc, this Court as the Court of appeal from that High Court.

11. It was suggested that the term “appellate court” in para. 6 of Article 13 should be taken to refer to the Federal Court only in so far as that Court had appellate jurisdiction at the time when the High Courts (Bengal) Order, 1947, was made and that the subsequent enlargement of that jurisdiction in 1948, by virtue of which the present appeal has come to this Court, could not attract the application of para. 6 to the decision in the appeal. We are unable to agree. When the Order was made this Court was undoubtedly an “appellate court,” though its appellate jurisdiction over the High Courts extended only to cases falling under s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The subsequent extension of such jurisdiction cannot affect the interpretation of the term. The scope of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court may vary from time to time, but whenever, acting within that jurisdiction, it confirms, varies or reverses an order of the High Court in Calcutta made before the appointed day, its decision will have the effect attributed to it by para. 6 of Article 13. That, we think, on its true construction, is the meaning of that provision.

12. Turning next to the appeal itself Mr. Panchanan Ghosh did not challenge the finding of the High Court as to the insufficiency of the notice given under s. 80, Code of Civil Procedure. He contended, however, that the Settlement Officer's assessment of rent having been found to be illegal and not binding on the company, the suit should have been decreed as against respondents 2 to 5. He maintained that the Government was not a necessary party to the suit, having regard to s. 104-H (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and that, therefore, the dismissal of the suit in limine against the first defendant should not affect the company's right to obtain the declaration sought as against respondents 2 to 5. We see no force in this contention. Section 104-H of the Bengal Tenancy Act says that no suit under the section shall be brought against the Government “unless the Government is landlord or tenant of the land to which the aforesaid entry relates”. In the present case, when the revision of the settlement of Touzi No. 893 was completed, the respondents 2 to 5 as proprietors were given the option to take a fresh periodical settlement paying the revised jumma, but they refused to do so and the Government thereupon assumed direct management of the Touzi as a Khas Mehal in exercise of their powers under Regulation VII of 1822 which has been made applicable to the settlement of Diara estates by Act XXXI of 1858. The position, accordingly, is that, during the currency of this settlement, the company has to hold Touzi No. 893 immediately under the Government to which it is liable to pay the putni rent. The Government is therefore the “landlord” of the “estate” within the meaning of the Act [see cls. (3) and (6) of s. 3]. No doubt when the suit was instituted the new settlement had not come into operation, but the position was similar as the predecessors of respondents 2 to 5 had refused to take settlement of the Touzi even at the previous settlement proceedings of 1920-21. That was why the Government was impleaded in the suit and it was alleged in the plaint that the putni patta of 1866 was binding on the Government and that in consequence the Government was not entitled to demand any rent in excess of that fixed in that patta. Indeed it is difficult to see how a decree against respondents 2 to 5 alone, who refused to take a settlement and are therefore not entitled to collect the putni rent, would be of any practical value to the company, if as a result of the suit failing against the Government, the company was left with the liability to pay to the Government the newly assessed rent every year during the whole period of the current settlement. On the allegations in the plaint and in the circumstances of the case we are of opinion that the suit was rightly dismissed even as against respondents 2 to 5. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.