Jwala Prasad, J.(His Lordship set out the facts of the case as narrated above and proceeded). In the Court below the parties went to trial on various issues as set forth in the judgment of the Court below; most of these issues have been set at rest by the decision of the trial Court and have not been raised in this Court. We are concerned only with the issues which relate to the validity or otherwise of the deed of gift. These are Issues Nos. 6 to 11 of the Court below. Some of these issues again attack the validity of the gift on some technical grounds and may be dealt with in the first instance. It is said that the deed is inoperative, inasmuch as it was not validly registered u/s 28 of the Indian Registration Act (Act 16 of 1908) by the Sub-Registrar of Beguserai, he having no jurisdiction to register it.

2. Now, the deed of gift in question deals with two properties: (1) eight-annas pokhta share out of sixteen-annas of Mahal Barsaon, old Tauzi No., 1404 and present Tauzi No. 6507, and (2) one bigha of jote land situate in mauza Semaris, otherwise known as Olao. The first property, Mahal Barsaon, which in fact is the bulk of the gifted properties, is situate in pargana Havi in the district of Darbhanga within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar of Bahera; the second which consists only of one bigha of jote land, is situate within the jurisdiction of the Registrar of Beguserai in the district of Monghyr. The plaintiffs case is that this one bigha of land did not belong to Mt. Jainti Kumari and that it was falsely alleged in the deed in question that it was purchased by her and was her property, with a view to give jurisdiction to the Sub-Registrar of Beguserai to register it.

3. Reliance is placed for this contention upon the survey khatian, Ex. F (2), wherein the land is shown as the qaimi land of Sukhan Barhai, with a note that the produce rent of it is paid to Mt. Jainti Kumari as malik thereof. Sukan Barhai has not been examined. His son, Ram Lal Barhai, Witness No. 3, examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, admits that Mt. Jainti Kumari is the malik of this land and that he used to pay the manhundi rent for the land to her and after her to Jagdhar Babu Plaintiff No. 2. He admits that the land.

was formerly in the khas cultivation of Mt. Jainti Kumari.

4. Now the deed of gift was executed on the 28th July, 1901, whereas the survey record-of-rights was published on the 9th November 1902. The plaintiffs, therefore, have failed to prove that the land was not in the khas possession of Mt. Jainti Kumari when the deed of gift was executed. Mt. Janti Kumari had twofold rights over the land; she was admittedly the proprietress of it and it was in her khas cultivation (probably at the time when the deed of gift was executed) as admitted by the aforesaid plaintiffs witness Ram Lal Barhai. The fact that she was not in khas possession subsequent to the deed of gift does not in any way affect the validity of the registration of the document. It is immaterial how she had obtained khas possession over the land, whether by purchase as stated in the deed of gift or otherwise. The recital in the deed of gift about the ladys title to the land in question far from being in any way disproved finds support from the aforesaid evidence. The plaintiffs rely upon the fact that the defendant was not in khas possession of the land. He has given a reasonable explanation of it. He says that the land was at a great distance from Benares where he resides and he did not care to retain possession of it. It must be remembered that the land was given, as stated in the deed, probably with a view that the defendant might plant a garden on it. It is enough for the purpose of registration that the donor had a good title to the property and intended to part with that property in favour of the donee. Whether the donee really exercised his right conferred by the deed is not at all essential. He might change his mind, and in fact in this case it seems that the defendant did change his mind as to his retaining his possession over the property. Section 28 of the Registration Act does not require anything more than the existence of the property within the jurisdiction of the Sub Registrar where it is sought to be registered.

5. The learned Counsel on behalf of the appellants has relied upon the decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the cases of Harendra Lal Roy v. Hari Das Devi [1914] Cal. 972 and Biswanath Prasad v. Chandra Narain Chowdhury AIR 1921 P.C. 8. In the former case the property sought to be dealt with in the deed in question was a fictitious property and had no existence. In the latter case, it was found that to the knowledge of both the parties the transferror had no title to the property and that he never intended to part with it. These decisions do not affect the present case, inasmuch as the property dealt with in the deed of gift admittedly does exist and it belonged to the donor Mt. Jainti Kumari, as proprietress thereof and at one time she was in possession of it, probably at the time the deed of gift was executed, and that she bona fide intended to make a gift of it to the defendant. Far from denying the title of Mt. Jainti Kumari to the land in question the plaintiffs are said to have taken possession of it after her death as reversioners to her husband. It is possible that the lady transferred the small piece of land in Olao in order to save herself the trouble of going to the Sub-Registrars office at Bahera in the district of Darbhanga far off from her residence at Olao within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar of Beguserai, she being a pardahnashin lady. This in itself is not a bad motive, and in fact nowhere has it been suggested that there was any fraud or collusion practised by the parties in the matter of getting the deed registered by the Sub-Registrar of Beguserai by including in it the land in question situated within his jurisdiction. It was pointed out in the case of Brojo Gopal Mukerjee v. Abilash Chandra Biswas 14 C.W.N. 532 that the registration of a document by the Registrar having jurisdiction over the property covered by it is not invalid in the absence of fraud or collusion on the part of or between the parties if in fact the property in question does exist. Similar is the view taken by all the High Courts in India: vide Durgaprasad Sahu v. Tameshar Prasad AIR 1924 All. 897 , Muhammad Abdul Hasan v. Fida Husain AIR 1924 All. 473 , Lakshmi Kantaraju Garu v. Sri Rajah Dantuluri Pada Venkata Jagannadharaju Garu AIR 1924 Mad. 281 , Mt. Ram Dai v. Ram Chandrabala Devi [1919] 4 Pat. L.J. 433, Mt. Jasoda Kuer v. Janak Missir AIR 1925 Pat 787 and Pirthi Din v. Ram Lal AIR 1926 Oudh 136.

6. The two recent cases decided by this Court to one of which I was a party seem to be on all fours with the present case. In those cases the registration was held to be valid. The learned District Judge has found, and we agree with his finding, that the land dealt with by the deed of gift in the present case did exist and that the lady had good title to it and in fact intended bona fide to make a gift of it to the defendant and that there was no fraud or collusion practised by her or any of the parties to the deed in including the property in the deed in order to give jurisdiction to the Sub-Registrar of Beguserai.

7. I, therefore, in agreement with the learned District Judge hold that the registration of the document in question was valid u/s 28 of the Indian Registration Act. The contention of the appellants must, therefore, be overruled. This disposes of the second part of Issue No. 6 framed by the Court below. The first part of that issue is:

Did Mt. Jainti Kumari sign the deed of gift after understanding its contents and after independent advice.

8. There is the positive evidence of Bansidhar (Witness No. 4 for the defendant), one of the marginal witnesses to the deed, that the document was read out to the Mussamat and she understood the contents thereof and then signed the deed and thereafter the witnesses to the deed attested it. The witness was in service of the Mussamat at that time and was in charge of the bahis or account books which used to be written at her deorhi. He says that the Mussamat used to understand business and look after her affairs. There is no suggestion that the Mussamat was like other pardahnashin ladies ignorant of her affairs and in fact her able management of such a large estate is not disputed. According to the evidence of the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs Ram Sumran Prasad and others she so diligently managed her business that she augmented the income of the property during her management. Bansidhar also proves the identification of the lady by Sheo Karan Upadhyaya (Plaintiffs Witness No. 9) before the Sub-Registrar, and that when asked by the Sub-Registrar she said to him that she had understood the document. The endorsement of the Sub-Registrar on the document supports this witness. Sheo Karan Upadhyaya (Witness No. 9 examined on behalf of the plaintiffs) does not deny the admission of the execution of the document by the Mussamat before the Sub-Registrar nor does he say that the Mussamat did not understand the document or that the Sub-Registrar did not satisfy himself as to her having executed it after understanding it, although he was examined on the 21st of March long after Bansidhar who was examined on the 5th of March 1921. Curiously enough, he is silent as regards the circumstances under which the document was executed, admitted and registered. In cross-examination he admits that he identified the Mussamat at the time of registration.

9. The other attesting witnesses to the deed Ram Krishna Das (P.W. 5), Sri Narain (P.W. 8) and Parmeshwari Prasad (P.W. 10), scribe of the document, want to make out that the document was written and attested at Monghyr, and not at Olao where the Mussamat is said to have executed it. The first two say that they signed the document as witnesses without the signature of the Musasmat thereon as they were told to do so by Bishwambhar Das, father of the defendant. This evidence is obviously false, inasmuch as the witnesses described themselves in the document as residing at that time at Olao, and the position of their signatures in the document indicates that they attested it after it was executed by the Mussamat. Ram Krishna Das is the brother of the Mussamat, it is not likely that he would attest it when it was not executed by the Mussamat in his presence and was executed at Monghyr where the Mussamat was not living, simply because he was told to do nO by Bishwambhar Das.

10. The scribe was the karpardaz of Banarsi Prasad, husband of the Mussamat and continued to be so after his death during the time of the lady. He says that he came to Olao 10 or 12 days after he wrote the document on stamp-paper, but he did not tell the fact of his having written the document to the Mussamat. It is absurd. These witnesses are self-condemned for on their own showing they falsely described themselves in the document as residing at Olao at the time and attested the document without having seen its execution by the Mussamat. None of these witnesses for the plaintiffs proves that the document was not read out to the lady or that she did not understand it or that no independent advice was given to her, for, according to their own showing, the document was not signed by the Mussamat in their presence. Agreeing with the Court below I disbelieve them, and would prefer the straightforward evidence of the defendants witness Bansidhar who was an accredited servant of the Mussamat and was her mukhtear-am, getting a decent salary of Rs. 50 a month.

