Authored By : Mitter, John Peter Grant

Mitter and John Peter Grant, JJ.

1. Two points of law have been argued before us: first, thatthe Magistrate was not authorised by law to allow this prosecution to beinstituted on the complaint of a private individual. In support of thiscontention the learned Counsel who appeared for the petitioner has cited aruling of the Allahabad High Court- Empress of India v. Radha Kishhn I.L.R.All. 36. With due deference to the learned Judge who decided that case, we areunable to take the view which has been taken in it. The language of Section 195clearly shows that it would be quite sufficient if either the sanction of thepublic servant mentioned therein were given, or a complaint is directly made byhim. That being so, we are unable to agree in the proposition of law laid downin the case cited before us. This point therefore fails, but upon the secondpoint which has been taken before us, we think that the conviction and sentencein one of the two cases are bad. The accused person was charged with having givena false information to a public servant, and in that information no doubt hementioned the names of two persons in whose houses he, the accused, wasinformed that stolen property belonging to Anandi Doss would be found, but thestatement is one, and therefore he could be charged only with having made onefalse statement. He was therefore erroneously tried for two distinct offencesunder Section 182. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence in thesecond case, viz., the case which was initiated on the complaint of SheikhAbdulla. The conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate in the case whichwas instituted on the complaint of Madho Bhot, gomastah of Baboo ChunderCoomar, will stand.

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Poonit Singh vs. Madho Bhot and Ors. (22.07.1886 - CALHC)