Varma, JJ.This is an appeal on behalf of the plaintiffs who filed a suit challenging a sale of property in execution of an award made by the Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies of the Gaya Circle, against the appellant Sheosaran Singh on 13th March 1930. It appears that MuralL dhar, father of Sheosaran, borrowed a sum of Rs. 500 from the society. Muralidhar died on 25th February 1925, and on that date a sum of Rs. 213 was found due to the society. It appears, on 27th August 1925, Sheosaran paid Rs. 25 to the society, Rs. 4-6-0 as principal and Rs. 20-10-0 as interest. It appears that Sheosaran was entitled to Rs. 12-8-0 as dividend of shares purchased by Muralidhar on 20th July 1927. On 2nd September 1929 reference was made to the Assistant Registrar for an award and the award was given on 13th March 1930. Execution under the award commenced in the Civil Court on 22nd July 1931.

2. On 25th July 1932, the joint family properties were sold. It is alleged that on 18th November 1932 Sheosaran and his family separated and Sheosaran got a small share of the family property. The present suit was filed on 6th April 1935, and was dismissed on 28th March 1936. Against that an appeal was filed before the lower Appellate Court, which was filed after the period of limitation but time was extended u/s 5, Limitation Act. It was ultimately dismissed on 11th December 1936.

3. The lower Appellate Court has found in concurrence with the findings of the learned Munsif that there was no fraud in obtaining the award. It held further that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit questioning the award of the Assistant Registrar. On the question whether plaintiffs 2 to 5 were bound by the award the Court came to the conclusion that they were bound, holding that the ancestral property in the hands of the plaintiffs is liable to be attached and sold in execution of the award. It held further that the sale affected the 4 annas of tauzi No. 10334 and 2 annas 13 dams odd of tauzi No. 5902 and that the whole of this property passed on the sale. The Court held further that the purchaser was not bound by the result of the partition suit. On the question of res judicata, it was held that the plaintiffs were not barred by the principles of res judicata; and so far as the last point, whether the suit was barred under Order 22, Rule 92, Civil P.C., the lower Court was of opinion that Sheosaran was not entitled to challenge the sale in a separate suit.

4. Mr. Khurshaid Husnain, followed by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, on behalf of the appellants, urged the following points; that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to pass the award because there was no dispute and because he had no jurisdiction over Sheosaran Singh. His line of argument is that as the debt was time-barred, there was no dispute to be referred to the Registrar and that as it was Muralidhar and not Sheosaran who was the member of the society, the dispute was not one as contemplated by the Co-operative Societies Act. Now, it has been held that the Registrar, Co-operative Societies is acting as a Court and he had jurisdiction to decide whether a dispute before him was time-barred or not. Once he has decided that rightly or wrongly, it cannot be said that he acted without jurisdiction. Mr. Mahabir Prasad deals with the question of limitation in another way and urges that no question of limitation arises.

5. He says that the sum of Rs. 500 was borrowed on 5th July 1923, and the monthly instalments were of Rs. 23. There, fore he urges that before July 1925, no suit could be instituted, and the contract did not show that on failure of payment of one instalment, the whole amount could be sued for. The last payment was on 2nd December 1924, and Muralidhar died on 25th February 1925. Therefore he urges that on this date, i.e. at the date of Muralidhars death, there was no cause of action and therefore six years limitation would apply. There is a good deal of force in this argument. But we are faced with the provisions of Section 63, Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act (Bihar and Orissa Act 6 of 1935), which says that

notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the period of limitation for debt including interest due to a registered society by a member thereof shall be computed from the date on which member dies or ceases to be a member of the society.

6. It is not necessary for me to give a definite opinion on this point in view of the line of reasoning followed by the Court below which I accept. So this point of Mr. Khurshaid Husnain fails. The next point that has been urged is that even assuming that the award could be passed, it was only in a representative capacity as an heir of Muralidhar and therefore the interest of Bheosaran could not be sold, or, in any case, the interest of Sheosarans son could not be sold. So far as these two points are concerned, they go together. From the award it is clear that the award is not against Sheosaran personally, but as against; him as representing the estate of his father, and the debt in respect of which the award has been granted was a debt of the father. Sections 52 and 53, Civil P.C., lay down that where a decree is passed against a party as the legal representative of a deceased person, and the decree is for the payment of money out of the property of the deceased, it may be executed by the attachment and sale of any such property, and for this purpose,

property in the hands of a son or other descendant which is liable under Hindu law for payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor, in respect of which a decree has been passed, shall be deemed to be property of the deceased which has come to the hands of the son or other descendant as his legal representative.

7. It therefore follows that the ancestral property in the hands of Sheosaran Singh and his sons is liable to be attached and sold in execution of the award. In support of this I rely upon the case reported in Nanoni Babuasin v. Modhun Mohun (1886) 13 Cal. 21 where their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held

if the fact be that the purchaser has bargained and paid for the entirety, he may clearly defend his title to it upon any ground which would have justified a sale if the sons had been brought in to oppose the execution proceedings.

8. Mr. Mahabir Prasad relying upon this case has referred to the fact that the purchaser is now in possession of the property. In the result the story of fraud having failed, the Registrar not having acted without jurisdiction in giving the award, and the ancestral property in the hands of the plaintiffs being liable to be attached, all the points urged on behalf of the appellants fail.

9. I would therefore uphold the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.

Fazl Ali J.

I agree.