11. It is suggested by the plaintiffs that the document was executed on account of the undue influence of Bishwambhar Das, but Bishwambhar Das at that time was not the manager of the Mussamat. He was appointed manager subsequently by managernamah (Exhibit A), dated the 5th October 1901. It may be that he used to be consulted in important matters and probably he was consulted with respect to the execution of this document. But it seems that the persons employed by the Mussamat in connexion with the transaction in question were the accredited servants of her from the time of her husband.

12. The learned District Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the plaintiffs case of any undue influence having been exercised upon the Mussamat in the execution of the document in question, or her not having understood the contents thereof before executing it, is a myth. This is corroborated by the fact that the document was given effect to and the donee, the defendant, came in possession of it forthwith and has been so for over 16 years up to 1916 during the time of the Mussamat, without any objection on her part, although the connexion between the two families had to a large extent been severed by the death of the daughter Chhotan Bibi in 1904 and of her second son in 1906. All this time she has not been shown to be in any suspected atmosphere.

13. There is no substance in the contention of the plaintiffs. It must be held upon the evidence on the record and the circumstances of the case that the document was executed by the lady independently and that she understood its full nature and effect. She hardly needed any advice in the matter, she had before her the accredited servants to seek their advice in the matter. In fact, the nature of the transaction does not necessitate that she should have the advice of anybody. She was nominally a pardahnashin lady, but, as observed above, she had the full capacity of understanding business transactions.

14. Accepting the case of the plaintiffs, she was in touch with Bishwambhar Das who was shortly after appointed manager, and the document was executed upon the advice of Bishwambhar Das. There is no reason to suppose that this was not independent advice, simply because Bishwambhar Dass son the defendant, was the beneficiary under the deed. This would only require the transaction to be examined with caution. It must be remembered that the defendant was her son-in-law and the only person upon whom she could bestow her affection. Then her brother was also there, besides responsible servants of the estate. What more is needed for independent advice in a matter of this kind, I fail to understand. It will be too much to hold that a document of this kind should be held invalid simply because no independent advice was offered to the lady. The authorities have not gone so far, nor is the rule that a pardahnashin lady should have independent advice inflexible. Even if no independent advice was taken by her, the document will not be invalid, unless it was shown that independent advice would have affected the execution of the document by the lady. It is amply proved in this case, and the circumstances unmistakably point to the fact that the Mussamat intended to give the property in dispute to her son-in-law as a gift and she, as a matter of fact, did give effect to her intention by parting with the possession of the property. Any advice, therefore, would not have affected her action in the matter. The principles are well laid down in re Coomber [1911] 1 Ch. 723, Santi Bala v. Dharasundari [1919] 46 I.A. 272 and Satish Chandra Ghosh v. Kalidasi AIR 1922 Cal. 203 .

15. It is not denied that the lady signed the document. In fact, her signature thereon is admitted. The document was presented by her to the Sub-Registrar before whom she admitted its execution and signed the endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar. It must, therefore, be held that the deed of gift was executed by the lady of her own free will and that it was properly registered by the Sub-Registrar of Beguserai. (His Lordship then dealt with other issues of fact and proceeded). On behalf of the plaintiffs it is contended that the agreement was in the nature of marriage brokerage and as such it is immoral and opposed to public policy. It is said that u/s 23 of the Indian Contract Act the consideration of the gift was unlawful and hence the gift itself is vitiated. The section is based upon the English Law, as according to notions in the West every marriage ought to be free and open: Scott v. Tyler [1787] 1 Wh. & T.L.C. 573. In certain cases in India it was held that the aforesaid rule cannot be applied in its entirety in this country, as marriages are scarcely, if ever, free and open, the real contracting parties being the parents and the guardians. The Court has to consider the relation of the contracting party (the promisee) to the boy or girl given in marriage and the motive, that is, whether the main object was to benefit himself without considering the fitness or unsuitableness of the marriage, or whether the latter was the prime consideration, the benefit to himself being incidental. All the cases were considered by Mookerji, J., in Bakshi Das v. Nandu Das [1905] 1 C.L.J. 261. In that case the brothers agreed to give their sister in marriage to the plaintiff upon his agreeing to pay them Rs. 190 as pan money, out of which Rs. 135 was paid in cash and the balance was to be paid on the day of the marriage. The plaintiff performed all the ceremonies and incurred expenses; but when he went to marry the defendants sister they refused. He brought a suit for recovery of the money paid by him and damages for the expenses incurred. The lower Courts gave a decree to the plaintiff and Mookerji, J., in second appeal, upheld it. Upon a review of the authorities he laid down the following rules:

(1) An agreement to reward a third person in consideration of negotiating a marriage is contrary to public policy.

(2) An agreement to pay money to the parents or guardians of the bride or bridegroom in consideration of their consenting to the betrothal is not necessarily immoral or opposed to public policy. Where the parents of the bride are not seeking her welfare but give her to a husband otherwise ineligible the agreement by which such benefit is secured is opposed to public policy and ought not to be enforced.

(3) An agreement to pay money to the parents or guardian of a bride or bridegroom in consideration of their consenting to the betrothal is under the circumstances of the case neither immoral nor opposed to public policy. It will be enforced and damages also will be awarded for breach of it: Umed Kika v. Nagindas Narotamdas [1870] 7 B.H.C.O.C. 122; Mulji Thakersay v. Gomti [1887] 11 Bom. 412; and Ranee Lallun Monee Dossee v. Nobin Mohun Singh [1875] 25 W.R. 32. The onus of proving that the agreement was opposed to public policy is upon the party who alleges it to be so. In this respect the English Law is not to be followed.

16. The text of Manu relative to the subject is as follows:

Let no father who knows the law receive a gratuity (sulka), however small, for giving his daughter in marriage, since the man who through avarice takes gratuity for that purpose is a seller of his offspring: Manu, Chapter III, Section 51.

Even the acceptance of a bovine pair by the father of the bride from the bridegroom is designated as a dowry by certain authorities. The acceptance of a dowry, be it costly or be it of insignificant value, constitutes the sale of the girl: Manu, Chapter III, Section 53.

A marriage in which the brides relations do accept the dowry voluntarily presented by the bridegrooms father, etc., is no sale of the bride since such a present is but an adoration of the bride done out of love or affection: Manu, Chapter III, Section 54.

17. This is a prohibition against the father taking gratuity for giving his daughter, which amounts to selling her. This rule in Manu agrees with the English Law on the subject and with Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act with this difference that a gift voluntarily made out of love or affection is not a sale of the bride as laid down in Manu, Chapter III, Section 54, referred to above. But Manu does not seem to prohibit the settlement of a nuptial gift on the bride or bridegroom at the time of the marriage. In practice the receiving of a gift by the brides parents or relations at any time in connexion with the marriage is not permissible; but gifts by the brides parents to the bridegroom and his relations is not considered to be bad and is in vogue. Such is also the evidence in this case as referred to above. On the other hand, the Hindu Law requires gifts to be made to the bride and the bridegroom during marriage, and without such a gift the marriage is not considered to be properly solemnized and performed.

18. The Bombay High Court, in the case of Dholidas Ishvar v. Fulchand Chhagan [1898] 22 Bom. 658 held that a stipulation for monetary payment for himself is an incentive and is dangerous both in the case of a father seeking a wife for his son and in the case of a father seeking a husband for his daughter. This was followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Kalavagunta Venkata Krishnayya v. Kalavagunta Lakshmi Narayan [1909] 32 Mad. 185 which held that a contract to make a payment to a father in consideration of his giving his daughter in marriage must be regarded as immoral or opposed to public policy within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and the money cannot be recovered by suit. If the money had been paid and the marriage solemnized, the money cannot be recovered back. In England such a practice will not be enforced as law: Kean v. Potter 3 P. Will 76.

19. The prohibition in the text of Manu is against receiving a gift by the father of the girl or her relations through avarice or greed which amounts to selling the girl. But the gift actually made whether to the bride, the bridegroom or the father of the bridegroom by the brides parents cannot be recovered back when once the marriage is solemnized, though it may not be enforced in a suit: vide Kalava gunta Venkata Krishnayya v. Kalavagunta Lakshmi Narayana [1909] 32 Mad. 185 and Jagdishwar Prasad v. Sheo Bukhsh Rai [1919] 1 U.P.L.R. 119. In other words, a suit may not lie to recover the promised dowry, but when once the dowry is paid as a consideration for the marriage and the marriage is performed, the dowry cannot be recovered back.

20. Colebrooke, in his Digest, volume I, pages 449-450, quotes the texts of Virhaspati and Narada, to show that a nuptial gift to the bride or her family is valid and not revocable. A nuptial gift is said to be a general term and to comprehend what is given to a bridegroom on his marriage by the parents of the bride. It includes not only the gift of money but also land and the like.

21. Shyamacharan Sarkar in his Vyavastha Darpana, 2nd edition, at page 621, mentions a nuptial gift as valid and irrevokable and relies upon the texts of Virhaspati and Narada referred to above: a nuptial gift or gratuity given to the bridegroom on his marriage to the daughter is not revocable nor is the property which is received after marriage from the wifes parents and kindred. Property given by the husbands father at the bridal procession is also not revocable.

22. In the present case, in accordance with the promise or agreement made, Mt. Jainti Kumari actually made over the property to her son-in-law who has been in possession thereof. The question is whether the plaintiffs can now recover the property back. Section 23, which renders the consideration of an agreement, which is opposed to public policy, as unlawful, does not go far enough to entitle the plaintiffs to recover the property after the object of the agreement was fulfilled; otherwise the defendant would be put to a great hardship, If the lady had not agreed to give the property in question to the defendant, his father and others who were in charge of the marriage would not have agreed to the marriage and the marriage would not have taken place. Mt. Jainti Kumari herself was anxious, considering the position of the family, the fitness of the bridegroom and the former connexion with the uncle of the bridegroom through her sister, to have the marriage of her daughter settled with the defendant. Her wishes would not have been fulfilled at all if she had not promised to make the gift in question. After having obtained the object and having fulfilled the promise, I do not think that she could have availed herself of the provisions of Section 23 and recover back the property in question, far less could the plaintiffs, who have succeeded as reversioners of her husband, recover it back on that ground.

23. We have now to consider the most difficult question in this case covered by Issue No. 11, and that is, whether, under the Hindu Law, the lady having succeeded to her husband with the restrictions imposed upon her in the matter of the use and enjoyment and power of alienation, could validly make a gift of an immovable property to her son-in-law. It is undisputed that she inherited the property of her husband both moveable and immovable as a lawfully wedded wife of her husband, Babu Banarsi Prasad, who died in the year 1897 without leaving any male issue. The parties belong to the Agarwala community, a sect of Vaisya class called Bisa Agarwalas. The plaintiffs are the Purbia (eastern) Agarwalas of Monghyr district in Bihar, and the defendant is a Pachhanhi (western) Agarwala of Benares in the United Provinces. This division does not create any difference in the status, respectability or dignity of the parties. They are both high class and are governed by the Mitakshara (Benares) School of Hindu Law. According to this School, Mt. Jainti Kumari, after the death of her husband in 1897, without any male issue, inherited the entire estate of her husband consisting of moveable and immovable property.

24. The widows right of succession is based upon the text of Yajnavalkya, Chapter II, verses 138-139, under which in default of a son the wife takes the estate of her husband in preference to the other heirs. Yriddha Manu and Katyayana also declare the widows right to the whole estate of her sonless husband.

25. The commentary of Yajnavalkya by Vijnaneswara which is followed as an authority by the Benares School discoursing on the text regarding the succession of the widow sums up his conclusions as follows:

Therefore it has been established that a wedded wife (patni) takes the whole estate of a man who being separated (from his co-heirs) and not subsequently re-united (with them) dies leaving no male issue": vide Colebrookes Translation, Chapter II, Section 1, Clause 39.

26. She, thus, succeeds as any other male member to the entire estate of her husband (moveable and immovable) and takes possession of it as an absolute owner thereof. Her interest is not in any way limited nor does she hold a life estate only as sometimes it is supposed to be. Only her power of disposition is a qualified one and is analogous to the power of a male co-parcener in a joint Mitakshara family, and the reason of this is in the nature of her relationship with her husband. She is supposed to be half the body of her husband and confers so much temporal and spiritual benefit on her husband as half of his own body does and associates with him in the performance of religious sacrifices: Smiritichandrika, Chapter XI, paragraph 6. A lawfully wedded wife is called patni as a correlative of the term pati (husband). The marriage is attended with nuptial rite and the object of such a marriage is to enable the husband to offer sacrifices and to discharge his religious duties and to beget a son unto him in order that he may be delivered from the hell called put to which the shades of a sonless man, according to Hindu ideas, descend: Manu, Chapter IX, paragraph 138; Dayabhaga, Chapter V, paragraph 6, Dattak Mimansa, Chapter I, paragraphs 3 and 5; Colebrookes Digest, Volume III, pages 159, 293 and 294. A man is enjoined by the Sastras to marry a wife as his last Sanskara or religious rite. During the lifetime of the husband the wife acquires ownership of a dependant character and on his demise she obtains independent power over it. Yriddha Manu says:

The widow (patni) of a childless man, keeping unsullied her husbands bed and persevering in religious observances, shall alone present his funeral oblations and obtain also his entire share (sic): vide quotation in the Mitakshtra on widows succession and Viramitrodaya, Chapter III, part 1, Section 2.

27. She takes the entire estate of her husband and is enjoined to perform acts calculated to increase the prosperity of her and her lord, such as, performing sraddhas, digging wells, etc., and giving presents with pious liberality in proportion to the wealth inherited by her. Thus, the performance of religious and charitable purposes and acts conducive to the welfare of her husband are the objects for which she takes the estate of her husband. Accordingly, Smiritichandrika in Chapter XI says that she possesses independent power of making gifts for religious and charitable purposes, for such gifts:

her husband, even if wanting a son, shall reach the heavenly abodes,

and for purposes not being religious or charitable but purely temporal, such as, gifts to dancers, etc., she has no independent power. Hence arises the restriction imposed upon the widows power of disposition.

28. In this respect the property inherited by a widow from her husband differs from those properties which a woman receives as presents at the time of marriage or at the time of going to her husbands family or on happy rites or ceremonies or those given to her by her father, mother or brother which are called Stridhan, or her own property or pecalium. Over these latter she has absolute dominion and her power of disposition is not restricted.

29. Mitakshara in Chapter II, Section 11, Clause (2) includes in the word Adya (sic) in Yajnavalkyas text among the aforesaid kinds of stridhan such property which a woman "may have acquired by inheritance." Interpreting the said clause in the light of Causes 11 to 25 of the same section, Sir James W. Colville, in the case of Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee [1866] 11 I.A. 487 would make it applicable only to property inherited in the husbands lifetime or from some persons other than him. The conclusion to which his Lordship arrived is summed up in the following words:

Their Lordships, therefore, have come to the conclusion that, according to the law of the Benares School, notwithstanding the ambiguous passage in the Mitakshara, no part of her husbands estate whether moveable or immovable, to which a Hindu woman succeeds by inheritance, forms part of her stridhan or particular property; and that the text of Katyayana which is general in its terms and of which the authority is undoubted must be taken to determine first: that her power of disposition over both is limited to certain purposes; and secondly, that on her death both pass to the next heir of her husband.

30. The text of Katyayana referred to above, which imposes restriction upon the widows power of disposition is as follows:

Let the sonless widow preserving unsullied or inviolate the bed of her landlord and abiding with her venerable protector or strictly obedient to her spiritual parents enjoy her husbands property being moderate (or with moderation) until her death, and after her let, the co-heirs (dayadas) take.

31. A similar passage in Mahabharata Dandharama dealing with the religious merits of gifts runs as follows:

It is ordained that the property of the husband when devolving on wives has enjoyment for its use. Let not woman on any account make a waste or apahara of her husbands property.

32. Viramitrodaya, citing these texts and in commenting upon them in Chapter III. part I, Section 3, says that by the phrase "on any account" in the texts it is intended that waste under all circumstances is reprehensive. Literally apahara (waste) is theft. Making useless gifts to dancers, players and the like and the wearing of delicate apparel, etc., the tasting of rich food, etc., and the like being improper for a widow who is enjoined to restrain her passions are equal to theft. Thus, the term apahara is used in a secondary sense, but gifts and the like for religious purposes are not so and cannot be included under the term apahara or waste.

33. Viramitrodaya sums up his conclusions: Therefore it is established that making gifts for spiritual purposes as well as making sale or mortgage for the purpose of performing what is necessary in a spiritual or temporal point of view, the widows right does certainly extend to the entire estate of her husband. The restriction, however, is intended to prohibit gift to players, dancers and the like as well as sale or gift without necessity.

34. Katyayanas text enjoins the widow to use the husbands property being moderate or with moderation, which practically means the same as the word waste used in Mahabharata, that is, the widow shall not uselessly spend the property which prohibits expenditure not useful or beneficial to the late owner of the property. The widow takes the whole property as heiress of her husband, and not merely the use of the whole or part of it. She is only enjoined by law not to commit waste. Thus, she has power to make a gift, mortgage or sale of the property at her pleasure for lawful purposes conformable to her duty as a Hindu widow and after her death what is left by her after the lawful use of it goes to the next heirs of her husband. They take only the residue of the estate remaining due after the use of it by the widow. Accordingly, she has power of disposition for religious or charitable purposes or those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband as well as for legal necessity.

35. Lord Gifford, in delivering the opinion of their Lordships in the case of Cossinut Bysack v. Hurroosoondry Dossee [1820] 2 MD198, which was heard by the Supreme Court at Calcutta in 1819 and by the Judicial Committee in 1826, stated that a Hindu widow had for certain purposes a clear authority to dispose of her husbands property and might do it for religious purposes including dowry to a daughter. His Lordship further stated that it is impossible to define:

the extent and limit of her power of disposing of it because it must depend upon the circumstances of the disposition whenever such disposition shall be made and must be consistent with the law regulating such disposition.

36. This was a Dayabhaga case, but the rule laid down is the same as regards the Mitakshara Law. This has been firmly established by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee. At the Bar the following authorities were cited: Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah [1859] 8 M.I.A. 529, Bhugwandeen Dooby v. Myna Baee [1866] 11 I.A. 487, Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry [1869] 13 M.I.A. 209, Rao Kurun Singh v. Nawab Mahomed Fyzali Khan [1871] 14 M.I.A. 176, Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar [1899] 21 All. 71, Lal Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh v. Allahabad Bank, Limited [1903] 25 All. 476, Munshi Karim-ud-din v. Kunivar Gobind Krishna Narain [1909] 31 All. 497, Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyar [1916] 39 Mad. 634, Sadasi Koer v. Ramgovind Singh 15 C.W.N. 857 and Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser [1916] 43 Cal. 574.

37. Justice Turner in the case of Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah [1859] 8 M.I.A. 529 stated the law as follows:

For religious or charitable purposes, or those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband, she has a larger power of disposition than that which she possesses for purely worldly purposes. To support an alienation for the last she must show necessity.

38. This distinction between legal necessity for wordly purposes on the one hand and the promotion of spiritual benefit of the deceased on the other has been recognized by the Indian Courts as well as by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, and within a proper limit a widow can alienate her husbands property for the performance of religious acts which are supposed to conduce to his spiritual benefit, Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser [1916] 43 Cal. 574 and Chowdry Janmejoy Mullik v. Sreemutty Russomoyee Dossee [1868] 11 B.L.R. 418 Note.

39. In Vuppuluri Tatayya v. Garimilla Ramakrishnamma [1911] 34 Mad. 288, Benson and Krishnaswami Ayyar. JJ. stated that the spiritual purposes should be such as are regarded by the Hindu community as reasonable and proper though not absolutely, necessary. If the property sold or gifted bears a small proportion to the estate inherited and the occasion of the disposition or expenditure is reasonable and proper according to the common notions of the Hindus, it is justifiable and cannot be impeached by the reversioners.

40. She is required to perform not only the funeral or periodical sraddaha ceremonies but also such religious ceremonies as the last holder was bound to perform and she has power within proper limitations to alienate the estate inherited by her from the last male holder thereof. This being the law, let us examine the gift of the property in question made by Mt. Jainti Kumari to her son-in-law on the occasion of the marriage of her daughter. It is the imperative and religious duty and a moral obligation of a father, mother or guardian to give a girl to be married before she attains puberty to a suitable husband cap-hie of procreating children.

41. Yajnavalkya, in Chapter I, verse 64, says:

(A qualified person) not giving away (in marriage, a maiden) will be visited by the sin of the destruction of fetus at every time of her menses. In the absence of a giver the maiden should herself give her away.

42. Vasishtha, in Chapter XV, says:

Fearing the appearance of the menses, the father shall marry his daughter while she still runs about naked. If she stays (in her fathers house) after menstruating, sin visits the father. As often as are the menstrual courses of a maiden, who is desirous of, and is solicited in marriage by, a qualified bridegroom of the same caste, so often her father and mother are guilty of (the crime of) killing an embryo: such is the sacred law,

43. To the same effect is the enjoinments of all the Samhitas: Manu Chapter IX. paragraph 4; Yama, verses 22 and 3; Gautama Chapter XVIII; Narada, Chapter XII, verses 24 to 27, Vyas, Chapter II verse 7, and Vishnu, Chapter XXIV, verse 40.

44. Vyas, in the chapter referred to above, says:

He who does not give away his daughter in marriage before she attains puberty becomes degraded.

45. Narada concludes by saying:

This is the rule establishes amongst the virtuous.

46. Thus, according to the texts, the marriage of a girl by her father is enjoined as a religious duty in order to prevent him from being degraded and visited with in and crime. There is, however, direct spiritual benefit also conferred upon him by such a marriage. According to Manu, marriage is religiously enjoined so that a man may beget a son and thus deliver himself from the hell called put to which the shades of a sonless man, according to Hindu ideas, descend. The word putra (son) literally means deliverer from the hell called put. Manu says that there is no distinction between a son and the daughters son in this world, inasmuch as a daughters son like a sons son, can sucour a man from hell: Manu, Chapter IX, slokas 138 and 139. In the earlier slokas 132-133 he says that a daughter is like unto a son and a daughters son offers two oblations: one to his deceased father and another to his mothers father and that is the reason why a daughter and daughters son successively take the estate of a sonless man: vide also Dayabhaga, Chapter V, paragraph 6; Dattak. Mimansa, Chapter I, paragraph 3; Colebrookes Digest, volume III, pages 159, 293 and 294. It is obvious, therefore, that the marriage of a daughter confers spiritual benefit on her father. The authorities also have taken the same view.

47. In the case of Jummona Dassya v. Ramasoonderi Dassya [1875] 3 I.A. 72, Sir James W. Colvile observes--

The foundation for marriages between infants which so many philosophical Hindus consider one of the most objectionable of their customs, is the religious obligation which is supposed to lie upon parents of providing for their daughter, so son as she is mature virgo, a husband capable of procreating children.

48. Vide also Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu [1910] 37 Cal. 1; Venkatacharyalu v. Rangacharylu [1891] 14 Mad. 316; Devulapalli Kameswara Sastri v. Polavarapu Veerackarlu [1910] 34 Mad. 422; G. Gopala Krishnam Razu v. S. Venkatanarasa Razu [1914] 37 Mas. 273; D. Srinivasa Iqengar v. Thiruvengadathaiyangar [1913] 38 Mad. 556; Sundrabai Javji Dagau Pardeshi v. Shivanarayana Ridkarna [1908] 32 Bom. 81; Ganpat v. Tulsiram Ukha [1912] 36 Bom. 88; Bhagirathi v. Jokhu Ram Upadhia [1910] 32 All. 575; and Kasturi v. Panna Lal [1916] 38 All. 520.

49. According to the texts, after the death of the father the duty of giving his daughter in marriage falls upon, amongst other relations, his widow, both under the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga, with this difference that the latter would postpone her right to that of a maternal-grand-father and maternal-uncle.

50. Marriage, according to the Sastras, is a religious act. It is the last Sanskara for a man or woman.

51. According to Hindu ideas marriage has for its object the performance of religious duty. It is a sanskara, that is, an essential ceremony held indispensable to constitute the perfect purification of a Hindu, both male and female. The sanskaras are ten or eleven in number and are performed by oblations to fire and customary offerings to idols: Wilsons Glossary, page 463.

52. According to Manu, Chapter II, verse 67, the sacrament of marriage is to a female what initiation with the thread is to a male. According to Yajnavalkya, the purificatory rites of a woman are performed without Mantras, except marriage which is accompanied with Mantras: Chapter I, verse 13. The Mitakshara also recognizes marriage as a religious obligation for both male and female: Sundrabai Javji Dagdu Pardeshi v. Shivanarayana Ridkarna [1908] 32 Bom. 81.

53. The texts prescribe details of nuptial rites to be performed at the time of marriage and the authorities already quoted above have recognized it to be so. The widow of a deceased Hindu has a right not only to provide for the marriage of his girl but also the expenses thereof for the performance of ceremonies, etc. connected therewith. The moral and the religious obligation cast upon the parents or other guardians to provide a husband for a girl confers upon them the right to spend out of the estate, funds necessary for the performance of marriage ceremonies.

54. Atri Samhita in Chapter I, sloka 320 says:

It is essential to make gifts on the occasion of an eclipse, the marriage, the last day of month and at the delivery of a woman.

55. Accordingly, he says that such a gift can be made even in the night time.

56. Yajnavalkya, in Chapter II, verse 179, relating to gift, says:

Let the acceptance be public, specially of immoeable property; and delivering what may be given and has been promised; let not a man resume it. In other words, whatever is promised to be given shall be given. Having once given it let him not resume it.

57. Mitakshara, commenting upon this with reference to the text of Narada makes a distinction between valid and invalid gifts and says that the valid gifts if once promised must be performed and among the seven valid gifts are mentioned a gift made "from affection" and "a womans sulka." The former is defined as what is given out of affection to "daughters, sons and the like" and the latter, namely, sulka as:

that which are given to the relations of a damsel for bringing about the marriage.

58. Continuing the author says:

These seven kinds of gifts are valid gifts and must not be resumed" vide Mitakshara by Gharpure, book II, Chapter XII, on the resumption of gifts, pages 314-315.

59. Shyamacharan in his Vyavastha Darpana, 2nd edition, page 54, paragraph 35. discussing the widows limited power of disposition of the property inherited by her from her husband construes the word "waste" or "apahara" used in the Mahabharata Dana Dharma as implying:

expenditure not useful or beneficial to the late owner of the property,

and says that a gift or other alienation by the widow is permitted for the husbands funeral rites, etc., as that is for the benefit of the husband. He sums up his conclusion at page 54, paragraph 35, as follows:

Widow is, however, competent even without the consent of the reversioners to make sale or other disposition of her husbands property for the liquidation of his debts, for the marriage of his daughters for the support of such persons as it was incumbent upon him to support, likewise to defray expenses of such other acts as are beneficial to his soul or very necessary to be performed. Great benefit is done to a departed soul by paying his debts, by bestowing his daughter in marriage and supporting his family indeed if these debts are neglected he is doomed to hell. To maiden should be given a nuptial portion of the fathers estate.

60. In support of his conclusion he refers to the text of Devala; see Colebrookes Digest, volume I, page 185. In paragraph 38 he says.

But a gift or other alienation by a widow of a moderate portion of her husbands property for his spiritual benefit (be the same made with or without the consent of his heirs) is religious and moral as well as valid.

61. The right of a Hindu daughter, whose father is dead, to receive a dowry at the time of marriage from the estate of her father is based upon the ancient texts: vide Manu, Chapter IX, verse 118, and Yajnavalkya, Chapter II, verse 127, which enjoin upon the brothers to perform the marriage of their uninitiated sisters by giving them a quarter of their share. According to Vishnu, the initiations of the unmarried daughters are to be defrayed in proportion to the wealth. Mitakshara, Chapter I, Section 7, Clauses 5 to 14, discusses the question of allotment of a portion of the estate of the deceased to the marriage of his daughter and comes to the conclusion that it is not right to interpret the text of Yajnavalkya referred to above, as signifying giving money sufficient for her marriage and hence,

after the decease of the father an unmarried daughter participates in the inheritance and is entitled to a share." (Colebrookes translation of Mitakshara) Chapter I, Section 7, Clause 14.

62. Viramitrodaya in Chapter II, part I, Section 21, says that shares should be allotted to uninitiated or unmarried daughter out of the paternal wealth, which represents her dowry and marriage expenses and such a share is one-fourth of what she would have been entitled to receive if instead of being a daughter she had been a son.

63. These texts, particularly the Mitakshara which governs the present case, make it perfectly clear that when upon the death of a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara law the property is taken by his widow a gift by her to her daughter on the occasion of her marriage out of the estate of her husband is within her power provided that the portion so given is reasonable in amount and the question whether it is reasonable or not has to be determined with respect to what should have been the share of the unmarried daughter under the above rules laid down in the Mitakshara, Chapter I, Section 7, paragraphs 5 to 14. Such gifts are recognized in all the texts.

64. Among the sixfold properties of a woman called stridhan or her own peculium are the two most permanent ones, namely, what is given before the nuptial fire and what is presented in the bridal procession: vide Manu, Chapter IX, verse 194; Dayabhaga, Chapter X, Section 1, paragraph 4; Narada, Chapter XIII, stanza 8; Vishnu Samhita, Chapter XVII, verse 18; Yajnavalkya, Chapter II, verse 146.

65. Thus, gifts of property during the performance of the nuptial rites and in the bridal procession form two most important properties of a woman. This supports the view that during the marriage she is given out of the estate of her father dowry which represents her share in her fathers estate.

66. Gifts during marriage have become customary and are coming down from the ancient times: Rig Veda, Mandal 10, Sakta 85, verses 9 and 11, refers to the presents given by Surjya to his sister in marriage. Marriage in the first four approved forms of Brahma, Daiva, Arsha and Prajaptya is a gift of the girl to the bridegroom, and the gift of the girl is accompanied with gifts of all kinds of necessaries in life including property to her and to the son-in-law so that both might live together with comfort and perform the religious duties having been united into one by the religious rites. The religious ceremony of giving the girl to the bridegroom must be accompanied with a gift of property to the son-in-law in order to enhance the merit of the spiritual ceremony of giving the girl in marriage, which is one of the highest Yajna or religious ceremony performed and a Yajna cannot become meritorious without a gift. The gift of land is ordained on every occasion of a Yajna as being efficacious for conferring spiritual benefit: vide Virhaspati Samhita. For these reasons Rishya Shringa ordains that one should give to the son-in-law according to his or her means lands cows, maids, cloths, she buffaloes, horses, gold and jewels. The sloka runs as follows: (sic)

67. It has been quoted in: (1) Viramitrodaya, Vivaha Sanskara, page 831, edited by Parvatiya Nityananda Sarma, the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 141, page 831; it also quotes at that page a similar passage from Linga Purana; (2) Nirnaya Sindhu, page 228, Bombay edition, Venkateshwara Press, Sambat 1965; 3) Dana Chandrika, page 28, Venkateshwara Press edition; (4) Dana Mayukha page 170 (in the Bhagwanta Bhaskar by Nilkantha) edited by Pandit Ratna Gopala Bhatta, Benares edition, 1909. To the same effect is the sloka in Dana Mayukha at page 171 which enjoins, among other things, gift of land according to the means of the giver in order to enhance the merit of kanyadana (sic) (giving the girl in marriage.)

68. The learned vakil on behalf of the defendant produced manuscript editions of Parayoga Ratan, page 62, Girhya Karika by Bhatta Kumarila Swami, page 13, verses 7 and 8, and Nirnaya Sagar Press edition of Sanskara Bhaskara, page 248, which recommend giving of land to the son-in-law after marriage and also at the time of departure.

69. Parashar Grihya Sutra (Hari Har Bhashya), Venkateshwara Press edition, Sambat 1950, pages 28-29, recommends, among other things, gift of villages by the father of the girl; other relations should also give dowry or yautaka at the time of marriage. Such gifts to the son-in-law are also recommended on occasions other than marriage: vide Dana Mayukha, page 404, which quotes from Bhavishya Purana and Vishnu in support of it.

70. Hence gift of land to a son-in-law on the occasion of marriage or at the time of departure, that is, bidagi, is meritorious. Such a gift by the mother cannot be considered to be an apahara or waste which alone is a restriction placed upon her use of the property inherited from her husband, provided the gift is reasonable in extent and not extensive.

71. Thus the gift of a reasonable portion of landed property to the daughter or son-in-law by the widow is supportable by the texts as a part of religious ceremony of marriage of the daughter and as being conducive to the spiritual welfare of her husband. It is her duty to perform the marriage ceremony accompanied with gift as discharging an obligation of her own husband. In making a gift of landed property to her son-in-law she only gives what is due to her as the nuptial portion of the estate of her father. The gift can be made at the time of the actual marriage or in connexion with the ceremonies connected therewith; for gifts in the bridal procession as well as nuptial rites are permissible.

72. The authorities in India seem to have interpreted the texts as above. The well-known passage in Lord Gilfords judgment in the case of Cossinaut Bysack v.Hurroosoondry Dossee [1820] 2 MD 198, referred to above, gives the widow power to dispose of property for religious purposes including dowry to a daughter.

73. In Damoodur Misser v. Senabutty Misrain [1892] 8 Cal. 537, a Mithila case, it was held that property sufficient to defray all the nuptials should be given to unmarried daughters, and accordingly l/24th share of the estate in view of there being several sons and daughters was directed to be set apart for nuptial purposes.

74. In the case of Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu [1910] 37 Cal. 1, Mookerji, J., reviewed the texts and the authorities and upheld a gift of a house made by the widow to her daughter a few days after the performance of the dwiragaman of gauna ceremony (that is, sending off the girl to reside in the family of her husband), a ceremony which was performed two years after the marriage. His Lordship overruled the contention that the gift should not be supported as the gauna ceremony had nothing to do with the marriage, and observed that the ceremony was connected with the marriage and there was no substantial distinction between gifts made at the nuptial fire or in the bridal procession and those made at the time of dwiragaman ceremony; the last may be regarded as dowry deferred. He also held that the gift was reasonable in extent upon the ground that the house in question was worth only Rs. 1,200 and the total value of the three houses inherited by the widow was Rs. 3,800 and the husband of the widow had left only one daughter.

75. Shortly after the above case, in 1910, his Lordship in the case of Gobinda Rani Dasi v. Radha Ballabh Das [1910] 12 C.L.J. 173, upheld the decree passed by the Subordinate Court allowing maintenance to the son-in-law against the mother-in-law when it was found that the father-in-law had agreed to the marriage upon the understanding that he would be brought up in the family as a gharjamai. This case was decided upon the principle of putrika putra which finds place in the Sastras under which the marriage takes place upon the condition that the son born of the girl would belong to her father and would be treated as his son and successor. "Putrika putra" means a son of an appointed daughter.

76. The Madras High Court in the case of Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar [1899] 22 Mad. 113, upheld a gift of a portion of the landed property by the mother to the son-in-law at the time of the marriage of her daughter. The parties were Brahmans and it was found that there was a practice in that community of (bhudan) making a gift of land along with other things at the time of giving the girl in marriage. Subramania Aiyar, J., however, supported the gift also upon the ground that the gift was a provision for the married couple and that it was believed to enhance the merit of the primary act, namely, the giving of a virgin in marriage which from a religious point of view is supposed to be productive of considerable spiritual benefits to the parents. Referring to the texts relating to the allotment of a quarter of a share of a son by the brothers to the unmarried sisters, his Lordship held that the texts justify something more than the disbursement out of the estate of only the price of things required in connexion with the celebration of the marriage.

77. Following this case, the Madras High Court uphold the gift of landed property in favour of a son-in-law in the case of T.R. Sundaram Aiyar v. Krishnasami Aiyar [1915] 28 I.C. 992.

78. In the case of Kudutamma v. Narasimha Charyalu [1907] 17 M.L.J. 528, the plaintiffs were sisters and were married by their father to men of small means and were maintained by the father until his death which happened three years after the marriage. His son, Defendant No. 1, became the managing member of the family. He executed a deed of gift whereby he gave to his sisters, the plaintiffs, certain portions of the joint family property. He and his son subsequently resiled from the gift and hence the plaintiffs brought the suit to obtain possession of the gifted property. The plaintiffs suit was decreed and the gift was uphold, upon the ground stated by their Lordships that there was a strong moral obligation on the joint family of which the father was the managing member to make a gift of the joint family property on the occasion of the marriage either to the girls or to their husbands as a provision for them; and the fact that the father maintained the daughters and their husbands out of the family property until his death may be regarded as the continuing recognition of such moral obligation which obligation continued until it was discharged by the deed of gift executed by the brother of the plaintiffs. The gift was found not to be in excess of the powers of the brother as the managing member of the family and therefore it could not be recalled by him or avoided by his son.

79. In Pugalia Vettorammal and Another Vs. Vettor Goundan, minor by his next Friend and mother Poochammal and Another, (Sundara Aiyar and Spencer JJ.), the gift to the girl by her fathers brother some years after the marriage which was performed by him was upheld as against his minor son who was joint with him. The property gifted was worth Rs. 400, and the family property was worth Rs. 2,400, that is, l/6th of the entire joint family estate. The father of the girl had died without marrying her, leaving his brother and the minor son of the brother as the surviving male members of the family.

80. Following this decision a gift of 1/10th of the immovable property by a father to his daughters at the time of their marriage was upheld as against the nephew who was a co-parcener: vide in re Subba Naicker minor [1915] 2 L.W. 754

81. In A. Sundararamayya v. C. Sitamma [1911] 35 Mad. 628, a gift by a father to his daughter of a small portion of ancestral property 40 years after the marriage was upheld as binding upon the coparcener, the son of the donor. There was no promise proved as having been made by the father at the time of the marriage. The gift was upheld, as it being a moral obligation could be discharged at any time. The important pronouncement in that case is that the gift to daughters stands in the same position as gifts to sons-in-law, for such gifts are intended to provide for the married couple and are probably given in lieu of her share of the family property when by marriage she is leaving it for another family. Such a gift is permissible both of moveable and immovable property.

82. The Lahore High Court in Jowala Ram v. Hari Kishen Singh AIR 1924 Lah. 429, upheld a gift of 70 bighas out of 300 bighas as being less than th of the entire property by a Hindu widow as a dowry to her daughter on the occasion of her marriage.

83. In Bachoo Harkisondas v. Mankorebai [1905] 29 Bom. 51, Harkishun Das and Bhagwan Das were brothers. Hirkishun Das died on 14th September 1898, leaving behind him as his survivors his wife who was pregnant and his brother Bhagwan Das. On the 5th November 1900, Bhagwan Das made a gift to his daughter, who was his only child, of promissory notes worth Rs. 20,000. On the 30th November 1900, he made a will directing his wife, to adopt even if a son was born to the widow of his deceased brother Bhagwan Das, and directing further that in the event of a son being born to his brothers widow she should before making an adoption enter into an agreement with the adopted son that he would be bound to accept as valid the provision made for his daughter and his wife. Bhagwan Das died on the 17th December 1900, and the next day a posthumous son was born to his brother. On the 13th February 1901, Bhagwan Dass widow already adopted Nagar Das Pitambar. The widow of his deceased brother brought a suit contesting the adoption and the gift on behalf of her posthumous son. Taiyabji, J., upheld the adoption but decided against the validity of the gift. On appeal Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. and Russal, J., upheld both the adoption and the gift, setting aside the decision of Taiyabji, J. The promissory notes of Rs. 20,000 were purchased out of the income of the property, which represented l/50th part of the estate valued at ten to fifteen lakhs of rupees. The gift was held to be valid on the ground that it was a gift of moveable property made through affection under the Mitakshara, Chapter I, Section 1, pl. 27 and Mayukha, Chapter IV, Section 70, pl. 11 and 13.

84. This decision was upheld by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai. [1907] 31 Bom. 373.

85. In Abhesang Tirabhai Vs. Raisang Fatesang, , a Hindu widow,_shortly after the marriage of her daughter, conveyed all the properties by way of gift to her sons-in-law. Three days later the reversioners passed a deed of release in favour of the widow on receiving consideration. More than 50 years after, one of the sons of the reversioners questioned the validity of the gift. It was held that the consent of the reversioners validated the alienation as being evidence of the propriety of the gift. It was also observed that there is authority that gifts by a widow on the occasion of the daughters marriage are understood in the Hindu law to conduce to the spiritual benefit of the widows husband and, if so, it is another reason for upholding the transaction.

86. In Rustom Singh v. Moti Singh [1896] 18 All. 474, it was held that when a Hindu father does not leave sufficient means to provide for the marriage of his daughter the mother of the girl can mortgage properties of her own stridhan, which the had inherited from her father, to meet the expenses of the daughters marriage and that such an alienation was binding on the reversionary heirs of her father. It is noticeable that the property alienated in this case was not that of the father of the girl but that of the father of her mother, which the mother had got from her own father. The principle upon which the alienation was upheld against the heirs of the father of the mother to the property in question, with which the girl could have no concern, is that it is not only the duty of the father of the girl to provide for her marriage but that of the mother also to provide from her personal property in order to confer spiritual benefit upon her husband and upon herself.

87. In the case of Bhagwati Shukul v. Ram Jatan Tewari AIR 1924 All. 23 Sir Grimwood Mears, C.J., and Stuart, J., upheld the gift of the entire property which the widow had inherited from her husband to her son in law as a dowry as against the claim of the husbands brothers son. The daughter married was blind and a cripple, and the property was very small in value. The ground for the decision was stated to be that it was the duty of the mother to provide a husband for her daughter and the alienation was made for sheer legal necessity, and that she had power to dispose of her husbands property for religious purposes including dowry to a daughter, and that the extent of the power depends upon the circumstances of each case as held by Lord Gifford.

88. In the case Madhusudan Prasad Singh v. Ramji Das [1020] 6 Pat. L.J. 516 (Sir Dawson Miller, C.J., and Mullick, J.), a verbal gift of cash and grains as monthly allowance to the son-in-law and his sons and heirs by a Hindu father at the time of his daughters marriage was upheld. The father possessed considerable wealth, and the allowance was made with a view to maintain the position of the bridegroom and also the bride. The fathers intention was to benefit the daughter. The contract was held to be legal and enforcible, and not in the nature of a marriage brokerage, though the son-in-law had stated that he would not have married in the family if the allowance had not been promised.

89. The case-law on the subject summarized above fully indicates the inclination of all the High Courts to uphold a gift by a widow of landed property to her daughter or son-in-law on the occasion of the marriage or any ceremonies connected with the marriage and that the promise made may be fulfilled afterwards; and it is not essential to make a gift at the time of the marriage, but that it may be made afterwards, upon the ground that the gift, when made, fulfills the moral and religious obligation of giving a portion of the property for the benefit of the daughter and the son-in-law. The only limitation placed upon this power of making a gift is that it should bear a reasonable proportion to the entire property of the deceased father and that it should he justifiable in the circumstances of the case in terms of the principle laid down in Cossinaut Bysack v. Hurrosoondry Dossee [1820] MD 198.

90. Now, gifts of a small portion of the deceased are permissible by a widow even if it is not for the performance of the strictly religious duties such as are expressly enjoined by the Sastras, provided the gifts are made upon the occasions which are conducive to the spiritual welfare of the deceased: vide Vuppuluri Tatayya v. Garimilla Ramakrishnamma [1911] 34 Mad. 288; Narainbali Kunwari v. Ramdhari Singh [1916] Pat. L.J. 81 and Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser [1916] 43 Cal. 574.

91. In Gopaljj Sah v. Manbirti Kuer [1919] P.H.C.C. 396, the gift by a widow of a house on the occasion of her husbands anniversary saraddha ceremony was upheld upon the ground that it was conducive to her husbands spiritual benefit, and that it was not excessive.

92. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, in the case of Sardar Singh v. Kunj Behari Lal AIR 1922 P.C. 261, upheld the gift of a small portion of the estate inherited by the widow for the observance of bhog or food offerings to the deity of Puri and the maintenance of the priest. In that case their Lordships observed that the lady had of course sufficient income to provide for the observances without any alienation of the part of the estate. The alienation was, however held to be valid upon the ground that the property given formed only a small portion of the whole estate and the gift was for the continuous spiritual benefit of the deceased, though not for an observance essential to the salvation according to the Hindu religious law. It was pointed out that there were two sets of religious acts; one essential for the performance of obsequial rites and other pious observances which conduced to the bliss of the deceased soul. In the case of the former if the income is not sufficient to cover the expenses she is entitled to sell the whole of the property. In the other case she can alienate a small portion for the pious or charitable purposes she may have in view. It depends upon the circumstances of each case what is reasonable.

93. These decisions are based upon the texts already referred to that the widow takes the estate for the performance of religious duties and acts conducive to the welfare of her and her lord by "pious liberality." I need not quote the texts in extenso again. The words "pious liberality" imply acts conducive to the spiritual benefit of her husband and herself, such as, performing sraddhas, digging wells, and giving presents, all requiring for the accomplishments pecuniary aid.

94. It has already been shown by reference to the texts and authorities that the marriage of the daughter and the gift made to the daughter and the son-in-law are acts which confer spiritual benefit upon the husband of the widow and such gifts are enjoined to be made on account of the unmarried daughters having share in the estate as her nuptial portion to be given to her in the shape of dowry and for meeting the marriage expenses.

95. No prohibition anywhere in the texts or in the authorities against a gift of immovable property by the widow on the occasion of her girls marriage or in connexion with any of the marriage ceremonies has been pointed out.

96. Therefore, the gift of the landed property in question in the present case by Mt. Jainti Kumari to Gobind Das, the defendant, is not in any way prohibited by the texts or the authorities. The gift in question has not been challenged as being in any way excessive. On the other hand, it has been shown that the property is only worth Rs. 50,000, whereas the deceased father of the girl had left behind property of very considerable value yielding an income of over a lakh of rupees from the landed property, the promissory notes and the money-lending business. The property gifted bears but a very small fraction of not more than one-fortieth of the entire estate. Chhotah Bibi was the only child of the deceased and would have succeeded to the estate in case she had survived her mother. The girls of the family of the brothers of the deceased were married at considerable expense, whereas the marriage of the girl in this case was performed at a very moderate expense and the property gifted, including the actual expense incurred otherwise at the marriage, does not in value exceed the amount spent in the marriage of the daughters of the family. The gift was, therefore, not unreasonable. It was in no sense a waste or apahara of the property inherited by the widow who by her good management and economy augmented the income of the estate and added to the corpus thereof. She has in terms of the texts used the property with moderation and without any waste and left it in a sounder and more substantial condition than what she inherited from her husband, in order to be taken by the reversioners, the plaintiffs in the present case. They have no reason for any complaint. They would certainly have no grievance if instead of giving the land the lady would have given cash in her possession even much more than the value of the property.

97. I have already disposed of the contention of Mr. Jayaswal that the gift is invalid, inasmuch as the consideration of it was in the nature of marriage brokerage by reason of the promise of the gift having been made prior to and as a condition for the bridegrooms party (father and uncle) consenting to marry the girl in question. The texts make such a gift unrevocable. Narada has gone so far as to make a womans sulka, that is, the fee given to the relations of a damsel for bringing about the marriage as unresumable or unrevocable. Manu, while forbidding the acceptance of a gift by the father of a girl by way of sulka from the bridegroom in verses 51 and 53 of Chapter III condones it in verse 54 if the bridegrooms father voluntarily and out of affection presents the sulka. Manu does not forbid the giving of presents or dowry by the brides parents and relations to the girl or the bridegroom. On the other hand, nuptial gifts at the bridal procession to the bride and the bridegroom are enjoined. The question in this case does not arise, inasmuch as the gift in the present case was actually made, and the donee has been in possession of the property for the last 26 years ever since the deed of gift was executed. The gift cannot be revoked or cancelled. The lady herself could not recover it upon the ground that the gift was invalid; much less can the plaintiffs, who are reversioners, recover it on that ground.

98. In the result, in agreement with the view of the Court below I dismiss the appeal with costs.

Bucknill, J.

99. (His Lordship set out the facts and dealing with the question of widows having any independent advice proceeded:) It is not imperative that she should have any independent advice if, from the environing circumstances it may safely be assumed that had she had any independent advice her conduct would not have been materially affected thereby vide Mt. Hira Bibi v. Ramadhan Lal AIR 1922 Pat. 70 , Satis Chandra Ghose v. Kalidasi Dasi AIR 1922 Cal. 203 . Now there wag nothing to my mind remarkable in a transaction of this kind. If one accepts any substantial part of the whole story, i.e., that it was with the object of obtaining a suitable husband for her daughter that the widow contemplated and did make this gift, I do not consider that the transaction was of such a character as would have been adversely affected by the advice of a prudent and independent person. As a matter of fact the widows own brother was one of the attesting witnesses to the document and, although it is true that he now has given evidence in favour of the plaintiffs, yet, as is pointed out by the learned District Judge, this brother, at any rate, represented what may be called the widows side of the family. Under these circumstances I do not think that the widow could be said to have suffered from the absence of independent advice even if she did not have such; indeed, I am inclined to think that she did have and take advice which was not improper in any way.

100. As to the question of the validity of the registration it is suggested that, as there was some evidence to show that the bigha or jote land situated in Ulaon was not in the jote possession of the widow at the time when she executed the document, its inclusion in the deed was fraudulent or improper and solely for the purpose of enabling the registration to be effected in the Monghyr and not in the Darbhanga district. But this objection to the registration has I think little or no solid foundation. The record of rights which was published in 1902 (some time after the execution of the deed) shows that the bigha of land was in the zamindari of the widow although it is true that it is not shown as being in her khas possession. There is nothing to indicate that there was any intention on the part of the widow to effect any fraud on the registry or deliberately to do anything of a character which would invalidate the registration. The law as laid down in a number of decisions is quite clear that in circumstances similar to those disclosed in this case, the registration cannot be regarded as invalid unless there is some intention definitely to commit a fraud upon the registry: vide Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri v. Haridasi Debi (1), Mt. Ram Dai v. Ram Chandrabati Debi (7) and Mt. Jasoda Kuer v. Janak Missir (8). (His Lordship then dealt with other issues of fact and proceeded.) Having dealt with this question of fact one now passes to the next issue. This issue is really the main question of importance in this case and is whether Mt. Jainti Kumari had any authority or power to make a valid gift of the property in suit to the defendant; if she had, of course the gift binds the reversioners; if she had not, it does not so bind them.

101. We have been favoured with references to a very large number of ancient texts from the Hindu sages works and with a formidable array of cases bearing more or less upon the subject-matter of this point. I think that it would serve little purpose to attempt to refer to them all: but one may I think, attempt to collate the effect of decided cases (supposed to interpret the Hindu Law) in a series of simple statements.

102. It is, generally, contrary to public policy for a father to be paid money in consideration of giving his son or daughter in marriage and a contract to that effect cannot be enforced in a Court of law (per Farran, C.J. and Tyabji, J., in Dholidas Ishvar v. Fulchand Chagan [1898] 22 Bom. 658, but an agreement to pay money to the parents or guardian of a bride or bridegroom in consideration of their consenting to the betrothal is not necessarily immoral or opposed to public policy. Where the parents of the bride are not seeking her welfare but give her to a husband otherwise ineligible in consideration of a benefit secured to themselves, the agreement, by which such benefit is secured, is opposed to public policy and ought not to be enforced; where an agreement to pay money to the parents or guardian of a bride or bridegroom in consideration of their consenting to the betrothal is, under the circumstances of the case, neither immoral nor opposed to public policy, it will be enforced and damages will also be awarded for breach of it; and semble an agreement to remunerate or reward a third person in consideration of negotiating a marriage is contrary to public policy and cannot be enforced [per Mookerjee, J., in Bakshi Das v. Nadu Das 1905] 1 C.L.J. 261; and where a contract provided that when a marriage has been arranged and performed the parent of either the boy or girl who is a party to the marriage shall pay a certain sum of money the contract is not void ab initio as being opposed to public policy [per Walsh and Ryves, JJ., in Jagadishwar v. Sheo Bakhsh. Rai [1919] 1 U.P.L.R. 119. There is a moral obligation imposed on a Hindu father to make a gift to his daughter on the occasion of her marriage; he may legally for such purpose give her a small portion of ancestral property either at or after the wedding [per Munro and Sankaran Nair, JJ., in Sundararamayya v. C. Sitamma, [1911] 35 Mad. 628: see too In re Subba Naiker [1915] 2 L.W. 754 (per Sankaran Nair and Oldfield, JJ.); the gift must be of a reasonable amount; a Hindu brother, who is the managing member of a joint family, will not be acting in excess of his powers as such, in giving away a reasonable portion of the joint family property to his sisters, who though married in their fathers lifetime, were left, for some reason or other without a marriage portion [per Wallis and Miller, JJ., in Kudutamma v. Narasimha Charyalu [1907] 17 M.L.J. 528.

103. A destitute sonless widow must, however, look for her maintenance primarily to her deceased husbands family and not primarily to her fathers family [per Maclean C.J., Prinsep and Hill, JJ., in Mokhada Dassee v. Nundo Lal Haldar [1901] 28 Cal. 278, but if provision should fail and the widowed daughter has to return to live with her father and brother there is a moral social obligation but not a legally enforceable right by which her maintenance can be claimed as a charge on her fathers estates in the hands of the heirs [per Parsons and Ranade, JJ., in Bai Mangal v. Bai Rukhmini [1899] 3 Bom. 291, and see, also Mokhada Dassee v. Nuddo Lal Haldar [1900] 27 Cal. 555, per Ameer Ali, J. So much for the position as between a Hindu father and his daughters. Next as to the position as between a Hindu father and his son-in-law.

104. It is neither contrary to any tenet of the Hindu law or against public policy for a Hindu father to contract to maintain his son-in-law and such a contract can be enforced. Where a Hindu father who had no son gave his daughter in marriage on the understanding that the bridegroom should be brought up and maintained as a member of his family as also his daughter the bride and any issue, the son-in-law cannot subsequently be turned out without any provision for his and his wifes and issues maintenance and even his separate maintenance can if the Court thinks fit be ordered [per Mookerjee and Teunon, JJ., in Gobinda Rani Dasi v. Radha Ballabh Das [1910] 12 C.L.J. 173, and where a Hindu father agreed to make an allowance to his son-in-law for the latters maintenance, the sons and grandsons of the grantor are liable to discharge the debt out of the ancestral property which devolves on them [per Dawson Miller, C.J., and Mullick, J., in Madhusudan Prasad Singh v. Ramji Das [1020] 6 Pat. L.J. 516.

105. As to the position of a Hindu widow and her daughter. Where a Hindu husband dies intestate and without issue, the widow is entitled to the absolute possession of the property descended from him to enjoy it during her lifetime and to dispose of it under certain restrictions. The extent and limit of her power of disposing of the property are not definable in the abstract but must be left to depend upon the circumstances of the disposition when made and must be consistent with the law regulating such disposition [per East, C.J., in Cossinauth Bysack v. Hurroosoondry Dassee [1820] M D 198 According to the Hindu Law prevailing in Benares (Western School) a widow cannot generally alienate the estate, inherited from her husband, to the prejudice of his heirs which at her death devolves on them [per Sir J.W. Colville in Bhaugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee [1820] MD 198; a Hindu widow in possession of the estate of her deceased husband, who made a gift by deed of immovable property forming about one-seventy-fifth of the whole estate for the observance of bhog (food offerings) to a deity and for the maintenance of the priests was entitled to do so, such a widow is entitled to spend or alienate not only in connexion with the actual obsequies of her deceased husband but also for such rites which are considered as essential for the salvation of the soul of the deceased [per Mr. Ameer Ali in Sardar Singh v. Kunj Behari Lal AIR 1922 P.C. 261; such a widow is also justified in alienating a small portion of the property (which she had inherited) of her father at the time of performing her fathers sradh ceremony and such alienation binds the reversioners [per Benson and Ayyar, JJ., in Vuppuluri Tatayya Verranna v. Garimilla Ramakrishnamma [1911] 34 Mad. 288. A Hindu widow has a larger power of disposition of her deceased husbands estate for religious and charitable purposes or for purposes which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband than what she possesses for purely wordly purposes but each case must be considered on its own merits as to the propriety and legitimacy of the transaction [per Mookerjee and Newbould, JJ., in Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser [1916] 43 Cal. 574 A Hindu widow governed by the Mitakshara Law is competent to make a valid gift of a reasonable portion of the immovable property of her deceased husband to her daughter on the occasion of the daughters gauna (transfer from fathers to husbands house) ceremony and such a gift is binding upon the reversioners [per Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ., in Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu [1910] 37 Cal. 1.

106. The provision of a dowry for a daughter is a matter of legal necessity which would justify the alienation by a Hindu widow of a larger or smaller portion of her husbands property. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what proportion of the property may be alienated, but where the daughter was blind and a cripple and the property was small (Rs. 500 only in value) an alienation of the whole of it in favour of the son-in-law was upheld [per Ryves, J., Bhagwati Shukul v. Ram Jatan Tiwari AIR 1922 All. 381 on appeal AIR 1924 All. 23 , such a gift should consist only of a reasonable and moderate portion of the deceaseds husbands estate [per Scott-Smith and Fforde, JJ., in Jowala Ram and Ors. v. Hari Kishen Singh AIR 1924 Lah. 429

107. Lastly, as to the position as between the widow and the son-in-law. The exact point or at any rate almost precisely the same point occurring in the present appeal was dealt with in the Madras High Court in the case of Ramasami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar [1899] 22 Mad. 113. in that suit the circumstances were that a Hindu man (a Brahman) died in 1895 leaving a widow, a son and a daughter, the son took the whole of the estate of his deceased father but died unmarried and the widow inherited the property. Later on she gave her daughter in marriage and at the time of the marriage made a gift of a portion of the landed property to her son-in-law.

108. The widow then died and the heir brought a suit against her son-in-law to set aside the alienation; it was contended by the reversioner that this Hindu widow holding but a widows limited interest in the estate had no power to make such a gift and that in any case the particular gift was not a justifiable one in the sense that it was an unreasonably large gift. The District Munsif and on appeal the Subordinate Judge held that the gift was quite a reasonable one and also bound the reversioner: the latter appealed. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court (Subramani Ayyar and Moore, JJ.), dismissed the appeal. They agreed with the lower Courts that the gift, having regard to the extent of the whole estate and the other circumstances bearing on the matter, could not be declared unjustifiable.

109. They also held on two grounds that the gift bound the reversioners. One ground was that:

At the time a girl, belonging to the community with which we are concerned in this case, is handed over in marriage, certain other gifts have to be made to the bridegroom of which one is bhudanam or gift of land. That, according to the notions of these people, a gift of that kind on such an occasion is indispensable is clear from what is done even in cases in which the family of the bride is not really in a position to give any land, In such cases conformity to the requirements of custom is sought to be secured by giving some little money as and for land. Nor is it difficult to understand how such a practice came to prevail from time immemorial. For apart from its being in reality a provision for the married couple, the gift is believed to enhance the merit of the primary act, viz., the giving of a virgin in marriage which, from a religious point of view, is supposed to be productive of considerable benefits to the parents of the virgin.

110. This was, I take it, a finding that there was a definite and indispensable custom amongst these Brahmans that a gift of land (or something allegorically representing land) should be made by a brides family to the bridegroom.

111. The learned Judges referred in support of this custom to the well-known work by the Abbe J.A. Dubois entitled.

Description of the character, Manners and customs of the People of India and of Their Institutions Religious and Civil.

112. Father Dubois was a missionary in Mysore and wrote in the 18th century about the people (chiefly Brahmans) with whom in that neighbourhood he was brought into contact. In Chapter 7 describing marriage ceremonies amongst the Brahmans he observes of the father of the bride:

He then takes the hand of his daughter and puts it into that of his son-in-law and pours water over them in honour of the great Vishnu. This is the most solemn of all the ceremonies of the festival, being the symbol of his resigning his daughter to the authority of the young man. She must be accompanied with three gifts, namely, with a present of one or more cows, with some property in land, and finally with a, Salagrama, which consists of some little amulet stones in high esteem among the Brahmans, worn by them, as talisman and dignified even with the homage of sacrifices [P. 111, Society for the Resuscitation at Indian Literature. New edition of English translation, Calcutta, 1905.]

113. The gifts mentioned are said, by the learned Judges, to be gifts to the bride groom and not gifts by the father of the bride to his daughter, and I think the proper reading of this passage from Father Dubois work must bear that construction. Indeed from other passages in the same work the meaning of the extract becomes quite clear. In the Abbes time daughters were valuable and had to be paid for as brides, at the present day it is rather the other way and it is the bridegroom who is the valuable commodity. On p. 108 of the edition which I quote of father Dubois work he writes:

To marry, or to buy a wife, are synonymous terms in this country. Almost every parent makes his daughter an article of traffic, obstinately refusing to give her up to her lawful husband until he has rigorously paid down the sum of money which he was bound for according to the custom of the caste. This practice of purchasing the young women whom they are to marry, is the inexhaustible source of disputes and litigation, particularly amongst the poorer people. These, after the marriage is solemnized, not finding it convenient to pay the stipulated sum, the father-in-law commences an action, or more commonly recalls his daughter home, in the expectation that the desire of getting her back may stimulate the son-in-law to procure the money. This sometimes succeeds, but if the young man is incapable of satisfying the avarice of his father-in-law, he is obliged to leave his wife with him in pledge. Now there is time for reflection, and the father-in-law, finding that the sum cannot be raised, and that his daughter from her youth is exposed to great temptations which might lead to the disgrace of all his family, relaxes a little and takes what the son-in-law is able to pay. A reconciliation is thus effected and the young man takes his wife quietly home.

Men of distinction do not appropriate to their common purposes the money thus acquired by giving their daughters in marriage, but lay it out in jewels, which they present to the lady on the wedding day. These are her private property as long as she lives and on no account can be disposed of by her husband.

114. The above observations refer to that part of the judgment which I have called the first ground upon which the learned Judges of the Madras High Court held that the gift bound the reversioners and as I have stated, it may, I think, be regarded as a ground which refers particularly to customs which existed amongst the Brahmans of whom Father Dubois was writing and amongst the Brahmans who were concerned in the case decided by Ayyar and Moore, JJ. But there was a second ground upon which they founded their judgment and which was of more general application. The learned Judges observed:

The question therefore is: had Thaiyyu Ammal (the widow) authority to make a gift of landed property inherited by her to her son-in-law at the time of her daughters marriage. No direct ruling on the point was cited before us. Reference was, however, made to certain passages in the Mitakshara (Chap. I, Section 7, paragraphs 6-14) and the Smriti Chandrika (Chap, 4, Section 20, etc.), wherein the texts of Manu, Yajnavalkya and other Smriti writers dealing with the question of allotment to be made by brothers to their maiden sisters at the time of partition are commented upon.

With reference to the true meaning of these texts, commentators are divided. Some of them hold that all that the texts mean it that funds required for the marriage of sisters should be provided out of their fathers estate. Other commentators--Vijnaneshwara among them--lay down that, inclusive of their marriage expenses, sisters aw entitled to a provision not exceeding a fourth of what they would have got had they been males. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to discuss which of the two views is to be taken as law. Assuming that, as argued for the appellant, the view advocated by Vijnaneshwara and his followers is not law, the fact that so high an authority as the author of the Mitakshara propounds a rule thus favourable to maiden daughters, ought to make one hesitate to accept as sound the exceedingly limited construction which was insisted on behalf of the appellant and which can scarcely be in itself very reasonable; viz., that the texts justify a disbursement out of the estate of only the price of things required in connexion with the celebration of the marriage. In my opinion the better and sounder view is, as contended for, the respondents, that the authorities should be understood to empower a qualified owner like Thaiyyu Ammal to do all acts proper and incidental to the marriage of a female according to the general practice of the community to which she belongs.

115. This very important decision has been followed in the Madras High Court in the case of T.R. Sundaram Aiyar v. Krishnasami Aiyar [1915] 28 I.C. 992 (per Ayling and Tyabji JJ.), where it was unequivocally held that a gift of family property to a son in-law is not necessarily invalid: it has also been followed in the case of Bhagwati Shukul v. Ram Jatan Tewari AIR 1922 All. 381 on appeal AIR 1924 All. 23 , per Ryves, J., and on appeal per Mears, C.J., and Stuart, J. AIR 1924 All. 23 , in which case it was held that a sonless widow was justified in alienating in favour of her son-in-law the whole of the property which she inherited from her husband; the property was of small value (Rs. 500 only) and the widows daughter was a blind cripple; the gift was in order to promote the marriage and was held to be a matter of necessity and therefore to bind the reversioner. In this case the Madras case was cited with approval; the Madras case has also been quoted and referred to (apparently with approval) in several cases, e.g., by Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ., in Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu [1910] 37 Cal. 1; by Dawson-Miller, C.J., and Mullick J., in Madhusudan Prasad Singh v. Ramji Das [1020] 6 Pat. L.J. 516; by Mears, C.J., and Stuart, J., in Bhagwati Shukul v. Ram Jitan Tiwari AIR 1924 All. 23 , and by Scott Smith and Fforde, JJ., in Jowala Ram v. Hari kishen Singh AIR 1924 Lah. 429; see too Abhesang Tirabhai Vs. Raisang Fatesang, , per Batchelor and Heaton, JJ. In that case a widow alienated all her inherited husbands property in favour of her son-in-law shortly after his marriage he undertaking to support her; the transaction was upheld and declared to bind the reversioners, some of whom had acquiesced in what was viewed by the Court as a very proper "family arrangement."

116. Now if the decision given in the Madras case to which I have just referred at length is correct there can be no doubt that in the present appeal the gift by Mt. Jainti Kumari to the defendant must be regarded as valid. No objection could possibly be taken in this case to the value of the gift because it is common ground that it only formed a very small portion of the property in which the widow held her limited interest. The learned District Judge has pointed out in referring to the case decided in the Madras High Court that the fact that a gift of land to a bridegroom from the brides family was regarded as an indispensable part of the nupt 1 ceremonies of Brahmins is of the strongest possible effect as indicating that such a custom could not have grown up or would not have been tolerated had it been in any way inconsistent with the Sastras and early Hindu Law. He therefore came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs suit must fail. But in this Court the learned Counsel who has appeared for the appellant has strenuously argued that the decision of the Judges of the Madras High Court, if not actually incorrect, is incapable of being applied to persons who do not belong to a caste in which there exists no custom such as that stated to exist amongst Brahmins who were the parties in the Madras suit. It certainly cannot be said that in the present case any custom of giving landed property to a bridegroom by the family of the bride on the occasion of a wedding was satisfactorily proved to exist amongst the Agarwallas to which caste the parties here belong; on the other hand there certainly was some evidence amongst this community that presents are as a rule made to the bridegroom and are accepted without demur. But the Madras case was not decided only on the ground of caste custom.

117. An endeavour has been made to show that there are some texts in some commentaries which indicate that a gift such as that which was made by the widow in the present case is invalid according to Hindu Law. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother upon this somewhat intricate question and I agree entirely with the views which he has expressed thereon. I may, however, say that so far as I myself was able to form any opinion at all satisfactory to my own judgment, I thought that it could, at any rate, be stated with confidence that no authoritative texts had been placed before us which forbade or declared illegal a gift such as that made by the widow in this case.

118. In my view, therefore, the decision of the learned District Judge was correct and this appeal must be dismissed.